Harm and enhancement : philosophical and ethical perspectives by Hall, Susan
  
 
 
HARM AND ENHANCEMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL AND 
ETHICAL PERSPCECTIVES  
 
 
Susan Hall 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts and 
Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Promoter: Professor Anton A. van Niekerk 
Department of Philosophy 
 
December 2012 
  
DECLARATION 
 
By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained 
therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent 
explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch 
University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety 
or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification. 
 
 
 
December 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2012 Stellenbosch University 
All rights reserved 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 ABSTRACT 
 
 
The distinction between treatment and enhancement is often considered to be a morally 
significant boundary, which, at the very least, marks the limits of our moral obligations.  This 
conviction holds despite the fact that treatment and enhancement are situated along a 
continuum of interventions that are directed towards the improvement of human functioning.  
The distinction between these two sorts of interventions is based upon a notion of normative 
normality, which suggests that we are morally obligated to provide interventions which are 
directed toward the achievement of normal functioning, but that no obligation exists to 
improve functioning beyond this point.  This dissertation will subject this position to critique 
by examining the constitution of normal functioning, and by suggesting that this kind of 
functioning cannot operate as a normative standard which determines the limits of our moral 
obligations.  The moral desirability which we attribute to the achievement of normal 
functioning is based upon the independent ethical imperative to promote the possibilities for 
well-being of moral agents.  This motivation, however, equally suggests that we will be 
obligated to provide certain kinds of enhancement interventions which will be likely to 
promote the welfare interests of moral agents, when these become available.  This argument 
also implies that the development of enhancement technologies will require us to rethink our 
ethical conception of harmful non-benefits.  We currently think of the non-provision of 
medical treatment and some environmental enhancements, such as education, as harmful to 
the extent that state intervention is justified to rectify this.  We recognise that such non-
provision, and the resultant failure to promote the welfare interests of moral agents, where 
such promotion is possible, harms persons by putting them in a worse position than they could 
have been in, with regards to their chances of leading a good life.  The new technological 
possibilities offered by the prospect of genetic enhancement mean that we might soon have a 
better alternative, in terms of our chances of leading a good life, to the level of functioning 
that we have thus far been able to achieve.  This implies that the non-provision of these 
enhancements would be harmful to the extent that intervention to bring about this provision 
would be justified.   
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 OPSOMMING 
 
Die onderskeid tussen behandeling (“treatment”) en verbetering (“enhancement”) word 
dikwels geag „n skeiding daar te stel wat van morele belang is, in soverre dit ten minste, die 
perke van ons morele verpligtinge afbaken. Hierdie oortuiging geld ten spyte van die feit dat 
behandeling en verbetering op „n kontinuum van ingrype wat op die verbetering van menslike 
funksionering gerig is, geleë is. Die onderskeid tussen hierdie twee tipes ingrype is gebaseer 
op „n bepaalde begrip van normatiewe normaliteit, wat suggereer dat ons moreel verplig is om 
ingrype te voorsien wat daarop gerig is om normale funksionering te bewerkstellig, maar dat 
geen sodanige verpligting bestaan om funksionering duskant hierdie punt te verbeter nie. 
Hierdie proefskrif sal laasgenoemde posisie aan kritiek onderwerp deur die manier waarop 
ons normale funksionering verstaan, te ondersoek, en deur aan die hand te doen dat hierdie 
tipe funksionering nie as normatiewe standaard wat die perke van ons morele verpligtinge  
bepaal, kan dien nie. Die morele gewenstheid wat ons toeskryf daaraan om normale 
funksionering mee te bring, is op die onafhanklike etiese imperatief om die moontlikhede vir 
welstand van morele agente te bevorder, gebaseer. Hierdie motivering doen egter eweseer  
aan die hand dat ons verplig sal wees om sekere tipes verbeteringsingrype te verskaf wat 
waarskynlik die welsynbelange van morele agente sal bevorder, wanneer sulke 
verbeteringsingrype beskikbaar word. Hierdie argument impliseer ook dat die ontwikkeling 
van verbeteringstegnologieë van ons sal vereis om ons etiese konsepsie van skadelike nie-
voordele opnuut te deurdink. Tans dink ons dat die nie-voorsiening van mediese behandeling, 
sowel as sommige omgewingsverbeterings soos opvoeding, tot so „n mate skadelik is dat 
staatsinmenging met die doel om dit reg te stel, geregverdig is. Ons erken dat sulke nie-
voorsiening en die gevolglike versuim om die welsynsbelange van morele agente te bevorder, 
waar sulke bevordering moontlik is, mense skade berokken deur hulle in „n slegter posisie te 
plaas as waarin hul kon gewees het, ten aansien van hul kanse om „n goeie lewe te leef. Die 
nuwe tegnologiese moontlikhede wat die voortuitsig van genetiese verbetering ons bied, 
beteken dat ons binnekort „n beter alternatief mag hê vir die vlak van funksionering wat ons 
tot dusver kon bewerkstellig, ooreenkomstig ons kanse om „n goeie lewe te leef. Dit impliseer 
dat die nie-voorsiening van hierdie verbeterings skadelik sal wees tot die mate wat ingrype 
om hierdie voorsiening teweeg te bring, geregverdig sal wees. 
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1  Introduction 
 
The possibility of the development and use of technologies which could alter the constitution 
of the human genome is a topic which has, in recent decades, received a great deal of attention 
in the field of biomedical ethics.  In particular, the ethical status of any future use of genetic 
enhancement technologies in humans is a contentious issue.  Genetic enhancement 
technologies are “any technolog[ies] that directly alter the expression of genes that are already 
present in humans, or that involve the addition of genes that have not previously appeared 
within the human population...for the purpose of human physical, intellectual, psychological, 
or moral improvement” (Baylis & Robert 2004: 3).  Many people instinctively feel uneasy 
about the potential application of these interventions (Davis 2009: 148).  However, it is not 
always easy to precisely express the reasons for this ethical discomfort. 
 
My focus in this dissertation will be the ethical status of genetic enhancement in humans.  In 
particular, I would like to subject arguments against enhancement to critique by calling into 
question ethical distinctions which are often made between genetic enhancement and other 
practices with which it seems to have a great deal in common, but which are themselves 
regarded to be morally desirable, or even morally obligatory practices.  My purpose will be to 
show that, if the differences between genetic enhancement and these practices are ethically 
irrelevant, genetic enhancement, contrary to a great deal of critical opinion and public feeling, 
may not only be morally acceptable, but morally obligatory.  
 
Before continuing to lay out the broad problem that I wish to address, however, it is necessary 
to provide a motivation for the importance of this study, particularly at a stage when such 
genetic technologies are not yet practically viable. 
 
Why it matters: the importance of a study of the ethical status of genetic enhancement  
 
As previously stated, the question of the ethical status of genetic enhancement in humans has 
received a fair amount of attention in bioethical debate.  However, the question may be posed 
as to why this topic is so contentious if the practices which it considers – interventions which 
will alter the genetic makeup of the human person, and particularly, genetically enhance the 
human person – are not yet, and may not for the foreseeable future be, technically feasible. An 
initial objection, therefore, to the project which I wish to embark upon in this dissertation, is 
that it is pointless to argue about a technology that is “foreseen but not yet accomplished” 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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(Billings, Hubbard & Newman 1999: 1873).  It is therefore necessary to make some 
preliminary remarks as to why the ethical status of genetic enhancement is, indeed, a topic 
which merits attention.   
 
I would like to contend that it is not only important to embark upon an ethical debate about 
the ethical status of genetic enhancement although enhancement technologies are not yet 
possible, but that it is crucial to get to grips with the ethical problems posed by such 
technologies before they become a practical reality.  The issues evoked by the possibility of 
genetic interventions are profound, and pose new challenges to the discipline of bioethics, as 
well as to our current conceptions of human nature and self-creation.  The difficulty of 
negotiating these unfamiliar ethical waters is described by Sandel as follows: “When science 
moves faster than understanding, as it does today, men and women struggle to articulate their 
unease”.  He contends in this regard that “the genomic revolution has induced a kind of moral 
vertigo” (2004: 51).  If we do not wish to find ourselves incapacitated by this “vertigo”, and 
therefore unprepared for the dilemmas posed by the successful development of enhancement 
technologies, it is essential that we grapple with these dilemmas now
1
.   
 
In addition, and as Gardner points out (1995: 69), if there is something ethically objectionable 
about enhancement technologies, the best chance we have of prohibiting the use of such 
technologies in practical terms is to prevent any further steps being taken to research genetic 
enhancement in humans.  In order to make this decision, and to facilitate a practical ban on 
such research if we should determine that genetic enhancement is unethical, research into the 
ethical status of genetic enhancement is necessary. 
 
However, there is a further objection to be countered.  One could contend that the genetic 
interventions which I wish to consider are unlikely to ever become practical possibilities, and 
belong in the realm of science fiction
2
.  I would like to suggest that such a proposal is 
foolhardy.  The reality is that genetic enhancement technologies have entered the scientific 
imagination, are currently being researched (even if this research is in its infancy), and, 
although many of the individual envisaged technologies will fail, eventually, bearing in mind 
the rapid advancements in medical science which we have witnessed during the last century 
(Fukuyama 2002: 79), some will reach a stage where they can be safely used (Mehlman 2003: 
                                                 
1
 This point is echoed by, among others, Allhoff (2005: 42), Kass (2003: 10), Mehlman (2003: 10, 2005: 81), and 
Tsien (cited in Weiss 1999: A1). 
2
 See for example Daniels (2009: 42). 
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3).  Baylis and Robert express this view
3
 as follows: “[D]espite the likely failure of particular 
genetic enhancements, there are some of us who will inevitably attempt to engineer the human 
genome for the purpose of improving Homo Sapiens.  And...some will succeed” (2004: 3)4.   
 
However, even if we allow for the possibility that genetic enhancement in humans will never 
become a practical reality, we can still see the sense in making allowance for the possibility 
that it could, and considering the moral dilemmas that this possibility may hold.  Agar makes 
this point as follows: 
 
It is better to have principles covering situations that turn out to be impossible than to have no 
principles for situations in which we suddenly find ourselves...We need principles for situations that 
may never eventuate, but whose possibility cannot be ruled out given our current state of knowledge 
(2004: 34).   
 
However, the objection which suggests that genetic enhancement will remain forever within 
the realm of science fiction does contain a kernel of truth.  Popular opinion, and sometimes 
bioethical argumentation, often imagines possibilities for genetic enhancement that are 
probably, based on our current knowledge of how genes work, beyond its scope.  This not 
only confuses the issue, but evokes horrifying scenarios that prejudice, particularly, the 
general public against genetic enhancement. It will be necessary, therefore, to provide some 
idea of the possible prospects of genetic enhancement, based on scientific fact, early in this 
dissertation. 
 
Stating the problem: if better is good, does resisting enhancement amount to harm? 
 
The supposition that genetic enhancement is morally problematic relies upon a conviction that 
there is some morally significant distinction between genetic enhancement and other practices 
with which it appears to have a great deal in common.  These latter practices are not only 
regarded to be morally inoffensive, but are also considered to be moral goods, the non-
provision of which can be harmful.   
 
                                                 
3
 For a fuller discussion of Baylis and Robert‟s argument that the development of genetic enhancement 
technologies is inevitable, see their 2004: 17-25.   
4
 Buchanan strengthens this point by arguing that policy makers would be highly unlikely to ban enhancement 
technologies, should they become a reality, because some enhancements would probably offer “significant gains 
in productivity”.  If this is true, it follows that it is not only the technical possibility of genetic enhancement 
technologies that is inevitable, but also the use of (at least some) enhancements, and it is therefore even more 
important that we should focus on the “ethically responsible” use of enhancement technologies (2008: 16).  
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The distinction which I want to focus upon in this dissertation is the distinction between the 
practice of medicine and the provision of enhancement technologies, which I will refer to as 
the treatment-enhancement distinction.  (I will also consider, to a lesser extent, the distinction 
between environmental and technological means of enhancement).  The broad question which 
I wish to answer in this dissertation is as follows: if it can be shown that the differences 
between genetic enhancement on the one hand, and medical therapy and environmental 
enhancement on the other, are not ethically relevant, it becomes likely that genetic 
enhancement may not only be ethically permissible, but also ethically desirable or obligatory.  
In this case, if genetic enhancement technologies become readily available, it would be a 
moral mistake to refrain from making use of them. Can it be shown, then, that to resist 
enhancement is harmful? 
 
This question arises out of the fact that human enhancement, in its broadest application, 
implies simply the improvement and betterment of human beings.   To enhance, when used in 
reference to capacities or characteristics, is “[t]o raise in degree, heighten [or] intensify” 
(Burchfield 1989), and “especially to increase or improve in value, quality [or] desirability” 
(Gay 1984).  The improvement or increase of capacities such as intelligence, physical 
prowess, or memory, for example, via education or exercise, is generally regarded to be 
something that is beneficial and desirable, and is endorsed rather than rejected (Parens 1998b: 
viii).  In other words, “[t]o enhance is to make better, so how could anyone object to 
enhancing anything, especially our own, notoriously flawed selves?” (Buchanan 2008: 1).   
 
It seems that both therapy and enhancement are directed towards this sort of improvement of 
human beings, as both interventions seek to improve human functionality, broadly construed.  
In the case of therapy, this improvement of human functioning is achieved via the correction 
of defects and the eradication or reduction of propensities to particular diseases (Satava 2003: 
249), in order to lessen the limits which these conditions place upon the level of human 
functioning.  In other words, the primary goal of therapy is to cure, eradicate, or correct 
disorders or diseases, where disease is defined as “a [negative] departure from species-typical 
normal functioning” (Holtug 1999: 137).  Enhancement, on the other hand, is directed 
towards the improvement of human functionality via the manipulation of an individual‟s 
normal genetic constitution, by, for example, increasing abilities and capacities such as 
intelligence or physical strength (Fenton 2008: 5, Gordon 1999: 2023). In other words, 
enhancement aims at supplying or improving specific non-disease characteristics that are 
valued (Anderson 1989: 682).  Both therapy and enhancement, then, are directed towards the 
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improvement of human functioning.  In one case, this is realised by the correction of 
capacities that are damaged by the presence of disorder or disease, and the restoration or 
achievement of normal functioning, and in the other, by reaching beyond the capacities that 
are usual for a human to have.  In the former case, this improvement of functioning is seen as 
ethically praiseworthy, but in the latter case, it is regarded to be morally problematic, or, at 
best, morally permissible but not desirable or obligatory.  Are the differences between these 
two practices morally relevant in a way which would justify this ethical distinction?   
 
To identify the factor which distinguishes therapy from enhancement, we can imagine the 
range of human characteristics as being represented on a sliding scale
5
.  At the bottom of this 
scale would be death or non-existence, where functioning is absent altogether, and where the 
range of human possibilities is therefore nil.  Above this zero point, we could place varying 
levels of impairment, moving up the scale as impairment lessens in degree, from extremely 
severe impairment where functioning is entirely curtailed at the bottom of the scale, to minor 
or trivial impairment just below the minimum level of species-typical functioning.  
Interventions which bring about an upwards movement in human functioning in an individual 
person towards the point of normal, or species-typical functioning, are regarded as 
therapeutic.  Any practice which increases capacities or improves functioning beyond the 
range of normal functioning is, on the other hand, enhancing.   
 
It is therefore clear that what distinguishes therapeutic from enhancing interventions is the 
effect of interventions relative to the range of normal species-typical functioning.  The 
distinction which is made between morally obligatory therapy and morally contentious or 
optional enhancement seems to be based on the supposition that an improvement of capacities 
beyond the level of species-typical functioning is regarded as somehow illegitimate, or at the 
very least non-obligatory, whereas a movement from a point of sub-normal functioning 
towards normal functioning is not only considered to be legitimate, but also ethically 
desirable.  
 
The argument in support of the ethical desirability of therapy is based upon the assumption 
that the effect of medical treatment promotes the interests of the affected moral agent in such 
a way that its non-provision is significantly harmful (Harris 2000: 97-98).  However, I want to 
suggest that closer interrogation of the moral motivations for treatment (and for 
                                                 
5
 Sober suggests that “from the point of biology, it makes sense to think of disease, health, and enhanced 
function as all falling on a single continuum” (2000: 353).  
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environmental enhancements) may reveal that very similar types of harms would result from a 
failure to intervene in an individual‟s genetic makeup in order to enhance it through positive 
genetic engineering.  If a failure to make use of genetic enhancement brings about significant 
harms, this would suggest that genetic enhancement ought to be actively pursued as a moral 
good. 
 
Erik Parens asks us to consider whether, in the context of the debate around genetic 
enhancement, “better [is] always good” (1998a: S2).  I would like to suggest that if it can be 
convincingly demonstrated that better is always good in the context of human functioning, 
this good ought to be actively pursued, and - to take this argument one step further - to fail to 
pursue this good would actually amount to the infliction of harm.  This supposition runs 
contrary to the current objections to genetic enhancement, and goes a step further than the 
vast majority of the current arguments in favour of the moral permissibility of genetic 
enhancement.   
 
However, there are further objections to genetic enhancement, prevalent in the literature, 
which do not focus on the inherent features of genetic enhancement itself (in terms of its 
tendency to exceed normal functioning), but rather upon likely undesirable social 
consequences, which, it is suggested, would follow from the widespread use of genetic 
enhancement
6
.  These objections must also be dealt with, and, if they are found to be 
persuasive, safeguards or guidelines must be suggested which would protect against such 
negative consequences.  I would like to suggest that it is possible to imagine circumstances 
under which these objections could be nullified, and therefore, under which genetic 
enhancement could and should be actively pursued as a moral good.   
 
In order to put forward the argument which I have outlined above, it is necessary to firstly 
establish the scientific facts of the matter.  These facts include the manner in which genes 
influence human traits, the current state of research into genetic technologies which seek to 
manipulate these traits, and the limits which the former facts place on the latter endeavours.  
A study of the relevant literature about the state of scientific research into genetic 
enhancement, to the extent that this is accessible, and the limits that such research will likely 
be subject to, based on the nature of genes, will therefore be the focus of Chapter 2. 
 
                                                 
6
 See for examples Anderson (1989), Kamm (2005) and Parens (1998a).  
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Secondly, in order to advance my own argument in favour of the moral desirability of genetic 
enhancement, it is necessary to provide a detailed summary of the current bioethical 
arguments around this topic.  Chapter 3 will therefore provide an overall review of the body 
of literature which considers these questions. 
  
In Chapter 4, I will turn to the main body of my argument in favour of a moral obligation to 
enhance.  Firstly, I will describe at some length the conceptual basis of the treatment-
enhancement distinction, before subjecting this distinction to critique.  I will argue that the 
underlying moral motivations for medical treatment (and for environmental enhancement) 
suggest that enhancement, too, may be a moral obligation.  I will then go on to suggest, via an 
analysis of the notion of harm, that a failure to enhance could be harmful. 
 
In Chapter 5, I will further define the concept of morally obligatory enhancements, in order to 
show that this category will exclude some sorts of “enhancing” interventions which will 
remain ethically problematic.  I will then attempt to provide some idea of how we ought to 
rate the moral obligation to enhance in comparison to our other moral obligations, and will try 
to suggest some ways in which we could guard against the negative consequences which 
could result from the (widespread) use of enhancement technologies.  Lastly, I will make 
some remarks about who will be responsible for providing enhancement interventions to 
particular individuals, taking into account the notion of special relationships. 
 
In Chapter 6, I will conclude my discussion by pointing out some of the wider implications of 
the argument which I present.  I will also identify some of the limits of my study which invite 
and provide scope for further investigation.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 8 
 
2  The Nature of Genetic Functioning  
 
Genetic enhancement and science (fiction) 
 
Any bioethical interrogation of a new medical technology demands a basic understanding of 
the pertinent scientific facts.  In the case of genetic enhancement, the attainment of such an 
understanding is complicated by the fact that this is currently a speculative technology, and 
while some practical experimentation has already been carried out on animals, genetic 
enhancement in humans is not yet a practical possibility.  An investigation into what is likely 
to be achieved by genetic enhancement, and genetic engineering in general, is therefore 
currently a partially imaginative exercise. 
  
However, it is essential that we do not let our imaginations run away with us.  This is a 
tempting possibility.  The idea that we will one day be capable of altering or manipulating our 
genetic makeup - thereby attaining a greater, and indeed a fundamental, level of control over 
what makes us who we are - has captured the popular imagination.  Myriad science fiction 
texts and Hollywood blockbusters have taken this idea and run with it.  The portrayals of 
genetic enhancement in popular culture range from the sublime
7
 to the ridiculous
8
.  Almost as 
a matter of principle, these images of genetic enhancement evoke a world gone awry as a 
result of the practice of this technology.  Genetic enhancement, it seems, is almost invariably 
represented as having sinister consequences, and is often portrayed as having a fundamentally 
transformative effect on the world of social interaction as we know it, whether in the form of 
a world characterised by discrimination, as in the film Gattaca (1997); a world in which the 
human goods that we currently value have been destroyed or replaced, as in Aldous Huxley‟s 
Brave New World (1932); or by almost complete obliteration of humanity itself, for example 
in Margaret Atwood‟s Oryx and Crake (2003) and The Year of the Flood (2009).    
 
                                                 
7
 In Sharon Shinn‟s science fiction romance, Archangel, an elite group within the human population, known as 
“angels”, have been genetically engineered to endow them with certain “supernatural” powers – they have large 
wings which enable them to fly and heated blood which allows them to withstand adverse weather conditions.  
These genetically engineered beings commune with their “god” Jovah (which is in fact, a spaceship orbiting the 
earth) once a year when they sing the “Gloria” that ensures peace and harmony on earth for the following year 
(1996).  
8
 Greg Bear‟s foundational science fiction text, Blood Music, describes a world in which an experiment by a 
rogue scientist to create intelligent genes, which he injects into his own body, results, firstly, in radical 
enhancement of the individual.  Ultimately, however, the intelligent cells take over individual human bodies, and 
dissolve them, until the entire world is transformed into a mass of organic matter, and individual humanity is 
obliterated.  Not only do the genes take over the world, and eventually the universe, but the scientist who triggers 
the apocalypse blames the genes themselves – “„They made me do it! The goddamn genes!‟” (1985: 66). 
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Of course, these images do not arise in isolation.  Rather, they are emblematic of a general 
discomfort with the idea of genetic enhancement, or genetic engineering as a whole, which is 
itself associated with a greater uneasiness with the idea of interfering with nature by 
technological means (Sandel 2007: 6).  These negative representations of genetic 
enhancement can in turn serve to reinforce such negative attitudes towards genetic 
enhancement – a negative portrayal of science in fiction can contribute towards a negative 
attitude towards science in reality
9
.        
 
Negative attitudes towards genetic enhancement are doubly problematic in this context, 
because images of genetic enhancement, both in the popular imagination and in popular 
culture, are often based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of genetics, and 
therefore upon a misrepresentation of the probable nature and scope of future genetic 
enhancements.  These misrepresentations can lead to an outright, and often unreasonable, 
moral rejection of genetic enhancement technologies
10.  As Agar suggests, “Hollywood gives 
bad moral advice about enhancement technologies precisely because it gets the facts about 
them wrong” (2004: 21).    
 
Bioethical debate around the topic of genetic enhancement, while for the most part avoiding 
the unrealistic portrayals of genetic enhancement found in popular culture, is also not immune 
to a tendency to imagine the possibilities of genetic enhancement (and other new medical 
technologies) without due consideration of the facts
11
.  Bioethics should provide a serious and 
                                                 
9
 This is attested to by a survey conducted by Gerbner in the late 1980s which found that “U.S. adults who 
consume popular culture frequently (habitual viewers) are more likely than infrequent viewers to hold negative 
opinions about science, to believe that science is dangerous, to consider scientists odd and peculiar people, and 
to feel that a career in science is undesirable” (cited in Kirby 2000: 208). 
10
 Of course, this does not exclude the fact that there may be very good arguments against genetic enhancement 
which are based upon reasonable expectations of what such technologies would be likely to achieve, or that 
representations of genetic interventions in popular culture may capture the essence of these objections.  For 
example, the possibility of genetic discrimination, as depicted in the film Gattaca (1997) is a concern often 
raised in bioethics literature (see, for example, Ledley 1994: 157).   
11
 Consider this panic inducing excerpt from the abstract of a paper by Richard Satava: “Technology is rampant, 
exponentially growing beyond the bounds normally comprehensible by the human mind.  Many of these 
technologies are so fundamentally disruptive that they challenge the very practice of science.  Discoveries once 
unimaginable except in science fiction are appearing at such a rapid rate that there is no time to evaluate their 
moral and ethical implications in a deliberate and measured fashion...[These  technologies] will revolutionize 
what it means to be human and what the ultimate fate of the species will be” (2003: 246), and later in the  paper, 
“no politics or regulation could stop the stampede of science” (2003: 247).  This language recalls the Hollywood 
thriller rather than the measured deliberations of bioethics, with “rampant” and “stamped[ing]” technology 
portrayed as the villain, and the human “species” as the victim.  Leon Kass uses similar rhetoric when he refers 
to the danger of “bio-engineered perfection” as a “wave of the future” that will “sneak up on us before we know 
it and, if we‟re not careful, sweep us up and tow us under” (2003: 10).  Bill McKibben, the popular 
environmentalist, is comparably vehement when he warns us, in an article discussing the perils of genetic 
enhancement, that “[e]very time you turn your back this technology creeps a little closer.  Gallops actually, 
growing and spreading as fast as the internet.  One moment you‟ve sort of heard of it; the next moment it‟s 
everywhere” (2003: 22).      
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considered evaluation of the ethics of genetic enhancement, and, as I have argued in Chapter 
1, could even be expected to provide a blueprint for ethically responsible research into, and 
future application of, genetic enhancement technologies  However, for such an investigation 
to be reliable and useful, it is necessary that it is based upon the consideration of realistic 
scientific possibilities – our “moral evaluation” of genetic technologies must proceed from 
“full and accurate representations of...genetic engineering and genomics”12 (Agar 2004: 21).  
Misunderstanding the science of genetic enhancement may lead to “unwarranted emotional 
reactions” (Motulsky 1983: 135) that are misplaced. 
 
An initial point to be made before embarking upon a discussion of the limits of genetic 
engineering, is that we must firstly accept another limit – it is highly unlikely that any layman 
will be able to provide an exhaustive explanation, or achieve a complete scientific 
understanding, of genetics and genetic technologies – the very complexity of these fields 
makes their technological intricacies difficult to understand.  Agar points out that this does 
not imply that we are therefore unable to make moral judgements about genetic engineering, 
and that we should “cede our moral authority to scientists” (2004: 21).  In fact, scientists 
involved in genetic research may themselves be limited in their ability to objectively evaluate 
the ethics of their subject matter, because of their common assumption of the beneficial nature 
of scientific research in general (Morton 2005: A25).  It does imply, however, that we should 
strive to achieve, at least, a broad understanding of the technologies in question in order for 
our moral evaluations thereof to be reliable and serious.  Agar uses the analogy of doctor-
patient relations – a doctor will find it difficult to explain the detailed intricacies of a medical 
condition to a patient, but can still provide a “morally transparent description” of a condition 
which “must at least gesture towards the deeper scientific truth” (2004: 23).  In the same way, 
bioethicists and members of the public who seeks to make moral judgement about genetic 
engineering should also be able to grasp such a morally transparent description of the likely 
possibilities of genetic interventions, so that they do not find themselves arguing against a 
straw man.  It is for this purpose that I will attempt to provide a broad picture, rather than a 
detailed diagram, of the possibilities of genetic enhancement.   
   
Before I go on, I would like to reiterate what I have previously stated in my introductory 
chapter.  One argument which has been made against an ethical investigation into the moral 
status of genetic enhancement is that it is not now, nor is it ever likely to be, a practical 
                                                 
12
 In the parallel case of the ethics of cloning, for example, Agar points out that those who “persist in thinking of 
clones as mindless automata are unlikely to have worthwhile views about the ethics of reproductive cloning” 
(2004: 160). 
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possibility.  Some of the limits and difficulties which may hinder the development of genetic 
enhancement and which will be discussed in this chapter may appear to make that possibility 
even more remote.  However, as I have previously argued, while it is true that genetic 
enhancement of humans is not currently technically feasible, and while there are weighty 
problems which are likely to beset future research into this topic, it is unlikely, given the swift 
rate of scientific progress made in recent years, and the current research being conducted into 
the human genome, that some form of genetic enhancement will never be a realistic 
possibility.  What is of value in this objection, however, is an emphasis upon the need for 
vigilance against an attitude which overestimates the likely possibilities of future genetic 
enhancement.   
 
This chapter will be divided into four sections: 
 
In the first section, I will attempt to provide some simple definitions and explanations of basic 
genetic terminology, which will be used in this chapter and throughout this dissertation.   
 
In the second section, I will discuss two complexities inherent in the relationship between 
genes and human functioning that are often overlooked, and draw attention to the implications 
that these complexities have for the development of genetic enhancement technologies.  I will 
illustrate these complexities with examples from animal experimentation, which will also 
serve to provide some idea of the current state of research into genetic enhancement 
technologies. 
   
In the third section, I will examine a scientific fallacy which often infects attitudes towards 
genetic enhancement – the fallacy of (simplistic) genetic determinism.  Taking genetic 
determinism seriously tends to lead to an overestimation of the influence genetic interventions 
will be likely to have, both on the affected individual, and on society as a whole. 
 
Finally, I will summarise the implications which the scientific facts of genetic functioning 
have for the possibility of the successful development of genetic enhancement technologies, 
as well as for the limits of these technologies. 
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Some basic concepts 
 
This section will attempt to provide a brief outline of the most central concepts of genetics.  
As previously stated in the introductory section, it is not possible to provide an exhaustive 
account of human genetics.  Rather, an attempt will be made to present a sketch of the manner 
in which genes work in the human body, and thereby to introduce simple definitions of basic 
concepts. 
 
The basic physical and functional unit of hereditary in all biological organisms is the gene, 
which consists of a particular sequence of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) bases.  DNA is 
“made up of millions of nucleotides”, each of which “contains one of the four nitrogenous 
bases” known as adenine, thymine, guanine and cytosine (commonly referred to as A, T, G 
and C). The relevant nitrogenous base is linked to a “deoxyribose unit, [which is] in turn 
linked to a chemical group containing a phosphorous atom” (Omoto & Lurquin 2004: 2).  The 
sugar phosphate molecules form the outside of the DNA molecule, and the bases the inside.  
The bases are loosely bonded together in pairs – adenine is bonded with thymine, and guanine 
with cytosine.  This forms the double helix structure famously identified by Watson and Crick 
in 1953 (Omoto & Lurquin 2004: 8).  
 
A gene constitutes a segment of DNA that is involved in producing a polypeptide chain, or 
protein.  A common, but mistaken, perception of genes tends to view the relationship between 
genes and human traits as direct – our genes determine our characteristics.  However, genes 
do not work directly on human traits.  Rather, they code for amino acid sequences, which 
make up the proteins which are the basic building blocks of physical structure and biological 
functions (Robinson, Fernald & Clayton 2008: 896).  The instructions for coding proteins are 
“transmitted indirectly through messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA)” (DOE Human Genome 
Program 1992: 7).  In other words, genes are “translated into amino acids that assemble 
themselves into proteins [that] make up our physical structure, catalyze the chemical reactions 
that keep us alive and regulate the expression of other genes” (Pinker 2009: MM24).   
 
Genes occupy a specific site, or locus, on one of the twenty-three chromosomes, which are 
“thread-like structures located within the cell nucleus composed of an extremely long, double-
stranded DNA helix tightly folded around proteins called histones” (Millodot 2009), one copy 
of each of which is inherited from each parent, giving forty-six chromosomes in total.   
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The complete genetic material of a biological organism makes up the genome of the relevant 
organism (Mai, Young Owl & Kersting 2005).  This genome is the entire gene map, or 
sequence, on all of the chromosomes (Youngson 2000), which contains all the information 
necessary for making an organism.  The human genome is thought to contain about 3 billion 
base pairs of DNA, and between 20,000 and 120,000 genes, although opinions vary as to this 
latter number (The Nature of the Number 2000: 127).  The most reliable estimate is probably 
that of the Human Genome Project, which has estimated that the genome contains between 
20,000 and 25,000 protein-coding genes (International Human Genome Sequencing 
Consortium 2004: 931). 
 
The concept genome is often used interchangeably with the concept “genotype”, although 
technically these terms differ in meaning slightly – while the genome refers to all the genetic 
material contained in the chromosomes of an organism, the genotype is the “complete genetic 
constitution of an individual at a particular location (locus) in the genome” (Millodot 2009).    
 
The genome of an organism can be distinguished from its phenotype, which refers to all the 
traits or characteristics which are attributable to a particular organism, as influenced by the 
genome, as well as its interaction with the environment (Hall & Morton 2002).  The 
complexities of the relationship between genome and phenotype will be the focus of the 
remainder of this chapter.   
 
The complexity of genetic functioning 
 
A popular argument made against genetic enhancement can be captured in the intuition that 
“nature often knows best” (Bostrom & Sandberg 2009a: 377).  This argument suggests that 
there is a high possibility that attempts to intervene genetically in the human organism will 
fail to have the desired effect, or worse, that these interventions will go badly wrong.  In the 
latter case, critics argue that the intervention will harm rather than benefit the affected 
individual, and possibly, in the case of germline engineering, will also harm their descendants 
(Murray 1991: 58). If this is indeed likely to be the case, this provides us with a good reason 
to refrain from any attempt to genetically enhance human beings, as such a result would 
undercut any further arguments in favour of enhancement.  The question is whether this 
intuition is indeed reliable.  To evaluate this, we must consider what scientists have thus far 
discovered about the nature of genetic functioning. 
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The human genome project 
 
Within recent decades, great strides have been made in our understanding of the human 
genome, and the manner in which genes impact upon the functioning of the human organism.  
Less than half a century after the discovery of the structure of the DNA molecule by James 
Watson and Francis Crick - a discovery which initiated the “modern revolution in genomics” - 
virtually the entire human genome has been sequenced (Mehlman 2003: 10).  The 
achievement of this latter milestone was the main objective of the Human Genome Project. 
 
The Human Genome Project was a scientific research project originating in the United States, 
but with a variety of international contributors, including researchers from the United 
Kingdom, Japan, France, Germany and China.  The project began formally in 1990, and was 
an undertaking with the central goal of the establishment of the complete sequence of the 
human genome (Mehlman 2003: 17).  In other words, the intention was to identify the 
complete sequence of the estimated 3 billion base pairs of DNA.  This main goal was 
achieved, and the project therefore completed, in 2003, two years ahead of schedule. 
 
The project was “heralded as the initial and necessary step for attaining a complete 
understanding of the hereditary nature of humankind” (Gannett 2010: 1).  Its implications are 
often regarded primarily to be the improvement of the prospects of genetic therapy and a 
better understanding of the genetic contribution to disease (Collins 1999: 28, Collins & 
McKusick 2001: 543, Greenhalgh 2005: 545).  However, the outcomes of the project also 
have obvious consequences for the prospects of human genetic enhancement, given that 
genetic therapy and genetic enhancement can be seen as two different stages on a continuum 
of possible genetic interventions.  
 
While virtually all the genes in the human genome have now been identified, scientists have 
yet to establish anything like a comprehensive account of what these genes, on an individual 
level, do, and how they do it.   While we do know something about the function of many 
genes, we are a long way from understanding exactly how genes function in the human 
organism – we do not yet have a complete grasp of the manner in which they interact with one 
another and their environment to form the complex traits of human (and other) organisms, 
particularly when these traits are behavioural.  Contributors to the Human Genome Project 
themselves emphasise that “the path from genes to proteins to development of a particular 
trait is still a mystery” (McInerney & Rothstein 2008).   
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However, the collection of knowledge of human genetics that scientists have thus far 
accumulated has identified some aspects of genetic functioning which render it immensely 
complex.  In this section I would like to discuss two features of genetic functioning, or the 
relationship between genes and human traits, which will complicate any attempt to intervene 
genetically in the human organism.  I will then go on to say something about the complexity 
of human traits themselves, particularly behavioural traits, which are often regarded as a 
likely target of genetic enhancement technologies.  I will use some examples from animal 
experimentation in the field of genetic engineering to illustrate these points, as well as to 
provide some insight into the current state of scientific research on this topic.    
 
Two complex aspects of genetic functioning 
 
The two characteristics of the relationship between the genome and human characteristics that 
I wish to discuss are interrelated, and together, they emphasise that “genes do not have a one-
to-one relation to the characters they effect” (Charlesworth 2001: 782).   I will identify each 
of these characteristics in turn, and discuss their consequences for the prospects of genetic 
engineering separately, before going on to draw out their joint implications. 
 
Firstly, human traits of any level of complexity are polygenic.  This means that a single 
human trait
13
 is determined or influenced by more than one, and usually by multiple, genes
14
.  
This is true of the vast majority of disease traits, such as diabetes (Greenhalgh 2005: 545, 
Permutt et al. 2010: S308) and breast cancer (Pharoah et al. 2002: 33), as well as physical-
structural traits such as height (Weedon et al. 2008: 575).  However, the polygenic nature of 
traits is most apparent in the case of human behavioural traits, as these traits are particularly 
complex – the number of genes influencing a particular trait seems to increase depending on 
the complexity of the given trait (McInerney & Rothstein 2008).  
 
This feature of genetic functioning has fairly obvious implications for the level of difficulty 
involved in effectively accomplishing specific genetic interventions.  It is not simply a matter 
of altering the expression of one gene and ending up with the desired result.  Many genes are 
involved in affecting even a single aspect of human functioning – for complex behavioural 
characteristics there may be “hundreds or thousands of genes” (Pinker 2009: MM24) 
                                                 
13
 The extent to which it makes sense to refer to a “single human trait”, particularly when it comes to complex 
behavioural traits, will be discussed later in this section. 
14
 Traits are also influenced by environment.  I will return to this point in the next section. 
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involved.  An intervention which acts upon only one, or even a few genes, may only make a 
negligible difference to a given characteristic.     
 
These difficulties have been evident in early failures to achieve the genetic enhancement of 
physical traits in animals.  Consider this example of an attempt to genetically engineer swine:  
 
Efforts to genetically improve the growth of swine have involved insertion of transgenes 
encoding growth hormone.  Nevertheless despite the fact that growth hormone transgenes are 
expressed well in swine, increased growth did not occur, [a]lthough the transgenic animals 
fortuitously have less body fat (Gordon 1999: 2023). 
 
Gordon suggests that this failure probably resulted from the fact that this genetic intervention 
worked on “one relevant locus and attempt[ed]...to improve it in isolation”.  However, the 
polygenic nature of the physical attribute of growth rate in swine implies that “[d]ozens or 
perhaps hundreds of genes may influence [this] trait” (1999: 2023)15.     
 
The example cited above also has bearing on the second characteristic of genetic functioning 
which I wish to identify.  Not only did the genetic engineering of swine not produce the 
desired effect, but it produced an effect (reduced body fat) which was unforeseen.  This is 
probably attributable to the fact that many genes are pleiotropic.  In other words, genes may 
influence more than one trait (Agar 2004: 29).   
 
We can consider this example, also provided by Gordon, which illustrates this feature of 
genetic functioning: 
 
                                                 
15
 Gordon also points out that this characteristic of genetic functioning explains why another type of genetic 
manipulation - selective breeding - has achieved great success historically.  This type of genetic engineering 
works on all loci simultaneously (1999: 2023).  Motulsky, in making the point that “[g]enetic manipulation is not 
a new development” emphasises the point that selective breeding is an instance of “[g]enetic manipulation by 
design” that has been practiced in society for many years, although mainly in animals, while unplanned selective 
breeding can be argued to sometimes take place in the human species in choosing like partners (1983: 135).  
There has, however, been at least one attempt in the last few decades to embark upon a limited program of 
intentional selective breeding in humans with the express purpose of enhancing intelligence.  This attempt was 
initiated by the Californian millionaire Robert K. Graham, a retired optometrist who made his fortune from the 
invention of shatterproof eyeglasses (Silver 1997: 160).  Graham set up a sperm bank called the Repository for 
Germinal Choice in the late 1970s, which offered prospective mothers (or at least those with high intelligence) 
the opportunity to use sperm from Nobel Prize Winners, and (when most of these prospective donors proved 
resistant to the idea) from gifted young scientists, for insemination.  This project produced over 200 children 
before its demise in the 1990s, although it is difficult to determine whether the project was successful, as most of 
those who made use of its services have chosen to remain anonymous (The Genius Sperm Bank 2006). 
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Another spectacular failed attempt at enhancement resulted from efforts to increase muscle 
mass in cattle.  When expressed in mice, the avian c-ski gene...induced massive muscle 
hypertrophy.  This prompted efforts to produce cattle expressing a c-ski transgene.  When 
gene transfer was accomplished, the transgenic calf initially exhibited muscle hypertrophy, but 
muscle degeneration and wasting soon followed.  Unable to stand, the debilitated animal was 
killed (1999: 2023). 
 
As is evident in this example, the pleiotropic nature of many genes greatly increases the 
possibility that things could go badly wrong in attempts to intervene genetically in the human 
organism, as the intervention could have unforeseen effects, adverse or otherwise, on traits 
other than those that the intervention is aimed at.  This risk demands that we take seriously the 
possible dangers of genetic engineering, and emphasises that we have a long way to go in 
establishing the exact functions of genes before we can begin to think about the practical use 
of this technology in humans. 
 
Taken together, these two aspects of complex genetic functioning, along with our thus far 
imperfect understanding of this functioning, make it difficult, at this time, to predict with 
certainty the likely outcomes of genetic engineering - a point echoed by Baylis and Robert 
(2004: 3).  The complexity of genetic functioning has even resulted in a straightforward 
rejection of the idea that the manipulation of genes will have any meaningful effect on the 
phenotype of the resulting individual (Graham 2002: 172).  What this also implies is that even 
when we reach a point at which genetic engineering can be safely accomplished, the 
straightforward, dramatic, single effect results that many envisage when they think of genetic 
enhancements may never come to pass, as the very nature of genetics will in all likelihood 
restrict the scope of enhancements. 
 
The considerations mentioned above may also explain why genetic therapy is considered to 
be a less challenging prospect than genetic enhancement (Sober 2000: 352).  These 
interventions do not make an attempt to “overhaul” the complex system of genetic 
functioning entirely, but rather to “figure out what has broken, and how to fix it” (Bostrom & 
Sandberg 2009a: 176); in other words, to determine what has gone wrong in the expression of 
a particular gene and to restore this aspect of genetic functioning to normality, which could be 
regarded as a decidedly more modest goal.  However, many scientists even doubt the likely 
effectiveness of therapeutic interventions, pointing towards the polygenic nature of most 
diseases and the influence of the environment upon the expression of the contributory genes, 
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and therefore to the phenotype of disease (Greenhalgh 2005: 545)
16
.  In addition, the line 
between therapy and enhancement is not so clear cut.  Many incidences of genetic therapy 
will be likely to target the reduction in functioning caused by disease, the cause of which is 
unlikely to be attributable to single loci.  These interventions will therefore also need to be 
complex in the same way that interventions aimed at the enhancement of function will be, as 
they will be of a similar type.  For example, interventions aimed at improving functioning, 
such as those aimed at improving muscular development and functioning of patients with 
disorders such as muscular dystrophy, or improving intellectual functioning in patients 
affected by Alzheimer‟s disease, would presumably be of a similar sort to those used to 
enhance the muscular and intellectual functioning of individuals in the normal ranges.  
 
All of this belies the manner in which the popular media generally reports on genetic research.  
News reports habitually proclaim that scientists have discovered a gay gene (Connor 1995), a 
gene which causes antisocial behaviour (Recer 2002: 3), a gene which causes intelligence 
(Wade 1998), and so on.  As the preceding discussion has revealed, this is highly misleading 
as to the nature of the interaction between genes and complex human characteristics, and 
results in an exaggeration of the possibilities, and therefore the ethical perils, of genetic 
enhancement, particularly with regard to its effects on society (Agar 2004: 11), leading in turn 
to an unreasonable moral rejection thereof.  I will briefly illustrate the above with reference to 
a human trait that is often emphasised as an obvious target for genetic enhancement – the trait 
of intelligence.  I will then use this trait to illustrate a further difficulty likely to be 
encountered in any attempt to genetically enhance complex behavioural characteristics.    
 
Gardner, in considering the possibility of cognitive genetic enhancement, notes that “[m]any 
genes affect cognitive abilities and each of those genes may affect many other body systems” 
(1995: 68), immediately drawing attention to the manner in which the polygenic nature of 
intelligence, and the pleiotropic nature of the genes which influence this trait, impose 
obstacles to the successful achievement of the genetic enhancement of cognitive functioning.  
The polygenic nature of the trait of intelligence implies that altering the expression of one 
gene (or more than one gene) which influences the trait of intelligence may have an 
insignificant effect.  Bostrom and Sandberg, also emphasise this difficulty, citing Craig and 
                                                 
16
 Greenhalgh believes that there are better means than gene therapy available to treat diseases like diabetes that 
are already technically feasible and easily accessible (2005: 545).  If she means to imply that it is therefore 
irresponsible to devote scientific research efforts and funds to investigating genetic interventions at the expense 
of providing already available treatments, this echoes an argument which we will consider further in the 
following chapter. 
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Plomin as stating that “[s]tudies of the genetics of intelligence suggest that there is a large 
number of genetic variations affecting individual intelligence, but each accounting for only a 
very small fraction (1%) of the variance between individuals” (2009a: 319).  For this reason, 
insertion of or manipulation of a single gene which affects intelligence may not have a drastic 
effect (Bostrom & Sandberg 2009b: 319).  On the other hand, the pleiotropic nature of many 
of the genes which affect intelligence simultaneously implies that any attempt to alter the 
expression of these genes may have unforeseen or undesired effects on other traits.  Of 
course, this risk increases with each additional gene that is altered, and the polygenic nature 
of intelligence implies that multiple genes will probably need to be altered to achieve 
dramatic enhancement of this trait.  I will illustrate these problems by means of an interesting 
case study. 
 
In a study published in 2001, researchers at Washington University claimed to have 
discovered in experimentation on mice that “[g]enetic modification of forebrain NMDA 
receptors can...influence pain perception”.  In this experiment, the overexpression of the 
protein NR2B, a contributory component of cellular proteins called NMDA receptors, 
resulted in mice having enhanced perception of minor pain for longer periods of time (Wei et 
al. 2001: 164).  The implication of this study is that deactivating or reducing the expression of 
NR2B may reduce the perception of long-term chronic pain in other species, including 
humans, without removing the protective qualities of pain perception, as the reduction of the 
expression of NR2B would seem to limit the perception of chronic pain, while leaving the rest 
of the pain perception system intact (Wei at al. 2001: 168).  Some critics also suggest that 
making use of genetic engineering to reduce NR2B expression may be an ethically desirable 
course of action which could be used to reduce the pain experienced by factory farmed 
animals (Shriver 2010: A27). 
 
However, this experiment not only reveals something about the genetics of chronic pain 
perception, but also indicates the difficulties likely to be experienced in the successful and 
predictable achievement of genetic enhancement of cognitive abilities and other complex 
traits of this nature.  This is because the first characteristic associated with overexpression of 
NR2B in mice was not a heightened perception of chronic pain, but an enhancement of 
learning and memory. 
 
The mice used in the Washington University experiment were originally genetically 
engineered by researchers at Princeton.  The extra copy of the NR2B gene was initially 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 20 
 
inserted to research the enhancement of cognitive abilities.  The results of this experiment 
were that “overexpression of NMDA receptor 2B (NR2B) in the forebrains of transgenic mice 
[led] to enhanced activation of NMDA receptors” which caused the affected mice to “exhibit 
superior ability in learning and memory in various behavioural tasks” (Tang et al. 1999: 63)17.  
The mice were found to “acquire new knowledge twice as fast, and [to] retain it for around 
four to five times longer [than] their normal counterparts” leading them to be referred to as 
“Doogie” mice, after the “television teen genius, Doogie Howser MD” (Agar 2004: 10).  This 
suggests that, due to the pleiotropic nature of genes, “a genetic manipulation conferring 
enhanced cognitive abilities may also provide unintended traits, such as increased 
susceptibility to persistent pain” (Wei et al. 2001: 168).  Even if, as one of the original 
Princeton researchers maintains, the Washington University experiment does not show that 
the mice experienced enhanced pain, but enhanced memory of pain (Weiss 2001: A2), this 
still implies that an enhanced memory may not always be an uncomplicated benefit to the 
affected individual, as all the consequences of this enhancement cannot be foreseen.   
 
This case shows how difficult it may be to separate human traits from one another, and by 
extension, to separately enhance, human traits.  If, as seems to be the case, “memory 
formation and pain sensation...share components of a common physiological pathway” (Stull  
2001: 21), this has perilous implications for the use of genetic engineering when an 
intervention is directed either at enhancing memory or at treating chronic pain.   
 
There is one further point which can be taken from this case.  The creation of the NR2B-
enhanced mice was heralded, particular in the popular press, as the successful creation of 
smart or “Doogie” mice (Leutwyler 1999, Weiss 2001: A2).  The suggestion was that mice 
had been genetically enhanced for intelligence.  However, the trait of intelligence is extremely 
complex (Harris 1992: 141, Newson & Williamson 1999: 328).  Memory, and the 
accompanying ability to learn, is one aspect of this multifactorial characteristic, the 
importance of which very few people would dispute. However, there are a multitude of other 
factors which make up this trait, which might include creativity, rational thinking, spatial 
perception, and could even be argued, in the case of genius, to include a certain measure of 
nonconformity.  Intelligence cannot only be attributed to increased powers of memory, but is 
constituted by some combination of these and other factors.  This has two implications.  
Firstly, because it is difficult to agree upon what exactly constitutes intelligence, it may be 
difficult to agree upon what counts as a successful enhancement of intelligence.  Secondly, 
                                                 
17
 These results have since been reproduced in experiments on rats (Wang et al. 2009). 
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even if we can agree upon the traits that constitute intelligence, the problem of the polygenic 
nature of traits is exacerbated, as a multitude of traits, each of them complex and influenced 
by multiple genes, will probably need to be enhanced to truly achieve enhancement of 
intelligence to the level of genius.  Whether this will ever be possible remains an open 
question.   
 
Practical genetic engineering: some examples from animal experimentation 
 
The discussion above as to the complex relationship between genes and traits may seem to 
indicate that the obstacles facing genetic enhancement, at least of complex behavioural traits, 
are insurmountable.  In fact, some degree of success has already been achieved in animal 
experimentation. 
 
Firstly, there are examples of the successful manipulation of the physical characteristics of 
animals by genetic means.  Increases in growth rate and muscle mass have been 
accomplished.  This is obviously a desirable economic goal for farmers of livestock and other 
animals reared for human consumption.  I will discuss three examples of these successes. 
 
A company called AquaBounty Technologies has succeeded in producing salmon which grow 
at twice the normal rate (although they do not reach a larger size than normal salmon).  This 
has been achieved by the insertion of a growth hormone gene into an Atlantic salmon from 
the Chinook salmon as well as a “genetic on-switch from the ocean pout, a distant relative of 
the salmon”.  This causes a divergence from normal functioning in that the salmon, which do 
not typically produce growth hormone in colder weather, are able to do so all year round (as 
does the ocean pout) (Pollack 2010: A1).    
 
In another case, researchers at Harvard University have created “Schwarzenegger” mice, who 
gain muscle more easily than normal mice, and appear to be immune to muscular wasting 
associated with old age, as a result of the insertion of “the gene that produces a protein 
associated with muscle growth known as insulin-like growth factor type 1 (IGF-1)”.  IGF-1 is 
also present in humans (Agar 2004: 10-11).   
 
Mice have also been genetically engineered to prevent them from expressing a protein called 
myostatin, which seems to regulate the limits of muscle development and function.  The result 
was mice who exhibited “dramatic increases in skeletal muscle mass, with individual muscles 
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weighing about twice as much as those of wild-type mice” (Lee 2004: 63).  It has been shown 
that the “predicted myostatin protein sequences” are identical in humans and mice (as well as 
other species such as rats, pigs, chickens and turkeys), suggesting “conservation of function” 
of myostatin across these species (Lee 2004: 64).    
 
Other interventions which affect physical functioning have also been successful.  Researchers 
at the University of Washington have succeeded in altering the vision of squirrel monkeys.  
Usually, “male squirrel monkeys have only two of the colour pigments known as opsins, 
unlike people who have three”.  Insertion of the gene which codes for the “missing red 
pigment” (Wade 2009: D3) has allowed them to “discriminate between two colours which 
had looked identical to them before treatment” (Shapley 2009: 737). 
 
There is also some evidence of the possibility of the successful manipulation of behavioural 
traits in animals.  In one experiment, researchers were able to influence “partner preference” 
in voles via the manipulation of a single gene, resulting in a previously promiscuous 
subspecies of voles exhibiting monogamous behaviour (Lim et al. 2004: 754).  Another study 
shows that it is possible to “turn lazy monkeys into workaholics by altering the reward centre 
in the brain” (Savulescu 2005: 36, see also Liu et al. 2004).  In addition, despite the 
complications which have arisen in the experiment to increase the expression of NR2B gene, 
this research does show that it is possible to genetically enhance memory.  Other studies also 
suggest that genetic interventions aimed at manipulating complex behavioural traits such as 
timidity (Carey 2005) and aggression (Bhanoo 2011) in mice have met with some success.  
As research is currently being conducted in humans “to understand the genetic basis” of 
characteristics such as “aggression and criminal behaviour, alcoholism, anxiety, antisocial 
personality disorder, maternal behaviour, homosexuality and neuroticism” (Savulescu 2005: 
37), it is by no means beyond the realm of possibility that similar manipulations will be 
successful in altering complex behavioural traits in our own species too. 
 
These studies, among others, show that despite the complex nature of genetic functioning, it 
would be foolhardy to assume that some form of genetic enhancement will never be a 
practical possibility, even if it is not equivalent to the dramatic, single effect enhancements 
often envisaged by science fiction and the popular press.   
 
However, there is another factor which we need to consider.  Genes influence human 
functioning in complex ways, but they are not the only influences which impact on human 
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traits.  To illustrate this, I will now turn to a discussion of another common misapprehension 
with regard to genetic functioning – the fallacy of genetic determinism. 
 
The fallacy of genetic determinism: what really makes us who we are?  
 
A project launched by the BBC in the year 2000 is attempting to follow the maturation of 
twenty-five British children from birth until the age of twenty, and professes to tackle the 
question as to “[w]hat makes us who we are”.  In particular, it attempts to arrive at some 
conclusions as to the respective contribution of “genes and environment” to individual human 
identities (Livingstone 2005: 11).  This question is another incarnation of the old nature 
versus nurture debate.  As it turns out, it is difficult to determine the extent to which each of 
these aspects exerts influence in establishing the phenotype (Sober 2000: 360).  What can, 
however, be ascertained with some certainty is that both genetics and environment matter - 
“genes are only part of the story” (Silver 1997: 213) - and this has implications for the 
prospect of genetic engineering.  A focus on the possibility of genetically altering, and 
specifically enhancing, human traits, can lead to an absence of appreciation of the extent to 
which environment plays a role in determining these traits.  It is therefore of vital importance 
in any discussion of the ethics of genetic enhancement to avoid the attitude that only genes 
matter in the determination of characteristics.  This attitude is known as genetic determinism, 
and amounts to an assumption, or conviction, that genes are wholly or primarily responsible 
for the determination of the eventual human phenotype, or that “a person‟s genome causally 
necessitates her every significant characteristic” (Agar 2004: 71).  Such an attitude both 
accompanies and causes a lack of emphasis on the role of environment.  
 
Genetic determinism has its own set of ethical perils.  The history of eugenics, particularly in 
Nazi Germany (Buchanan, Brock, Daniels & Wikler 2000: 37), but also in campaigns which 
resulted in the forced sterilisation of tens of thousands of the supposedly unfit in, among other 
countries, the United States during the first half of the twentieth century (Bruinius 2006: 11), 
was based upon a similar attitude - namely, that human traits could be solely attributed to 
natural inheritance
18
 - and this viewpoint, combined with class bias and racism, led to the 
designation of certain sections of society as innately inferior.  This resulted in a conviction 
that “social problems had both a biological basis and...a potential biological remedy” 
                                                 
18
 Buchanan et al. point out that there were notable exceptions to this emphasis on nature as opposed to 
environment in the history of eugenic thought.  For example, the “French and Brazilian eugenic movements were 
at least as concerned about neonatal care as with hereditary”, and believed that “parents passed onto their 
children characteristics acquired during their lives” (2000: 32). 
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(Buchanan et al. 2000: 41) – a “remedy” which routinely involved gross human rights 
violations, and, in its worst incarnation, resulted in genocide. 
 
The horrors resulting from the eugenic project have engendered a standpoint of wariness 
towards many endeavours which seem to bear similarities to it, including research into genetic 
enhancement.  It is therefore fairly ironic that genetic determinism, which is a similar attitude 
to that which provided a foundation for eugenic thinking, now grounds one form of an 
unreasonable rejection of the possibility of genetic enhancement.  This rejection is based upon 
an overestimation of “what enhancement technologies can achieve” (Agar 2004: 11).   
 
Sober confirms that genes “influence how organisms develop”.  However, they are not the 
only mechanisms by means of which this occurs.  Non-genetic causes (grouped together as 
“environment”) also play a role in determining how the individual develops.  In other words, 
“there is more to biology than genetics” (Sober 2000: 347), and the genetic traits which we 
inherit are not “fixed and unmodifiable” (Dawkins 1976: 3).   
 
Genetic determinism, in contrast to this standpoint, tends to perceive genes as “self-sufficient 
or autonomous causes of traits or behaviours” (Buchanan et al. 2000: 23).  As Steven Pinker 
points out, this perception is completely accurate in some contexts.  For example, in the case 
of some genetic diseases, such as Huntington‟s disease, “everyone with the affected gene who 
lives long enough will develop the condition” (2009: MM24).  In this case, we can rightly 
consider the gene as an “autonomous cause” of a particular disease trait – it has in a very real 
sense determined this aspect of the phenotype. 
 
However, this is not the case for all diseases.  For example, scientists think they have 
identified genes on chromosome 20 that are associated with type II diabetes (Greenhalgh 
2005: 545), but the presence of these genes is “neither necessary nor sufficient” (Permutt et 
al. 2002: S308) for the manifestation of the disease – the likelihood that the individual with 
the relevant genes will eventually develop diabetes is highly dependent on environment, and 
particularly lifestyle.  This is true for most other diseases too – “variation...among people...in 
their susceptibility to a given disease” may only be contributed to in part by “a given 
gene...and non-genetic factors frequently also contribute to the variability” (Charlesworth 
2001: 682).    
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Physical characteristics, such as height, can also be influenced by environmental factors such 
as nutrition, as is evident in the increase in average height in industrialized nations over the 
last century (Gudbjartsson et al. 2008: 609).  However, variability of the phenotype as a result 
of environmental influences is most strongly evident with regard to complex behavioural 
traits (Charlesworth 2001: 682, Resnik 1994: 30).           
 
We can once again make use of the trait of intelligence as an example.  As Gordon points out 
with regard to cognitive functioning, “[t]he genome only provides a blueprint for formation of 
the brain; the finer details of assembly and intellectual development are beyond direct genetic 
control and must perforce be subject to innumerable...environmental influences” (1999: 
2024).  This means that while genes undoubtedly contribute towards one‟s level of 
intelligence (Agar 2004: 28), they are not the only contributing factor
19
.  Genes should 
therefore not be viewed as “determining causes”, but rather as “influences” which contribute 
towards individual human phenotypes (Agar 2004: 28-29). 
 
McInerney and Rothstein of the Human Genome Project sum up this interaction between 
genes and environment as follows: 
With disorders, behaviours, or any physical trait, genes are just a part of the story, because a 
variety of genetic and environmental factors are involved in the development of any trait. 
Having a genetic variant doesn't necessarily mean that a particular trait will develop. The 
presence of certain genetic factors can enhance or repress other genetic factors. Genes are 
turned on and off, and other factors may be keeping a gene from being turned “on”. In 
addition, the protein encoded by a gene can be modified in ways that can affect its ability to 
carry out its normal cellular function (2008).  
As this extract illustrates, the claim that human phenotypes are constituted by both genetic 
and environmental influences does not imply a simplistic dichotomy of genetics and 
environment, both legitimately and separately affecting human functioning.  Rather, these two 
factors interact with one another in myriad ways from the point of conception onwards, with 
our genes interacting with their environment, which includes other genes (Dawkins 1986: 
170), and the environment influencing the way in which genes are expressed in individual 
human organisms (Agar 2004: 71, Horowitz 2010: 77).  In addition, human beings are not 
only being shaped by their environment but shaping it in return in a “reciprocal, co-defining 
                                                 
19
 Some studies suggest that the genetic contribution to intelligence in a population is approximately 50%, 
although these results are controversial (Newson & Williamson 1999: 330). 
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relationship” (Buchanan 2011: 204).  This feature of genetic functioning can only be 
appreciated by a perception of genes not merely in terms of what “they are (their fixed DNA 
sequence)” but also “what [they] do”; in other words, the expression of genes by means of 
their coding for “proteins that are the building blocks of life” (Robinson 2004: A27).  It is this 
latter process that is subject to environmental influences.  Genes cannot accurately be 
regarded as a blueprint for a particular phenotype, as their mere presence or absence is not 
deterministic for the resulting organism.  Rather, what matters is the manner of their 
expression, which is a complex matter (Moss 2003: xvii).  The study of how experience and 
environment (including the presence of other genes) affect the expression of genes is an 
emerging field known as epigenetics (Carey 2010: D7).  Moss describes the complex 
interactions that result in the phenotype as follows:  “the achievement of the phenotype must 
be the result of an epigenesis within which chromosomal, cytoplasmic, and environmental 
constituents become mutually and reciprocally causal, instructive, and determinative of the 
outcome” (2003: 43).    
 
Turkheimer gives a good description of this interactive process in his discussion of the 
relative contributions of genes and environment to human personality and behaviour:  
 
Individual genes...and their environments (which include other genes) interact to initiate a 
complex developmental process that determines adult personality.  Most characteristic of this 
process is its interactivity: subsequent environments to which the organism is exposed depend 
upon its earlier states, and each new environment changes the development trajectory, which 
affects future expression of genes, and so forth.  Everything is interactive, in the sense 
that...any individual gene or environmental event produces an effect only by interacting with 
other genes and environments (2000: 161). 
 
Consider this simple example taken from the BBC documentary, Child of Our Time (2010).  
Identical twins Alex and Ivo have the same genes.  However, their parents, and the boys 
themselves, have noticed subtle differences in their personalities, which have been evident 
from a fairly young age.  Ivo is more artistic and tends to be attracted to pursuits that have 
traditionally been perceived as more feminine, while Alex is more dominant, focused and 
given to more traditionally masculine play.  A facial perception expert determines that there 
are subtle differences in the shape of their faces – Alex has a wider jaw, while Ivo‟s is 
narrower.  This difference can be attributed to tiny differences in their uterine environment.  
The makers of the programme suggest that as Alex has a subtly more masculine face, this has 
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led his parents (and others) to treat him, subconsciously, in a slightly different way to Ivo, 
which has resulted in the differences in personality between them.  This example of the 
posited interaction between genes and environment shows the extent to which these two 
factors are interrelated in their influence on individual human identities.      
 
What implications does this have for the prospect of the development of genetic 
interventions?  The interaction between genes and environment reminds us that we should be 
wary of overestimating the level of control which we will be able to achieve by means of 
genetic engineering to determine the phenotype.  This does not imply that we will have no 
control – this would imply going to the other extreme of environmental determinism.  As 
Pinker puts it with regard to the influence of environment on a trait such as height, “no one 
thinks Kareem Abdul-Jabbar just ate more Wheaties growing up than Danny DeVito” (2009: 
MM24).  To altogether ignore the influence of genes, one would “be the sort of person who 
thinks it is only living in kennels which makes dogs different from cats” (Glover 1984: 26).  
Genes undoubtedly play a “fundamental role” in determining human traits (Charlesworth 
2001: 682).  However, their influence on these traits will be “probabilistic” rather than 
deterministic (Pinker 2009: MM24).   
 
Environmental influences are the strongest on the complex behavioural aspects of the 
phenotype.  Of course, social behaviour is undoubtedly influenced by genes – “genetic 
variation between individuals leads to variation in social behaviours” (Robinson, Fernald & 
Clayton 2008: 896).  However, in this case, genetic enhancement probably will not be able to 
achieve the desired effect in the absence of certain environmental factors (Agar 2004: 117).  
Being genetically engineered for intelligence will not have the desired effect on the phenotype 
without environmental stimulus, for example.   
  
All of this implies that we can no longer perceive of the genome as “a relatively passive 
blueprint guiding organismal development” – rather, “genomes in fact remain highly 
responsible throughout life to a variety of stimuli” (Robinson, Fernald & Clayton 2008: 896).  
This means that fears of genetic enhancement as a deterministic technology by means of 
which we will be able to control and direct the resulting human phenotype, particularly its 
behavioural aspects, are based upon an overestimation of what genes can do. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to summarise the relationship between genotype and phenotype, 
and the implications which some characteristics of this relationship have for the prospects of 
genetic engineering, and specifically for genetic enhancement.  The major point to be taken 
from this summary is that the interaction between the genome and the eventual characteristics 
of a particular organism is complex.  This complexity is often “overlooked in media reports 
hyping scientific breakthroughs on gene function, and, unfortunately, this can be very 
misleading to the public” (McInerney & Rothstein 2008). 
 
I have identified two aspects of genetic functioning which contribute to this complexity – the 
polygenic nature of most human traits, and the pleiotropic nature of many genes.  These two 
features emphasise that human beings (and other biological organisms) are “a marvel of 
evolved complexity”, and, by their nature, complex systems are difficult to enhance (Bostrom 
& Sandberg 2009a: 375).  Currently, we have not reached a level of understanding of genetic 
functioning which would ensure that genetic engineering would be either safe or effective.  
As we do not yet fully understand how the complex human organism works, particularly with 
regard to its genetic component, the prospect of genetically enhancing biological systems is 
extremely daunting, as it is difficult to predict the effects of our interventions – “[c]hanges to 
imperfectly understood complex systems produce effects that, relative to our knowledge, are 
random” (Agar 2004: 162).  The obstacles which must be overcome before practical use could 
be made of genetic enhancement are immense (Allhoff 2005: 42). 
 
However, our understanding of genetic functioning is increasing as scientists continue to 
conduct research into this topic.  The successes that have been achieved in the genetic 
enhancement of animals show that it is not unreasonable to expect that we may one day reach 
a stage when the genetic enhancement of humans will be a practical possibility.  However, the 
nature of genetic functioning, and particularly the influence of genes on multifactorial 
behavioural traits, suggests that genetic enhancement will be more subtle and less dramatic 
than commonly thought, and certainly less drastic than the representations of genetic 
enhancement in science fiction would have us believe. 
 
The limits of future genetic enhancements, particularly with regard to complex behavioural 
traits, are also suggested by the joint and interactive contributions of environment and 
genetics to the human phenotype.  The claim that human functioning is influenced by both 
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these factors is not equivalent to a denial that the genome has, to some extent, a deterministic 
effect on the corresponding phenotype.  It is clearly the case that genes have a profound 
influence on who we become.  Twin studies have clearly indicated that this is the case.  
However, these same studies have also indicated that environment, too, has a role to play in 
the formation of human identity (Agar 2004: 27-28).  Therefore, genetic enhancement alone 
will never give us complete control over the total range of human characteristics.  
 
All in all, “[m]any of the dystopian fears raised by...genomics”, and often imagined in popular 
culture, “are simply out of touch with the complex and probabilistic nature of genes” (Pinker 
2009: MM24).  This is worth bearing in mind as we move onto a discussion of the various 
moral arguments which have been made against the development of genetic enhancement.  
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3  The State of the Debate     
 
Introduction 
 
The possibility of the genetic enhancement of humans is a contentious and emotive issue, as I 
noted in my introductory chapter.  To many, the prospect of the development and use of 
interventions which aim to manipulate our genetic makeup evokes an attitude of discomfort or 
repugnance.  Some contend that the goals of enhancement technologies, or the means by 
which these goals will be achieved, represent a threat to important aspects of our humanity, or 
fear that enhancement‟s potential for harm may outweigh its positive consequences.  To 
others, genetic enhancement offers exciting opportunities for the improvement of individual 
human beings, society and the species as a whole.  This chapter will attempt to draw out the 
reasoning behind these contrasting positions as such reasoning has emerged in bioethical 
debate over the last decades. 
 
Some of the positions which will be discussed in this chapter will be interrogated at length 
later in this dissertation, while others are presented here simply in order to provide a general 
summary of the enhancement debate as it stands.  I will firstly consider three kinds of 
arguments against the development and use of genetic enhancement, as well as the criticism 
which has been levelled against these arguments
20
.  Secondly, I will summarise the positions 
which maintain that the practice of genetic enhancement is morally acceptable, and, in some 
cases, that enhancement is a moral obligation.   
 
Three groups of arguments against genetic enhancement 
 
The possibility of the development and use of genetic enhancement technologies has been 
subject to critique from a number of standpoints.  Broadly speaking, three different sorts of 
                                                 
20
 Buchanan suggests that the debate surrounding enhancement is chiefly characterised by a division, not 
between “pro-enhancement” and “anti-enhancement” schools of argument, but between “anti-enhancement” and 
“anti-anti-enhancement” views (2011: 13).  This is largely borne out in the structure of most of this chapter, 
where I consider anti-enhancement views, and then the arguments levelled against these views.  Opinion is often 
divided between those who oppose enhancement, for various reasons, and those who find the arguments 
advanced against enhancement unconvincing (or at least, unconvincing with regard to all enhancements under all 
circumstances) and therefore regard some enhancements to be morally acceptable, or beneficial, under some 
circumstances.  Julian Savulescu and John Harris , whose contributions I will consider towards the end of this 
chapter, perhaps come closest to what Buchanan would characterise as “pro-enhancement”, as they regard 
enhancement as positively morally desirable, or even obligatory, in some contexts, although even in this case, 
this does not represent an unqualified acceptance of the desirability of all enhancements.   
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arguments against genetic enhancement can be identified
21
, although in practice, as shall 
become evident, there is often overlap between these groups. 
 
The first group of arguments which I will consider are arguments which take as their main 
focus the inherent nature of genetic enhancement itself.  These arguments take issue with the 
combination of goals and means expressed in a desire to enhance human beings by the 
manipulation of their genetic makeup.  What is usually seen as problematic about these goals 
and means is that the pursuit of genetic enhancement is perceived as a threat to human nature, 
either in terms of its potential to undermine species membership, or in terms of the posited 
likelihood that genetic enhancement will undermine values and attitudes that are regarded as 
foundational to our uniquely human identities.  I shall term this group of positions arguments 
from human nature. 
 
The second group of arguments is concerned not with the inherent nature of genetic 
enhancement as such, in terms of its internal goals and means, but rather with the possible 
consequences that would result from the use of such technologies.  These arguments hold that 
if enhancement is practiced, either in single instances or by multiple users, undesirable 
consequences would or could follow, which would outweigh any possible benefit which 
genetic enhancement could produce.  In other words, it is not something internal to the 
technology of enhancement which is considered to be problematic, but some external result.  
This group of arguments is based upon a consequentialist approach to ethics, which regards 
the wrongness of actions as deriving from the results which they produce.  I shall term this 
group of arguments consequentialist arguments.   
 
The third group of arguments have largely to do with genetic enhancement as a medical 
technology.  These arguments consider the nature of medicine, and question whether the goals 
of medical practice and research are compatible with or appropriate to the technology of 
genetic enhancement.  I shall term this group of arguments goal compatibility arguments. 
 
I shall summarise each of these groups of arguments in turn, as well as considering the 
critique which has been levelled against each position. 
 
 
                                                 
21
 For alternative delineations of objections to genetic enhancement, see Baylis & Robert (2004: 5-6), DeGrazia 
(2005: 262), and Parens (1998a: S1). 
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Arguments from human nature 
 
Many people feel uneasy or uncomfortable about the prospect of genetic enhancement, but 
find it difficult to articulate this unease (Kass 2003: 17).  The positions which I will consider 
here suggest that the underlying reason for this ethical discomfort is that the project of genetic 
enhancement holds a revolutionary new capacity to alter or transform our “humanness” 
(Anderson 1989: 682).  However, it is not always clear what is meant by this.  What aspects 
of human nature does genetic enhancement have the potential to transform, and why might we 
regard such a transformation as problematic?   
 
There are two versions of the argument that genetic enhancement will transform human 
beings to the extent that what we currently think of as human nature will be unrecognisable or 
obliterated.  Firstly, there is a concern that genetic enhancement will change our genetic 
makeup in such a way that we (or at least some of us) will no longer be members of the 
human species in terms of our genetics and biology, and that this will weaken or undermine 
human commonality and threaten our recognition of the moral status of others.  Secondly, 
there is a concern that the goals and means of genetic enhancement will undermine or come 
into conflict with attitudes or values that we regard as foundational to our humanity, and that 
this will have a dehumanizing effect on enhanced individuals and on society as a whole.  In 
other words, the first concern is principally to do with the genetic basis of species 
membership and its role in determining moral status, and the second focuses upon the values 
and attitudes that give meaning to our humanity.  
 
Genetic enhancement threatens species membership 
 
Genetic enhancement is aimed at the manipulation of the human genome.  This lies at the core 
of the argument against genetic enhancement which holds that such genetic interventions are 
morally dubious because they imperil our genetic identity as human beings.  The Universal 
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights expresses the basis of such a position 
in its statement that the “human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of 
the human family” (UNESCO 1997: 3).  What this implies is that our genetic code serves as 
the biological marker of our membership of the human species, and therefore also functions 
as a common bond between us.  Because genetic enhancement (and genetic engineering in 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 33 
 
general) will work to alter the human genome, some critics (Annas 2001, Fukuyama 2002
22
, 
Silver 1997) have expressed concern that this will undermine human nature in terms of the 
genetic species membership of those who are enhanced. 
 
Why should this be concerning?  Is there anything intrinsically unethical about enhancing 
ourselves out of the genus Homo sapiens?  The possible danger of taking the human out of 
human lives (Agar 2004: 89) is evoked in the next few lines of the Universal Declaration on 
the Human Genome and Human Rights.  According to this document, not only does the 
human genome underlie our species membership, but it also serves as a foundation for “the 
recognition of [the] dignity and diversity” of all members of the human species (UNESCO 
1997: 3).  In other words, there is a suggestion that species membership, bestowed by a shared 
genetic code, is the basis for our recognition of human dignity, human rights and the moral 
status of other people, as it is the source of our commonality.  The contention here is that 
there is “an intimate connection between human nature and human notions of rights, justice, 
and morality”, and that human nature is equivalent to “the species-typical characteristics 
shared by all human beings qua human beings” (Fukuyama 2002: 101).  These characteristics 
are a “genetic endowment” possessed by each “member of the human species” (Fukuyama 
2002: 171).  Therefore, according to critics such as Fukuyama (2002: 102), and Annas, 
Andrews and Isasi (2002: 153), attempts to alter or manipulate the human genome for 
enhancement or other purposes have the potential to transform the human species itself, and 
therefore threaten to undermine the basis for human morality and universal human rights. 
   
This argument encompasses a concern about posthumanism.  Again, this concern is based 
upon the idea that genetic enhancement will transform human nature to the extent that 
enhanced individuals will no longer be categorised as members of the species Homo sapiens.  
The boundaries that currently determine membership of the human species will be eroded as 
two “subspecies” (Sandel 2007: 15) emerge – humans who maintain their naturally given 
genetic characteristics, and posthumans who are genetically enhanced.  The use of genetic 
interventions could even result in the existence of multiple groups of beings who, through 
                                                 
22
 Fukuyama‟s approach, in fact, combines a focus on species membership with some elements of the concern 
which I will consider next – that genetic enhancement is likely to rob us of some of the values and attitudes 
which make us human.  Fukuyama never adequately describes what the central feature of our humanity is, but 
refers to it as “Factor X”, which is the “essential human quality” that is “worthy of...respect” and that remains 
when we “strip away all of a person‟s contingent and accidental characteristics” (2002: 149).  He expresses the 
view that “biotechnology will cause us in some way to lose our humanity – that is, some essential quality that 
has always underpinned our sense of who we are and where we are going” (2002: 101), but he regards this 
quality as having a genetic basis: “human nature is the sum of the behaviour and characteristics that are typical 
of the human species, arising from genetic rather than environmental factors” (2002: 130). 
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their divergent uses of genetic enhancement, have each developed their own distinct nature or 
genetic identity, and who are “related to one another only through a common ancestor (the 
human race)”.  There is a suggestion that this development, as a result of its destabilisation of 
our “sense of moral community” based on common species membership (Buchanan et al. 
2000: 95), will lead to a failure of such groups to respect the rights and dignity of other 
groups who no longer share their genetic identity, and could also have the potential to lead to 
what Agar refers to as “polarization” (2004: 134) between enhanced posthumans and 
unenhanced humans (Annas 2001, Annas, Andrews & Isasi 2002, Fukuyama 2002, Silver 
1997)
23
. 
 
Is it the case that genetic enhancement will threaten species membership in the way that these 
critics envisage?  DeGrazia seeks to cast doubt on such a conviction.  Firstly, he argues that 
genetically engineered beings would still be hominids, and that the case could be made for 
regarding “all hominids, or at least some hominids in addition to Homo sapiens...as human”.  
Secondly, he argues that the basis of our species membership could be seen as resting upon 
the identity of our biological parents, proceeding from the view that “it is debatable whether 
genetic interventions on...Homo sapiens gametes could produce an individual of another 
species”, making genetic enhancement subsequent to the conception of individuals “irrelevant 
to species membership” (2005: 278).  DeGrazia argues that even if genetic interventions 
rendered the enhanced individual unable to reproduce with members of the human species, 
“these individuals would still be “human” in any sense that might be normatively important” 
and that this would not constitute “a case of violating an inviolable core trait” (2005: 278).     
 
Other critics, in contrast to DeGrazia, accept that genetic enhancement might threaten species 
membership, but raise the question as to why the human genome, as the basis of our identity 
as members of the species Homo sapiens, should be regarded as something which we should 
fight to preserve, or even that we could preserve (Juengst 2009: 50), given that it is itself the 
result of millennia of alteration.  In other words, they question why “merely remaining human 
[should be considered] some manner of moral achievement” (Agar 2004: 91) when our 
genetic code is simply the result of a process of evolution which has responded to “an 
enormous array of random forces, accidental environmental contingencies, and stochastic 
                                                 
23
 The possibility of polarization, and the potential of such polarization to lead to discrimination between the 
enhanced and the unenhanced, and, in the worst manifestations of this discrimination, to enslavement or 
genocide – a possibility considered by Annas (2001) – will be discussed later in this chapter as a consequentialist 
argument.  
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genetic events” (Caplan 2009: 201).  Unless we think that human nature cannot be improved 
upon, it is difficult to defend the claim that we ought not to intervene to enhance human 
capacities, even if this does constitute altering human nature (Buchanan 2011: 115, 
McConnell 2010: 421).    
 
If this is the case, it is unclear why improvements to the human genome, even if these are 
enacted by genetic manipulation which will alter the human species, should be regarded as 
morally problematic.  The human genome is, after all, still subject to evolutionary forces, and 
will continue to change in the future, and it is unclear to critics of the above argument 
precisely why random change exacted by evolution should be preferable to directed change 
exacted by human interventions, if it cannot be shown that the latter is considerably more 
risky than the former (Buchanan 2011: 137, Caplan 2009: 202, Harris 2007: 34).  If genetic 
engineering entails a move away from what we currently regard to be human nature, based on 
our genetic characteristics, then this will merely constitute a hastening of a process that will 
occur in any case as a result of evolution – “[n]atural selection and selective pressures make it 
unlikely that in a few million years our descendants will be physically or mentally much like 
us.  So what genetic engineering threatens here is probably doomed anyway” (Glover 1984: 
36).  Harris, who argues strongly against the contention that ceasing to be genetically human 
should be ethically concerning, cannot see “any powerful principled reason to remain human 
if we can create creatures, or evolve into creatures, fundamentally “better” than ourselves”.  
He notes “the absurdity” of the idea that the preservation of our evolved human natures 
should be considered a moral requirement, by imagining the results of “our common ape 
ancestors getting together with a simian agenda to block evolution so that simian nature 
would be preserved” (2007: 40).   
 
Human nature also cannot be said to be determined purely by our biological characteristics.  
What we think of as human nature, is, instead a result of “the complex relationships between 
genes and environment” and “the reciprocal influences between biological and cultural 
evolution”.  Therefore, “the claim that our nature is our biology is both misleading, and, to the 
extent that it is true, less important” (Buchanan 2011: 7).  Human nature is not wholly 
determined by genetic identity, and as such, the threat to human nature from genetic 
engineering is, at the very least, overestimated.   
 
This point is also relevant to the assertion that genetic enhancement‟s potential to undermine 
species membership is concerning because our common genetic code is the basis for our 
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recognition of moral status, human dignity, and by extension, universal human rights.  
Commentators respond to this assertion by questioning whether human nature, as the basis of 
human rights, can be reducible to brute biological characteristics.  Rather, “there are many 
candidates for the qualities that serve to give us our inalienable rights” (Juengst 2009: 52).  
The moral status of beings is usually regarded as being conferred by morally relevant traits, 
such as the ability to feel pain (which confers some degree of moral status upon animals) or to 
experience suffering, or to have the capability to fulfil certain functions (Fenton 2008: 4), and 
is not solely dependent upon our “taxonomy” (Juengst 2009: 52).  Theories of human rights 
usually regard such rights as stemming not simply from our genetic identity as human beings, 
but rather from the presence of interests – morally relevant beings have an interest in being 
treated in particular ways.  While we might feel intuitively that “all humans have „human 
rights‟ precisely because they are human”, an interrogation of this idea reveals that it is 
“problematic as a theory of moral status” (Beauchamp & Childress 2009: 68).  Rather, we are 
inclined to grant moral status, and associated rights, to those beings which have certain 
capacities, such as the ability to reason, to form a conception of themselves as the subject of 
autonomous action, and to engage in moral deliberations, and while such qualities usually 
correspond with human species membership, this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for our recognition of such moral status (Beauchamp & Childress 2009: 68).  To 
deny this conception of rights and to insist instead that rights and moral status are bestowed 
upon us solely as a result of our genetic identity as human beings is to indulge in what Peter 
Singer refers to as speciesism (1993: 88) - the belief that moral status is conferred by the brute 
fact of our membership of the human species, based upon a prejudice towards those of our 
own kind.  This amounts to the “moral idolatry” of the human genome (Juengst 2009: 52).  If 
such a conception of moral status is unreliable, and moral status depends instead upon the 
presence of morally relevant characteristics, this implies that genetic enhancement, despite its 
potential to erode the current boundaries of species membership, is not necessarily a threat to 
our recognition of the rights of others.  
 
The notion that our moral status is conferred by our morally relevant characteristics, however, 
raises another quandary.  At present, most people make a distinction between the moral status 
of human beings and the moral status of non-human animals on the basis of such 
characteristics (such as the human capacity for rationality), and believe that this morally 
significant distinction allows us to treat animals in certain ways (raising them for 
consumption for example) that would not be acceptable with regard to the treatment of 
humans.  If enhanced beings possess these moral status conferring characteristics to a much 
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higher degree than us, could this imply that these enhanced beings would be morally justified 
in considering unenhanced humans as beings of lesser moral status, implying that they could 
therefore treat them accordingly?  A related question is whether, if those who are enhanced 
are of vastly superior intelligence and competence in comparison to those who are not 
enhanced, it would be justifiable for the latter group to behave paternalistically towards the 
former group, by restricting their autonomy and liberty for their own good, in the same way 
that we currently believe it is justifiable for competent persons to behave paternalistically 
towards incompetent persons whose mental functioning diverges sharply from that which is 
species-typical (Wikler 2009: 341-356).   
 
Buchanan argues that neither of these results are likely, because “the concept of human rights 
is a threshold one, not a scalar one” which implies that once a being achieves a particular 
threshold of morally relevant capacities and capabilities, the degree to which they possess 
them is irrelevant to their possession of moral status (2011: 215).  This implies that after the 
threshold level is reached, moral status is inviolable (2011: 221).  Enhanced being would 
therefore not be justified in treating unenhanced beings as though they were beings of lesser 
moral status, as, on the threshold view of inviolability, they would not be.     
 
Thus, not all critics are wary of the prospect of posthumanism.  Some even delight in the 
possibility – those who describe themselves as transhumanists, in opposition to the positions 
described above, are excited by the prospect that genetic enhancement may allow us to 
become “beings with vastly greater capacities than present human beings have” (Bostrom 
2004: 493), and are not concerned about the possibility that this might imply that we could no 
longer be regarded as members of the human species. 
 
Ultimately, critics who reject the argument against genetic enhancement described above, 
which appeals to the importance of the preservation of genetic species identity, aver that this 
argument fails to answer the question as to “why [evolved] human nature” should be regarded 
as a static standard which “tells us everything about what is good or desirable in terms of the 
traits humans should possess” (Caplan 2009: 201).  They therefore do not believe that the 
possible threat to species membership justifies a general moral condemnation of genetic 
enhancement technologies.   
 
While the arguments summarised above assume that genetic enhancement threatens human 
nature because this human nature rests in our genetically determined biological characteristics 
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(Fenton 2008: 3), there is another set of arguments, which I will consider next, that also focus 
on the threat that genetic enhancement poses to human nature, but regards the basis of this 
human nature as lying not simply in our genetics, but in the manner in which we give 
meaning to our lives in our attitudes towards nature, ourselves, and each other.  Agar refers to 
this group of arguments as “argument[s] from meaning” (2004: 61). 
 
Genetic enhancement threatens values and attitudes that constitute human nature 
  
The dehumanizing effect attributed to genetic enhancement by arguments from meaning is 
related to the posited potential of such interventions to undermine values and attitudes 
towards ourselves and the world which are regarded as constitutive of human nature, or which 
give content to our notion of “what it means to be human” (Robert 2005: 28).  These 
objections are less easy to formulate in clear terms, but are more sophisticated than the 
foregoing arguments in that they do not simply reject genetic enhancement purely on the basis 
that it threatens the brute biological fact of human species membership.  They therefore do not 
fall prey to speciesism.  Rather, these positions are concerned that genetic enhancement will 
threaten aspects of human nature that are valuable.  In other words, the fear is that genetic 
enhancement will “give us what we say we want, but only in a form purged of its proper 
human significance” (Agar 2004: 61).  
 
Leon Kass, one of the principle proponents of arguments from meaning, acknowledges that 
his conviction as to “the intrinsic threat of dehumanization” or “superhumanization” 24 (2003: 
10) posed by the possibility of genetic enhancement is difficult to formulate, but claims that 
genetic enhancement represents a threat to the “fundamental aspects of being human” (2009: 
273) which “have something to do with what is natural, or what is humanly dignified, or with 
the attitude that is properly respectful of what is naturally and dignifiedly human” (2003: 17).  
What values and attitudes do critics of genetic enhancement consider to be “humanly 
dignified”?  Or, what aspects of our current mode of existence are regarded as constitutive of 
proper human nature?  In this section, I will consider the contributions of Kass and Sandel, 
among others, who attempt to offer answers to these questions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Kass suggests that “dehumanization” and “superhumanization” are equivalent – “[t]o try to turn a man into a 
cockroach...would be dehumanizing.  To try to turn a man into more than a man might be so as well” (2003: 20). 
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Mastery and givenness  
 
Both Michael Sandel and Leon Kass offer versions of the argument that genetic enhancement 
is problematic because it expresses an attitude of mastery towards the natural world, and, 
more importantly, towards our own selves, and in so doing undermines the appropriately 
human acceptance of givenness. 
 
Sandel, in his essay, The Case Against Perfection (2004), and the later book of the same name 
(2007), takes issue with the “drive to mastery” which he believes is expressed in the pursuit of 
genetic enhancement.  He describes this pursuit as “a Promethean aspiration to remake nature, 
including human nature, to serve our purposes”.  Sandel sees this “drive to mastery” as 
destructive of an appreciation of the “giftedness” of our natural human abilities and 
endowments (2007: 26-27).  This “giftedness” entails a recognition that our abilities are “not 
wholly our own doing, nor even fully ours”25 – a recognition that fosters an attitude of 
“humility” (2007: 27).  Sandel sees this appreciation of giftedness as being threatened by the 
ability that genetic enhancement would give us to alter or shape our own characteristics – if 
we have the ability to genetically shape our own capacities, these could no longer rightly be 
regarded as “gifts for which we are indebted” but would instead be perceived as 
“achievements for which we are responsible” (2007: 86-87).  This, for Sandel, is an 
inappropriate “habit of mind and way of being” (2007: 96).  
 
Leon Kass, the onetime chairman of The President‟s Council on Bioethics, also takes issue 
with the attitude of “mastery” or “hubris” which he regards as central to the project of genetic 
enhancement (2003: 18).  Both Sandel and Kass express moral disquiet at the prospect of the 
development of technologies which will enable us to master, control or manipulate nature, 
particularly our own natures.  However, as Kass notes, the difficulty which such an argument 
immediately encounters is that we typically do not wish to humbly accept the givenness of 
disease and dysfunction (2003: 19).  What Kass therefore seeks to argue is that there is 
something different, and morally objectionable, about the drive to enhance human nature.  
Kass sees this difference as lying in the attitude expressed in genetic enhancement “that seeks 
                                                 
25
 Sandel also argues that because the practice of genetic enhancement is likely to undermine an appreciation of 
the giftedness of our human characteristics, and will instead encourage a mindset which regards us as being 
responsible for the establishment and manipulation of our own traits, this will also undermine human solidarity 
and have negative consequences for social justice.  This implication will be discussed later in this chapter in the 
context of the consequentialist argument that genetic enhancement could contribute towards or exacerbate 
injustice. 
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wilful control of our own nature” and contrasts this with medicine as “servant and aid to 
nature‟s own powers of healing” (2003: 18), a point which Sandel echoes: 
 
Although medical treatment intervenes in nature, it does so for the sake of health, and so does 
not represent a boundless bid for mastery and domination.  Even strenuous attempts to treat or 
cure disease do not constitute a Promethean assault on the given.  The reason is that medicine 
is governed, or at least guided, by the norm of restoring and preserving the natural human 
functions that constitute health (2007: 46-47). 
 
Buchanan rejects the notion that any desire to enhance is self-evidently motivated by a desire 
for mastery.  He points out that all enhancement interventions cannot be assumed, without 
further argument, to be necessarily expressing a desire for mastery or for total control over the 
given world, and as such, the argument against enhancement based upon this false premise 
fails (2011: 79).  Such a claim is a “vast empirical generalization...about the psychology of 
those who pursue enhancement” which unjustifiably excludes the possibility “that some may 
seek an enhancement in order to be better in some particular way without thereby desiring to 
achieve total mastery of the conditions of life” (2011: 9).  In this way, this criticism of 
enhancement makes poorly motivated claims without any empirical backup.    
 
The critics of this position are also unconvinced by the insistence that intervening in our own 
natures to bring about enhancement constitutes hubris, while intervening in our own natures 
to cure or prevent disease or dysfunction does not (McConnell 2011b: 376).  Buchanan 
regards this as an example of “[m]urky rhetoric masquerading as argument” (2011: 2), and 
sees the use of “grand-sounding, but deeply ambiguous catchphrases and slogans” as a 
substitution for reasoned argument (2011: 3).  He argues that it is simply illogical to assert 
that it is acceptable to transform the given when it comes to curing disease and dysfunction, 
but not when it comes to improving normal functioning (2011: 3).  In his view, it does not 
follow from the fact that “one ought to be appreciative of the good things one has and aware 
that many of them are unearned” that “one should refrain from ever trying to improve one‟s 
life or the lives of others” (2011: 3).  Harris echoes this point in his failure to be persuaded by 
the argument that we should accept the “gifted nature” of human talents but not the giftedness 
of disease and disability (2007: 112).  While both Kass and Sandel argue that the distinction 
between treating disease and enhancing function lies in the fact that medical practice aids or 
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restores natural human functioning
26
, Harris reasons that disease and disability are themselves 
an aspect of natural human functioning, and that “no systematic account of relevant moral 
differences” between medicine and enhancement is offered (2007: 125).  Thus, under this 
view, a rejection of interventions that seek to manipulate nature would necessarily exclude the 
practice of medicine altogether (2007: 35).    
 
It is not only through the practice of medicine that we routinely seek to exercise “wilful 
control over our own nature” (Kass 2003: 19).  Attempts to master nature, and specifically, 
attempts to act upon and improve our own natures and the natures of others, are hardly novel 
pursuits – they are constitutive not only of the goals of medicine, but also of law, child-
rearing and education, and the striving towards improvement and enhancement has always 
been a project which characterises human life (Buchanan 2011: xi).  In fact, Caplan points out 
that the whole history of human culture and civilisation is the history of human attempts to 
alter and shape the naturally occurring state of affairs, including our naturally occurring 
human natures – we have “long tinkered with ourselves using all manner of technologies from 
clothing to medicines to agriculturally produced food to telescopes to computers to airplanes” 
(2009: 202), and in this sense, “Sandel‟s warning that one should not imperil giftedness 
comes several millennia too late” (Buchanan 2011: 79).  Harris fails to comprehend why the 
difference in means that genetic enhancement represents makes a moral difference, taking into 
account our routine attempts to alter our nature and the nature of our children through 
interventions such as “education or child-rearing” (2007: 125).    
 
Critics of genetic enhancement do, however, seek to make a distinction, of the sort which 
Harris rejects above, between attempts which parents make to alter their children‟s natures 
through education and child-rearing and attempts which make use of genetic enhancement.  
They consider such a distinction as lying in the attitude towards the parental project which is 
expressed in attempts to genetically enhance one‟s children – an attitude which they regard as 
destructive of an appropriate parental mind-set.  I will consider this argument next.   
 
The parental project  
 
Proponents of arguments from meaning regard parental interventions which aim at the genetic 
enhancement of their children to be a particularly troubling form of the drive to mastery.  
                                                 
26
 There are obvious overlaps between this argument and the goal compatibility arguments which will be 
considered later in this chapter.  Both rely upon some notion of natural or normal human functioning to ground 
their claims. 
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What concerns these critics is that parents who choose to genetically enhance their children 
(probably at an embryonic level) will be expressing an attitude which is wrongheaded in the 
context of what we currently regard to be appropriate models of parenting. 
 
Sandel‟s argument in this regard stems from his discussion of the notion of “givenness”, as 
discussed above.  The appreciation of givenness is central to what Sandel suggests is the 
proper attitude of parents towards their children.  This attitude entails an “openness to the 
unbidden” (2007: 86), which implies a commitment to the appreciation of children as “gifts”, 
and a willingness to “accept them as they come, not as objects of our design, or products of 
our will, or instruments of our ambition” (2007: 45).  Genetic enhancement in this context is 
therefore regarded as illegitimate because of the disposition it expresses – the “anxious excess 
of mastery and dominion that misses the sense of life as a gift” (2007: 62)27.  The central 
concern here is that parents might begin to regard their children as products, which would 
undermine the unconditional love and acceptance which we currently regard as foundational 
to the proper parental stance (Bostrom 2004: 497).   
 
Of course, much of the parental project as it is currently conceived involves active attempts to 
improve one‟s children, through means such as education and moral instruction, as mentioned 
above.  However, Kass believes that such traditional modes of child-rearing are distinct from 
genetic enhancement, as the latter is conducted with an idea of “what it takes to grow up to 
lead a decent, civilized, and independent life”, where such an idea is based upon “cultural 
teachings that have stood the test of time” rather than the drive to achieve “wilful control over 
our own natures” (2003: 19).   
 
A further concern with regard to the relation between genetic enhancement and the parental 
project is the worry that the use of genetic enhancement will restrict the autonomy of 
enhanced children.  Because genetic enhancement is seen as an attempt to determine the 
characteristics of a person, some critics believe that in the case of parents choosing to enhance 
their children, this process could be overly deterministic (McKibben 2003: 25), as parents 
could make choices expressing their own idea of the good life, which will curtail possible life 
choices for their children and for future generations (Birch 2005: 22, Cooke 2003: 37, Dekker 
2009: 91).  Kass refers to this as the problem of “genetic despotism of one generation over the 
next” (2003: 16). 
                                                 
27
 Sandel does not see this problem as arising solely in the context of genetic enhancement, but believes that it is 
also evident in other “high-pressure child-rearing practices” (2007: 52). 
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Of course, it is not the case that in the absence of genetic enhancement, children are entirely 
free in terms of the establishment of their characteristics and their choice of life plans.  The 
genetic lottery ensures that we are all born subject to a particular genetic makeup, the 
selection of which is beyond our control.  Habermas, however, argues that there is a moral 
difference between the determination of one‟s characteristics by the genetic lottery and (at 
least partial) determination of one‟s characteristics by means of genetic enhancements chosen 
by one‟s parents.  He describes this moral difference as lying in the introduction of a 
“previously unheard-of interpersonal relationship [that] arises when a person makes an 
irreversible decision about the natural traits of another person” that restricts “the fundamental 
symmetry of responsibility that exists among free and equal persons” (2003: 14).  Habermas 
suggests that this is because genetic enhancement deprives the enhanced individual of the 
opportunity to take up a “revisionary” stance towards self-understanding, which would restore 
the balance to the “asymmetrical responsibility that parents have for their child‟s upbringing”.  
Rather the affected individual would remain “blindly independent on the nonrevisable 
decision of the other” (2003: 14). 
 
Harris and Lewens criticise Sandel‟s conception of the appropriate parental attitude as being 
one which is “open to the unbidden” (Sandel 2007: 86).  Openness to the unbidden implies an 
attitude which accepts the contingent characteristics of the children one might have with 
unconditional love.  However, Harris points out that “openness to the unbidden also implies 
openness to disease, misfortune and calamity – things which parents and other members of 
society try to avoid and prevent, and which they are morally congratulated for” (2007: 116).  
Lewens argues, in addition to this, that there is “no contradiction in parents being disposed to 
love their children however they might turn out, while seeking to influence their children‟s 
lives so that they go as well as possible” (2009: 355) – in fact, we would usually regard 
parents who seek such influence to be fulfilling an important parental duty.   
 
Bostrom, too, rejects the notion that genetic enhancement technologies will necessarily 
undermine unconditional parental love.  Calling upon the example of in vitro fertilization, 
which evoked similar concerns in the past, he notes that the evidence suggests that “[p]arents 
will in fact love and respect their children even when artificial means and conscious choice 
play a part in procreation” (2004: 497).  To assume or predict that the use of genetic 
enhancement in reproduction will necessarily or self-evidently undermine or distort the 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 44 
 
parental project, and the relationship between parent and child, is to assume too much without 
any empirical assurances that this will indeed be the case (Buchanan 2011: 10).  
 
The argument against genetic enhancement from the perspective of the distortion of the 
parental project also faces a further criticism, specifically with regard to its concerns that 
genetic interventions will reduce the autonomy and freedom of enhanced children whose 
parents have chosen those interventions.  This criticism is that these concerns seem to be 
vulnerable to accusations of adherence to genetic determinism, an attitude which I have 
discussed in Chapter 2.  To determine or manipulate (some) of our genetic characteristics 
does not, by any stretch of the imagination, imply that the actual expression of genes in terms 
of attributes and behaviours will be determined solely by the presence or absence of these 
genes, and therefore the idea of parents prescribing life plans for their children which they 
will necessarily conform to is unscientific.  This point is made by Agar (2004: 126), and 
Buchanan, who accuses Habermas of subscribing to “the crudest sort of genetic determinism” 
(2011: 5) in his insistence that “[b]eing at odds with the genetically fixed intention of a third 
person is hopeless [as t]he genetic program is a mute and...unanswerable fact” (Habermas 
2003: 62).  If Habermas does not intend to express this sort of genetic determinism, but rather 
intends to say something about the “self-perception” of individuals as “being the undivided 
author of [their] own li[ves]” (2003: 63, my italics) - in other words that the individual could 
not “regard [themselves] as free”28 (Buchanan 2011: 5) - this also fails to convince.  If, in the 
first place, this intends to convey that the individual would not be empirically capable of 
regarding herself as free, this is based upon “a vast empirical generalization about what 
people are...capable of thinking, without a shred of evidence to support it”, and in the second, 
if Habermas means that the individual could not “correctly” see themselves as free (Buchanan 
2011: 5), this once again falls back into the trap of genetic determinism (Buchanan 2011: 6, 
McConnell 2011a: 5).  In addition, the opposition which this argument constructs between 
environmental and genetic enhancement, in terms of their respective effects upon autonomy, 
underestimates the extent of control which parents already exert over the phenotype of their 
children via the method of environmental enhancement (Buchanan et al. 2000: 160).     
 
                                                 
28
 Tonkens describes Habermas‟s position as follows: “even though the enhanced child may turn out to be just as 
autonomous...as nongenetically manipulated humans, the worry is that she may nonetheless not come to 
understand herself as being able to decide for herself what kind of life she will lead.  The difference would be in 
her mental orientation and in her (admittedly misguided) understanding of herself as someone whose life course 
was dictated to her by her parents based on the fact that she was genetically altered” (2011: 277).  Tonkens 
implies that this position assumes that genetically altered children would be more likely than others to subscribe 
to the (false) doctrine of genetic determinism (2011: 291).  However, no empirical evidence is provided to 
support this claim (2011: 281). 
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Agar also suggests that it might be possible for regulation of enhancement technologies to 
exclude the possibility of parents making use of very specific enhancements that would 
obviously “rule out plans founded on conceptions of the good life radically opposed to the 
parents‟ conception” (2004: 106).  In other words, the suggestion is that the (legal) 
availability of enhancements should constrict choice by limiting accessible interventions to 
those suitable to pursuing a wide range of life plans, rather than operating to constrict free 
choice (Brock 1998: 55, Kline 2007: 20-21, Schmidt 2007: 195).  In other words, only 
enhancement of attributes which are largely neutral with regard to competing conceptions of 
the good should be endorsed (Dekker 2009: 98).   
 
If such safeguards were to be introduced, it is likely that enhancements could in fact operate 
to expand autonomy.  Provided that improvements are not limiting (in that they are beneficial 
only with regard to the achievement of a very specific life plan), enhancement could be 
regarded as an intervention aimed at “intentionally promoting [children‟s] expected 
autonomy” as “children with greater talents...will have more options open to them” 
(Savulescu & Kahane 2009: 282).  There are many enhancements (Lewens suggests an 
increased attention span, for example) which would be beneficial in all or most conceptions of 
the good life.  These enhancements, even if chosen by another, would not seem to violate 
what Feinberg refers to as a child‟s “right to an open future” (1980: 124), and their use would 
therefore not necessarily conflict with, but could promote, good parenting (Bostrom 2004: 
499, Davis 2008: 264, Newson &Williamson 1999: 339, Schmidt 2007: 191). 
 
This argument is not incompatible with the conviction that “we may have genuine ethical 
concerns with the efforts of some parents to use some enhancements” where these efforts are 
an expression of “procrustean parenting” (Lewens 2009: 356) and are directed towards 
enforcing a particular life plan upon their children.  However, this does not constitute an 
argument against enhancement as whole - the problem here is bad parenting rather than the 
enhancement technologies themselves (Caplan 2009: 208, Savulescu & Kahane 2009: 284), 
and such examples of bad parenting are already prevalent, as acknowledged by Sandel, in “the 
heavily managed, high-pressure child-rearing practices that have become common these days” 
(2007: 52).  Such a parental attitude is morally troubling in the level of control which it seeks 
over the lives of children, but the fact that it could be manifested through the technology of 
genetic enhancement does not imply that all choices in favour of enhancement would 
necessarily express such an attitude.  Harris argues (2007: 125) that it is instead likely that 
most parents will still approach the decision to enhance with what Kass refers to as an idea of 
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“what it takes to grow up to lead a decent, civilized, and independent life”, informed by the 
same “cultural teaching that have stood the test of time” (Kass 2003: 19) that currently govern 
child-rearing practices.  Harris points out that “these teachings tell us to do the best for our 
kids and to give them whatever advantages we can” (2007: 125), an aspiration that does not 
necessarily come into conflict with enhancement technologies. 
 
The structure of agency and the value of effort 
 
Michael Sandel advances a further objection to genetic enhancement which primarily 
considers the means by which this technology will bring about improvement.  In his view, 
“[o]ne aspect of our humanity that might be threatened by enhancement and genetic 
engineering is our capacity to act freely, for ourselves, by our own efforts, and to consider 
ourselves responsible – worthy of praise or blame – for the things we do and for the way we 
are” (2007: 25).  Sandel‟s implication here is that “enhancement threatens human agency” 
(2007: 26) because our achievements could no longer be regarded as flowing (entirely) from 
our own action, but would rather be the result of technological achievement.    
 
Sandel‟s point here is related to the value we ascribe to the effort which we expend in 
achieving our goals.  Enhancement technologies, in the point of view of some critics, bypass 
the “substantial discipline and effort” which we currently invest in our attempts to “produce 
the desired feature or capability” and negates the fact that “a valued human activity is 
[sometimes] defined in part by the means it employs, not just by the end at which it aims” 
(Brock 1998: 58).  We ascribe virtue to the means which are employed when our advantages 
are acquired through effort and hard work, and therefore regard the resulting advantages as 
honourable and deserved.  The advantages that could be acquired through genetic 
enhancement, however, would be regarded as unmerited, as they are not acquired through 
such virtuous means (Mehlman 2003: 112).  
 
Kass also argues that the striving for self-improvement is valuable in and of itself (as opposed 
to the passive improvement granted by genetic enhancement) as this partially constitutes “the 
deep structure of natural human activity” (2003: 22).  Genetic enhancement is therefore 
problematic because it “produce[s] changes in us by disrupting the normal character of human 
being-at-work-in-the-world” (2003: 24), which is characterised by our recognition of “the 
relation between our doings and the resulting improvement [and] between the means used and 
the end sought” (2003: 22).   
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Harris objects to this account of the value of effort.  In his view, despite the fact that it would 
seem that genetic enhancement represents a shortcut, we can still “take pride in our choice of 
appropriate means to our ends”.  In addition, he points out that many enhancing technologies 
“leave plenty of room for effort, skill training [and] hard work” (2007: 133).  This is 
particularly the case for genetic enhancements, which, as has been noted in Chapter 2, will 
only affect genotypes.  The causal relationship between genotypes and phenotypes will vary, 
and will depend upon environmental influences, including one‟s own actions and efforts, a 
point which Sandel concedes in his assertion that “the roles of effort and enhancement will be 
a matter of degree” (2007: 25).  While enhanced individuals may be engineered for high 
levels of intelligence, for example, this genetic disposition is worthless without education, 
with all the associated effort in terms of study and discipline which that implies. 
 
Allhoff also makes two points in opposition to an argument against genetic enhancement from 
the perspective of the value of effort.  Firstly, he points out that “successive generations have 
always had more resources available to them than previous generations”, and that we 
routinely expend less effort in the achievement of our goals than our ancestors.  Motorised 
transport, technological study aids, and domestic appliances, amongst other technologies, 
have greatly reduced the effort and transformed the means by which we realise our ends.  We 
do not regard this as problematic, or the ultimate achievement of our goal as any less 
laudable, as a result.  Secondly, he points out that some people, due to their genetic 
advantages as provided by the genetic lottery, do not need to expend as much effort to achieve 
their objectives as others.  We do not regard their accomplishments as any less valuable, or 
any less their own, despite this (2005: 46).  In addition to this point, many of the advantages 
that members of society enjoy, such as the advantages enjoyed by children born into wealthy 
families, are undeserved, and are not the result of their own efforts (Mehlman 2003: 112).  
Genetic enhancement would therefore not seem to represent an unprecedented departure from 
the existing state of affairs.   
 
Taken together, these counter arguments suggest that genetic enhancement may not represent 
the kind of novel disruption to human agency that critics of enhancement suggest it would.  
However, there is a final argument against enhancement from the need to preserve human 
values which also criticises the posited easy solutions which genetic enhancement offers.   
This argument emphasises the importance of vulnerability to human nature. 
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The goodness of fragility 
 
Human beings are by nature vulnerable creatures, and are susceptible to misfortune, adversity, 
disease and disability.  Critics of enhancement technologies suggest that the revolutionary 
potential of genetic enhancement to reduce or nullify this human fragility is morally 
problematic.  The reasoning behind this position is that the physical and mental frailties of 
human beings, which will be the targets of enhancing technologies, are in fact valuable 
aspects of the human condition, or, in other words, that “the limitations” which our bodies 
impose upon us with regard to the achievement of our goals “might have ethical significance 
that [will be] imperilled by efforts...to overcome all such limitations” (McKenny 1998: 223). 
 
Winkler argues in this regard that the “power over uncertainty or contingency” (1998: 242) 
which enhancement technologies offer us could lead to a sacrifice of our “full humanity” 
(1998: 248), as this humanity is partially constituted by a tendency to “love and honour the 
body in all its fragility, imperfection and finitude” (1998: 249).  Why should we feel that the 
fragility of the body is something to be valued, taking into account that much of the history of 
civilisation represents an attempt to overcome it?  One of the principal answers offered in 
reply to this question is that the experience of our frailty and vulnerability makes possible 
important modes of “self-formation” in our responses to adversity (McKenny 1998: 235).  
Our failure to recognise “the goodness of fragility” (Parens 1995: 141), then, will actually 
impoverish rather than improve human beings, by, for example, obliterating the experience of 
caring for others who are more vulnerable than ourselves, or by removing the opportunity to 
develop capacities of perseverance and forbearance in response to our own finitude. 
 
Kass extends the argument that fragility is the basis of many valuable human capacities and 
attitudes as follows: 
 
[T]here is a connection between the possibility of feeling deep unhappiness and the prospects 
for achieving genuine happiness.  If one cannot grieve, one has not loved.  To be capable of 
aspiration, one must know and feel lack.  As Wallace Stevens put it: Not to have is the 
beginning of desire.  There is, in short, a double-barrelled error in the pursuit of ageless bodies 
and factitiously happy souls: human fulfilment depends on our being creatures of need and 
finitude and hence of longings and attachment (2003: 27).   
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Critics of this argument against genetic enhancement point out that enhancement technologies 
would not make us invulnerable (Harris 2007: 68), and would therefore not remove all 
adversity or contingency from our lives (Buchanan 2011: 81, Savulescu 2007: 287) – 
enhancement does not offer heaven on earth.  Is it still problematic that genetic enhancement 
is at least directed towards the eradication of human fragility, even if this is a goal which can 
never be completely accomplished? 
 
It is not clear to all commentators on the enhancement debate why this should be so, or why 
human fragility should be regarded as a valuable aspect of functioning that it is central to 
human nature.  This perspective is based upon a particular worldview which is not universally 
shared.  Rather, some critics insist that it is not “intuitively obvious that there is 
necessarily...anything good about aging, or death, or human fragility” and believe that “the 
use of genetic enhancement to address these issues would be valuable” (Allhoff 2005: 45).  
Indeed, the use of multiple technologies to counteract such frailty has been regarded as 
morally laudable over the course of history, and it is unclear why genetic interventions should 
be an exception to this.  Savulescu characterises positions which reject genetic enhancement 
on the basis that it will reduce human frailty as expressing the warped argument that “because 
life is unpredictable, and good can come out of bad, we should choose the bad or be 
indifferent to it, or allow it to occur...when we can easily and forseeably avoid it” (2007: 286).  
This is an argument which fails to convince proponents of genetic enhancement.  Rather, 
critics such as Harris suggest that “removing limits from our bodies and minds” will not 
reduce the possibilities for human fulfilment, but will make our lives “fuller” than their 
unenhanced versions (2007: 136).  Thus, Harris argues that arguments against genetic 
enhancement from the goodness of fragility are founded upon a particular “conception of the 
scope of life and its possibilities”, and a restriction of genetic enhancement based on this 
particular worldview would be “tyrannical” in the face of competing conceptions of the good 
life which do not regard frailty as an important human value which ought to be preserved 
(2007: 137).   
 
Is the transformation of human nature ethically concerning? 
 
The arguments against genetic enhancement from the perspective of human nature are 
concerned that this technology will undermine our capacity to be fully human, either in terms 
of our genetic species identity, or in terms of our ability to live authentic human lives, as 
constituted by the presence of certain values and attitudes which are posited as giving these 
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lives uniquely human meaning.  The criticism of these positions argue either that these 
arguments are mistaken in their perception that genetic enhancement will threaten our 
humanity, as they rest on a confused understanding of the concept of human nature (Daniels 
2009: 25), or that, even if enhancement does hold the possibility that human nature will be 
transformed, this is not necessarily ethically concerning, and our discomfort at this prospect is 
misplaced.   
 
This is, firstly, because attempts to alter human nature are hardly new.  Human nature has not 
only been subject to change through evolutionary processes, but also through our own 
environmental interventions (Daniels 2009: 33).  Compared to human beings of the not-too-
distant past, today “we are taller, we live longer, we have more inclusive ethical codes” 
(Lewens 2009: 354).  These are changes that are at least partially the result of human action, 
including the use of technological interventions.  Opponents of the argument against genetic 
enhancement from the perspective that human nature should be preserved therefore aver that 
it is unlikely that the transformation of human nature could be considered an “ethical 
firebreak” (Lewens 2009: 355) which excludes any future attempt to pursue enhancement 
technologies.  Secondly, these critics posit that genetic enhancement has great potential to 
transform human nature for the better without necessarily endangering important goods which 
we value – our evolved human identities “contain...bad as well as good characteristics and 
there is no reason to believe that eliminating some of the bad would so imperil the good as to 
make the elimination of the bad impermissible” (Buchanan 2009: 141).  Finally, 
transhumanists argue that even if genetic enhancement, in its capacity to “develop greater 
capacities...of a far higher order than those we can realize as un-enhanced biological human 
beings” (Bostrom 2004: 495), does have the potential to radically transform human meaning, 
it could also offer new and unimagined forms of meaning to our lives which we currently 
cannot contemplate (Agar 2004: 62), and which a restriction on genetic enhancement would 
unjustifiable deny us. 
 
I will now consider a further group of arguments against genetic enhancement which consider 
not the effect of genetic enhancement upon the preservation or transformation of human 
nature, but instead consider whether a rejection of genetic enhancement technologies might be 
warranted because of the likelihood that such interventions would bring about bad 
consequences.   
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Consequentialist arguments 
 
Consequentialist arguments against genetic enhancement hold that there are negative 
consequences which are likely to follow from the use of enhancing technologies.  As these 
consequences are ethically undesirable, proponents of these arguments contend that we should 
seek to avoid them, and should therefore refrain from practicing genetic enhancement.  In 
other words, the contention is that a risk-benefit analysis of the consequences of genetic 
enhancement shows that the possible benefits of this practice are outweighed by their 
potential to bring about harm (Brock 2005: 391, Buchanan 2008: 2).  There are two 
possibilities here.  On the one hand, genetic enhancement, despite the benefits that it might 
appear to offer, may also have negative consequences for the person who is enhanced, 
implying that the balance of benefits and harms produces a negative result for the enhanced 
individual overall.  On the other, although genetic enhancement may benefit the individual, 
the result of many individual decisions to enhance may be bad for society, which could result 
in tension between autonomous individual decisions and the interests of the community as a 
whole (Brock 2005: 378). 
 
The first risk of genetic enhancement to be considered is the possibly medically hazardous 
nature of enhancement technologies, a risk which affects the enhanced individual.  Critics 
express the concern that the practice of genetic enhancement will be dangerous, as the nature 
of genetic interventions render them particularly vulnerable to the risk of unintended 
consequences.  The remaining three sets of negative consequences which I will consider are 
consequences for society as a whole.  Firstly, I will examine the suggestion that the use of 
enhancing technologies will result in increased levels of injustice, as inequitable access to 
such technologies will exacerbate social and global inequalities.  Secondly, I will consider the 
possibility that the practice of genetic enhancement could rely upon and perpetuate existing 
prejudice, and engender new forms of discrimination based on the presence or absence of 
enhanced characteristics.  Finally, I will summarise the position which holds that the adoption 
of genetic enhancement technologies will partially be driven by social pressure.  The 
contention here is that the resulting widespread use of enhancement technologies could result 
in homogenization, or could lead to the goal of enhancing interventions being negated by their 
becoming self-defeating.  
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Risks to the individual: genetic enhancement is medically hazardous  
 
The first consequentialist argument against genetic enhancement is that the procedure may be 
medically hazardous (Anderson 1989: 686, Borenstein 2009: 524, Kamm 2009: 127, Kass 
2003: 14, Mehlman 2003: 71, The President‟s Council on Bioethics 2003: 48), in that it could 
go wrong, and inadvertently cause (possibly irreversible) harm to the recipient of the intended 
genetic intervention, as well as to their offspring and descendants.    
 
While the possibility of dangerous and unforeseen side-effects is always a relevant concern in 
choosing whether to embark upon new medical procedures, genetic enhancement (and genetic 
engineering in general) is seen as particularly vulnerable to such concerns.  As already 
discussed in Chapter 2, the pleiotropic nature of genes, in that most genes appear to have 
more than one function (Coors & Hunter 2005: 21) and to affect more than one body system 
(Gardner 1995: 68) implies that it may be difficult for researchers to predict the entire effect 
of a given genetic intervention.  Coors and Hunter draw our attention to an incidence of 
genetic intervention in mice, which caused over-expression of the p53 gene.  This 
intervention reduced the incidence of cancer in the affected mice, but also significantly 
lessened their life expectancy (2005: 21).  This example illustrates the danger that “even 
modest alterations in the best studied genes...can have completely unexpected consequences 
for aspects of the organism that were not at all suspected to be related to the function of the 
gene”, even when the attempted intervention is therapeutic, and that these unexpected 
consequences may reveal themselves only some time after the intervention (Coors & Hunter 
2005: 22).   
 
This risk is amplified, as previously discussed, by the polygenic nature of most complex 
human traits which would likely be the targets of enhancement interventions (Agar 2004: 29, 
Robertson 2003: 477).  It is possible that successful genetic enhancement would require the 
manipulation of multiple genes, thus increasing the risk of unintended and harmful 
consequences, due to the pleiotropic nature of each altered gene.  Therefore, it seems possible 
that doctors contemplating genetic interventions will not be sure whether they will 
“unexpectedly harm” their proposed subjects (Fletcher 1983: 516).   
 
A second point which is raised in support of the particularly hazardous nature of genetic 
engineering has to do with the inheritability of germline genetic interventions. Genetic 
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interventions are usually classified as somatic cell or germline interventions
29
.  Somatic cell 
genetic interventions (whether therapeutic or enhancing) entail “the insertion of a...gene into 
somatic, or body, cells of a patient”, while germline interventions, often viewed as more 
controversial, aim at genetic alterations at the level of the “gametic cells” in such a way that 
“children of the patient would receive the [altered] gene” (Anderson 1989:682).  Germline 
genetic interventions, even in their therapeutic manifestations, are unique technological 
interventions in that their effects would not be limited to the treated patient, but would be 
passed onto their offspring (Brock 1998: 62, Murray 1991: 58).  Where the safety of a 
particular intervention has not been established, or, more pertinently, where unforeseen 
negative effects of an intervention are delayed, the future person may be harmed by a genetic 
intervention which affects them but which they have not consented to.  The possibility of 
“unpredictable [and] long term iatrogenic risks” (Juengst 1991: 590) may be a good reason to 
avoid at least germline genetic interventions which could “allow untold numbers of people to 
be put at a significant risk of harm” (Berger & Gert 1991: 68). 
 
Finally, the medical risks associated with genetic enhancement may be greater than those 
associated with therapeutic genetic interventions, as “enhancements may have relatively broad 
effects on complex, multifactorial traits” (Brock 1998: 61).  Anderson suggest that “replacing 
a faulty part is different from trying to add something new to a normally functioning, 
technically complex system” and that “correcting a defect in the genome” is less likely to 
“endanger the overall metabolic balance of the individual cells as well as the entire body” 
(1989: 686) than enhancement.   
 
Thus critics argue that genetic enhancement is likely to be medically risky, not simply 
because genetic enhancement would be a novel technical procedure, but also because the 
nature of the practice itself makes it particularly vulnerable to danger.  However, the fact that 
a procedure is risky does not necessarily give us reason to avoid it, if the potential benefits 
would be very great.  For example, we might have reason to undertake an extremely risky 
medical procedure if we knew that the potential benefit (for example, the preservation of life) 
would be so great as to justify this risk.  Critics of genetic enhancement, however, hold that 
the benefits of genetic enhancement would never be as great as the benefits of a therapeutic 
intervention.  In other words, a risk-benefit analysis of a proposed instance of genetic therapy 
and genetic enhancement respectively would always give us greater reason to proceed with 
                                                 
29
 See for further discussion on this distinction Anderson (1989: 682), Juengst (1997: 125-126), and Murray 
(1991: 58). 
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the former intervention than with the latter, even if the risks are comparable, because the 
benefits of therapy, particularly with regard to the relief of suffering and the restoration of 
species-typical functioning, are clearer than the benefits of enhancement
30
 (The President‟s 
Council on Bioethics 2003: 39). 
   
Not all commentators are convinced that medical risk is a definitive argument against the 
practice of genetic enhancement.  While safety concerns, particularly with regard to new and 
revolutionary interventions, should be at the forefront of researchers‟ minds, these seem to 
suggest the need for the utmost caution, rather than the need for an outright ban on genetic 
interventions, whether they are aimed at therapy or enhancement (Baylis & Robert 2004: 14, 
Glover 1984: 43).  If genetic interventions are inherently more risky than other novel medical 
interventions, this simply calls for more caution, not a complete rejection of genetic 
technologies.  If it can be shown, through extended and careful research, and controlled 
clinical testing, that genetic interventions can overcome the difficulties identified above, and 
could be practiced in a relatively safe and effective manner, this objection simply disappears. 
 
Secondly, the possible effect of enhancements on future generations is not unique to genetic 
interventions.  As Moseley points out, “[h]umans alive today do many things which may have 
unforeseeable and negative consequences for future generations but which appear ethically 
acceptable” and that normal procreation in general is subject to this very same complaint 
(1991: 643).  If we assume that rational persons will not choose interventions that run clear 
risks of bringing about obviously negative consequences for their offspring and descendants, 
we cannot reject genetic interventions purely on the basis of remote and vague risks which 
have not been proven without calling into question many other human practices, especially in 
the realm of scientific interventions, which we currently consider to be not only ethically 
acceptable, but desirable. 
 
If the use of genetic interventions does imply an element of risk, it may well be true that 
“where there is an appreciable degree of risk...the benefit of an enhancement that produces 
some trivial improvement to the quality of an already good life might be judged less valuable 
than an intervention that saves a life or dramatically ameliorates a genetic disease” (Harris & 
Chan 2008: 339).  However, this does not rule out enhancement where the risk-benefit ratio is 
more favourable, and ultimately, critics argue that this judgement should be performed on a 
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 This point is echoed in the goal compatibility arguments against enhancement which will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
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case-by-case basis and by the individual concerned (Harris & Chan 2008: 339).  The 
argument that a risk-benefit analysis of interventions aimed at improvement rather than 
therapy will be more likely to suggest that genetic enhancement should be avoided also 
ignores the “significant benefits” which many forms of enhancement offer (Agar 2004: 163), 
and therefore cannot rule out the practice of genetic enhancement in general.   
 
Neither is the obligation to responsibly evaluate the risks and benefits of genetic enhancement 
unique to this practice.  Rather, an “insistence on rigorous risk assessment and on only 
proceeding if in all the circumstances of the case the risks are acceptable is a feature not only 
of all medical and scientific advance but of all human decision making whatsoever” (Harris 
2007: 33).  Kass echoes this point: “many good things in life are filled with risks, and free 
people if properly informed may choose to run them”.  Ultimately, “the big issues” with 
regard to the ethics of genetic enhancement “have nothing to do with safety”, and “the ethical 
issue of avoiding risk and bodily harm is independent of whether the risky intervention aims 
at treating disease or at something beyond it” (2003: 15). 
 
Thus the risks of genetic enhancement, with regard to the possibility of its safe application, 
cannot provide a definitive argument against this practice.  The risks involved accrue to the 
enhanced person, and as such, critics argue that these should be evaluated by the individual 
concerned.  I will now turn to three sets of possible societal consequences of genetic 
enhancement which critics have identified as militating against the development and use of 
enhancement technologies altogether. 
 
Risks to society: genetic enhancement and difference 
 
The risks to society which critics attribute to the practice of genetic enhancement are all 
associated with the effects of difference.  Genetic enhancement of human beings aims at the 
improvement of human characteristics – “in the context of interventions which impact on 
human functioning, an enhancement is clearly anything that makes a change, a difference for 
the better” (Harris 2007: 36).  In other words, the goal of enhancement is to bring about a 
change for the better in a particular human feature or a multitude of features, so that a 
differentiation can be made between the unenhanced, inferior quality of a particular 
characteristic and the enhanced, superior quality.  This is the central motivation for the 
genetic enhancement of human beings.  It is also the source of some of the central concerns, 
in terms of the effect of genetic enhancement upon society, which many critics have identified 
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as militating against current research into and the future practice of genetic enhancement. 
These are concerns about the effect of genetic enhancement on social justice and inequality, 
the possibility that the use of genetic enhancement will rely upon, perpetuate, or engender 
discrimination, and the prospect of the exertion of social pressure in favour of enhancement.  
As Buchanan points out, these concerns are situated within the framing assumption that the 
benefits of enhancement are primarily accrued to the individual, and that this benefit should 
be balanced against the possibility of “social or collective harms” which the (widespread) use 
of enhancement may bring about (2011: 36).   
 
Genetic enhancement will contribute towards injustice 
 
As indicated above, concerns about the compatibility of genetic enhancement and justice are 
specifically related to the qualitative difference between enhanced and unenhanced future 
members of society.  The worry here is that genetic enhancement will bring about profound 
inequalities between individuals and groups in society which will be unjust, particularly when 
the inequalities brought about by genetic enhancement will be based upon, and will serve to 
widen, existing social inequalities, and particularly, the gap between the rich and the poor 
(Brock 1998: 59-60, Cooke 2003: 34, Davis 2009: 149, Mehlman 2003: 109).    
 
The reasoning behind this argument is easy to grasp - if genetic enhancement technologies 
are, at least initially, expensive procedures which are not covered by national health schemes 
or health insurance, they will be purchased on the free market, and it is likely that only those 
who are already financially advantaged will be able to make use of them, for themselves and 
for their children
31
.  These genetic interventions will bring about improvements which will in 
turn provide “advantages in competitions for social goods such as wealth, status or power”32 
(Gardner 1995: 69).  This improved ability to compete will therefore increase the variance of 
the distribution of social goods (Gardner 1995: 74), contributing to “the widening gap 
between the well-off and the less-so” (Robert & Baylis 2004: 12).  Parens expresses this 
concern as follows: “[t]hose who already have economic resources will readily gain access to 
new technologies.  And those new technologies will make them stronger competitors for more 
resources” (1998a: S8).  Similar concerns are raised by, among others, Gordon (1999), 
Juengst (1998), Kiuru & Crystal (2008), McKibben (2003), and Mehlman (2003).    
                                                 
31
 DeGrazia considers the equivalent case of cosmetic pharmacology and identifies a similar problem (2000:38). 
32
 The question as to whether genetic (and other) enhancements are valuable because they are good for the 
enhanced person in themselves or because they confer a competitive advantage will be discussed later in this 
chapter.  
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Some critics have concerns which extend beyond the likely tendency of genetic enhancement 
to amplify existing social divisions.  They worry that the sustained use of enhancement 
technologies over time will have the potential to create a “genetic aristocracy” (Faust 2008: 
411).  In other words, they are concerned that the discrepancy in the availability of genetic 
enhancement, where this discrepancy tends to advantage those in society who are already 
better off, and where this advantage is compounded over time as the enhanced are 
increasingly competitively privileged, will create two distinct classes of human beings 
(America’s Next Ethical War 2001: 22) and that this stratified class system will result in the 
disappearance of the current (albeit limited) possibility of “mobility between the lower and 
the upper classes” (Bostrom 2004: 502). 
 
Taking this suggestion even further, some critics worry that if enhanced capabilities are 
inheritable, these two classes may eventually develop into “subspecies” (Baylis & Robert 
2004: 9, Sandel 2004: 52).  This is a concern that has already been discussed in the first 
section of this chapter, but is relevant here in the light of the possibility that the 
human/posthuman divide will run along the current lines of disadvantage/advantage.  The 
concern discussed previously as to the possibility that the development of subspecies will 
undermine moral commonality is raised here again in the worry that this divide will interrupt 
notions of justice as each group fails to identify with the other as fellow members of a 
distributive community (Annas 2001). 
 
This problem of moral identification is also raised by Sandel in his discussion of the notion of 
“solidarity”.  He argues that “perfect genetic control would erode the actual solidarity that 
arises when men and women reflect on the contingency of their talents and fortunes” (2007: 
92).  The contention here is that appreciation of the “giftedness” of our genetic attributes 
tends to lead us to regard the relative advantages and disadvantages bestowed upon us as 
contingent, rather than as a result of our own achievements, and therefore, the more 
advantaged are more inclined to share, to some extent, the fruits of these advantages with, and 
to take an interest in, the fate of those who have been less fortunate in the genetic lottery 
“through no fault of their own” (2007:91).  If, however, our attributes are no longer the result 
of chance, but within the realm of human control (and are therefore the result of our own 
achievement), this has the potential to undermine this attitude.  Sandel seems to be suggesting 
that the use of genetic enhancement could lead to a form of moral degeneration in society, in 
that the eradication of the appreciation of the “giftedness” (2007: 85) of human attributes and 
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the “explosion of responsibility” (2007: 88) for the determination of genetic traits could lead 
to a general devaluation of the demands of justice (particularly distributive justice), which 
currently relies upon the idea that members of society are not (entirely) responsible for the 
position in which they find themselves, and that therefore other members of society owe them 
solidarity and some form of compensation for disadvantage.  
 
The issue of the effect of genetic enhancement upon justice is not only relevant within 
societies, but also between societies (Harris 1992: 197, Mehlman 2003: 127). There is already 
concern that the goods of new biotechnological advances may not be made available in many 
African countries as a result of their prohibitive cost (Benatar 1998: 169).  It is likely that this 
pattern would be continued with regard to enhancement technologies, and that countries and 
societies which are already advantaged materially in comparison to others may enjoy the 
benefit of the genetic enhancement of their citizens, while poorer countries cannot (Harris 
2007: 62, Singer 2009: 286).   
 
In particular, in countries where greater provision is made for access to healthcare beyond the 
primary level, it is likely that genetic enhancement will be distributed more equitably among 
the population than in countries where only the wealthy will be able to fund it. This implies 
that the ethical issues at stake in any discussion of genetic enhancement are not confined to 
the sphere of personal morality, but are significant in terms of global bioethics. This is 
particularly relevant in the African context, where the distribution of healthcare resources, and 
particularly the just distribution of global health resources, is already a major ethical concern.  
Davis articulates the concern that genetic enhancement may represent a misallocation of 
resources in a context where the basic health needs of millions of people remain unfulfilled
33
 - 
a concern also expressed by Kass (2003: 15) and Mwase (2005: 87-88) - as follows: 
 
[I]t is unjust to be devoting resources to longer and better lives for citizens of First World 
nations, when people in Swaziland barely make it to their thirties.  After all, we already know 
how to save millions of lives and how to make other millions of lives dramatically better.  We 
do not need genetic engineering to provide all children with mosquito netting or vaccinate
34
 
everyone against measles (2009: 149).  
 
                                                 
33
 Buchanan argues that even the need for basic nutrition is not currently being met, which itself could be 
considered a form of cognitive enhancement: “adequate nutrition...allows people to function better 
cognitively...than malnourished people in less developed countries” (2008: 9).  
34
 In fact, vaccination is a technological enhancement: see Buchanan (2008: 9).  I will revisit this in the next 
chapter.   
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Not only do critics worry that research into genetic engineering will represent a misallocation 
of funds in the context of grossly unequal global access to basic, existing medical therapies, 
but also that such costly research may deplete the resources available for research into 
conventional medical therapies, particularly research into the treatment of diseases which 
primarily affect the developing world. (Baylis & Robert 2004: 15, Kamm 2005: 13). Is it just, 
for example, that research into the technology of genetic enhancement should eat up resources 
which could be better used for additional research into tropical diseases such as malaria?
35
  
Or, “given our scarce resources, should enhancement be at the top of the list of things to 
which we should be attending?” (Kamm 2005: 13).   
 
It is indisputable that enhancement technologies, not distributed equally to all members of 
society, will create inequality.  As pointed out above, this stems from the very nature of 
genetic enhancements themselves.  The aim of these technologies is to create a qualitative 
difference between human characteristics, where the enhanced characteristic can be 
considered better than the unenhanced characteristic.  On average, this will imply a qualitative 
difference between the characteristics of the enhanced and the unenhanced in general.  There 
is no doubt, therefore, that if some are enhanced while others remain unenhanced, there will 
come to exist inequality between these two groups which will extend beyond naturally 
occurring genetic inequality.  However, critics who suggest that “enhancements that create 
inequality among people are ethically concerning”, particularly where such “inequality [is 
generated] on an economic basis” (Kiuru & Crystal 2008: 335)36 are going a step further.  
Brute inequality does not necessarily imply injustice.  For the inequality created by genetic 
enhancement to be morally concerning, it must also be unjust.  This raises some difficult 
questions, as the notion of justice itself is extremely difficult to define or to reduce to a single 
theory of justice (Harris 1992: 192).  I will discuss this issue generally as it has been raised in 
the literature, and will include references to specific theories of justice as far as this is 
possible.  
 
To counter the allegation that the inequality fostered by genetic enhancement is unjust, critics 
point out that, rather than being born genetically equal, we are all already subject to the 
                                                 
35
 It is already the case that research into medical problems that affect the developed world vastly outweighs 
research conducted into problems affecting the developing world – some studies suggest that “90% of all 
medical research [is] undertaken on 10% of the global burden of disease” (Benatar & Singer 2000: 824).  
Equally shocking are the statistics from “UNICEF‟s report on The State of the World’s Children” that state that 
“1.4 million...children under the age of five died in 2003...from lack of drinking water and basic sanitation” 
(cited in Robert 2005: 28).  As Robert points out, “[w]e can safely presume that they did not die for lack of 
biotechnological enhancement” (2005: 28).  
36
 See also De Melo-Martín (2004: 74-75) on this point. 
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natural genetic inequality imposed by the genetic lottery (Holtug 1999: 138) and nobody can 
be said to deserve their natural genetic attributes (Mehlman 2003: 111).  Some of us are 
naturally genetically advantaged, and some are less fortunate (Brock 1998: 67), and nature 
does not take notions of “fairness” into account (Savulescu 2006: 331).  However, critics of 
this counter argument could suggest, firstly, that this naturally given inequality is not the 
result of human action and therefore not within the sphere of behaviour that can be morally 
censured.  Rather, according to some theories
37
, this natural inequality may even be 
interpreted as imposing a moral demand upon us to counter or balance the advantage or 
disadvantage which results.  The situation of genetic enhancement is different – here, what 
specifically concerns many critics is the possibility of the development of a situation in which 
enhancements are available only to those in society who are already wealthy and powerful – 
in other words, that the competitive advantages that accompany genetic enhancement can be 
bought in a way that natural genetic advantages cannot be, and that this model of access to 
enhancement technologies is unjust. 
 
However, many commentators point out that it is already the case that financially advantaged 
members of society can buy competitive advantages.  We are not only already subject to 
naturally occurring inequality as a result of the genetic lottery, but also to inequality brought 
about by expensive environmental enhancements available only to the wealthy - for example, 
private school education (Brock 1998: 60, Silver 1997: 9 & 225) - which indisputably 
exacerbate social inequalities between the rich and the poor, and the purchase of which is not 
subject to restrictions (Moore 2000: 118).  The new possibilities offered by genetic 
enhancement for parents to shape their children are not changes of motivation but “changes of 
degree and means” (Brock 2005: 378).  If critics are so concerned with the possible inequality 
which may be caused by the future use of genetic enhancements, why are they seemingly 
unconcerned with already existing, and often extremely debilitating inequality which is 
already present, and which is clearly intensified by the ability of the wealthy to access 
environmental enhancements?   
 
Harris has this to say as to why we do not restrict the purchase of educational privilege and 
other environmental enhancements: 
 
[B]uying educational privilege in a context in which not all can afford to do so is certainly 
unfair in some sense.  But if we defend people‟s rights to do this it is because we feel it is right 
                                                 
37
 Such theories include Egalitarianism, Justice as Fairness, and Prioritarianism. 
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to encourage people to provide goods for their children and wrong to deny them these goods 
even if not all can obtain them (2007: 27). 
 
For this reason, Harris argues that it is not wrong to provide benefits to your children in other 
contexts (such as the context of genetic enhancement) even “when others cannot match your 
efforts” and even when this “will probably confer an advantage”, as it is “doubtful ethics to 
deny a benefit to any until it can be delivered to all”. Harris argues strongly that 
“[f]airness...does not require that benefits should not be provided to any” until they are widely 
accessible (2007: 28), and sums up this position as follows: 
 
So when enhancements make life or lives better they are justified if they do just that if they 
also confer positional advantage that is no part of their justification and will in fact always 
constitute a moral disadvantage of their use, although whether this disadvantage constitutes a 
decisive argument against either the use or the permissibility of the enhancement will depend 
upon many other factors, among which are the degree of advantage, the degree of unfairness it 
creates, and the likelihood of the unfairness being minimized over time or by other factors 
such as compensation (2007: 30). 
 
Savulescu also denies that unequal access to genetic enhancement is necessarily unjust.  He 
asserts that “when enhancements are purchased or developed with private funds in a legal and 
legitimate way, there is no violation of the requirements of distributive justice”.  Of course, 
this position relies on “free-market or libertarian” conceptions of justice (2006: 331), but to 
the extent to which economic policies that are at least partially based upon these theories 
prevail in much of the world today, it is not necessarily the case that an exacerbation of the 
inequality between the rich and the poor is unfair in an intrinsic sense. 
 
However, there are a multitude of other theories of justice which could come into conflict 
with this position.  These would include Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, Rawls‟s conception of 
Justice as Fairness, and Prioritarianism (Savulescu 2006: 331).  In each of these theories, 
there is a conviction that there is some standard (such as the maximisation of general well-
being, the presence of need, or the maximisation of the position of those who are worst off in 
society) which should govern the distribution of resources which go beyond one‟s access to 
financial resources.  This would seem to include the distribution of goods such as 
enhancement.   
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 62 
 
Is it necessarily the case that the use of genetic enhancement will contravene these standards, 
thereby giving rise to unjust inequality and widening existing gaps between the rich and the 
poor, or could alternative possibilities for the use of genetic enhancement technologies exist 
which could diminish, rather than exacerbate, inequalities between people?  Savulescu 
expresses this possibility as follows:  “It is no doubt true that enhancement technologies might 
create inequality and injustice.  But their use may also reduce inequality, injustice and 
unfairness” (2006: 321). 
 
How might this be so?  Firstly, we can consider the argument that suggests that while genetic 
enhancements may initially only be available to the wealthy, this is a necessary evil which 
will ultimately give way to a situation in which the distribution of enhancements will be more 
equitable.  Moore points out that the vast majority of new medical technologies are initially 
only available to the rich, but as they are further developed and refined, costs are lowered, and 
eventually “procedures that were once cost prohibitive are...available to everyone”.  He 
questions why genetic enhancement should be an exception, and how we could justify a ban 
on a system that “yields everyone better prospects in the end, [so that] the resulting initial 
inequality of distribution is hardly objectionable” (2000: 117).  Harris makes a similar 
argument (2007: 31), and draws comparisons with other modes of enhancement.  He argues 
that formal education and literacy, which could both be considered enhancing technologies 
(Bostrom & Sandberg 2009b: 312), were initially only available to the wealthy, and resulted 
in social inequality (a point echoed by Buchanan 2011: 43), but are now increasingly 
available to all, and have had enormously beneficial consequences for society as a whole 
(2007: 14).    
 
Secondly, critics such as Faust address the possibility that genetic enhancement could be used 
to improve our ethical sensibilities through genetic means – in other words, that “genetic 
moral enhancement” (2008: 397) could be used to improve our sense of responsibility 
towards others, and could thus increase our feelings of solidarity and heighten our moral 
intuitions as to the demands of justice, rather than merely being used as a tool to gain a 
competitive edge over others. 
 
However, some critics go even further than this and suggest that active use could be made of 
genetic enhancements in order to counter or diminish the natural inequality that is the result of 
the genetic lottery, the results of which are “arbitrary from a moral perspective” (Rawls 1971: 
64).  If our natural genetic advantages and disadvantages are not something which we can be 
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said to deserve (Rawls 1971: 86), an argument can be made for the redistribution of genetic 
goods by the means of genetic enhancement, favouring not the wealthy and powerful, but 
those who are worse off genetically (Brock 1998: 68, Farrelly 2002: 73, Harris & Chan 2008: 
338, Holtug 1999: 138)
38.  Buchanan et al. (2000: 303) argue that “the new genetics...creates 
hitherto unimaginable opportunities for including more people as effective participants in 
fulfilling forms of social interaction”.  In their estimation, this would take place primarily 
though the use of genetic therapy, but also, to some extent, through the use of enhancement 
(2000: 302).  While this alternative may be somewhat idealistic in terms of the current 
financially driven medical market, it does at least indicate that the obligation to reduce 
inequality can be called upon as a motivating factor for the development and use of genetic 
enhancement, rather than a factor militating against it.  Holtug, for example, suggests that 
“people who are badly off through no fault of their own” (1999: 42), for example, because of 
genetic disease, should be compensated to satisfy the principle of justice, which accords with 
Rawls‟s theory of justice in that morally arbitrary natural inequalities may require 
compensation (1971: 86).  One of the acceptable methods of compensation is genetic therapy.   
However, people may also be badly off through no fault of their own, while still falling within 
the range of species-typical functioning, if they are “less intelligent, less talented, [or] less 
attractive” than others.  If genetic enhancement can be used to compensate for their 
disadvantage in the “genetic lottery”, this seems to be a legitimate reason for practicing it, 
although Holtug only regards it as a “pro tanto” reason which can be overridden by other 
ethical considerations, namely, that the need to compensate people who suffer from greater 
disadvantage through genetic and other disease is more urgent and should be given preference 
(1999: 142).  Holtug, in his discussion, draws attention to a valuable point: it seems 
nonsensical that “one should be troubled by a disadvantage that precludes a person from 
reaching the [normal] minimum, but not at all by the disadvantage that is compatible with 
reaching it” (1999: 140).  According to some theories of justice in healthcare39, society is 
obliged to provide treatments which are directed towards the achievement of normal 
functioning, as this is a precondition for equality of opportunity.  However, natural genetic 
                                                 
38
 Harris argues strongly against the position, expressed here, that the pursuit of equal opportunity provides a 
moral justification for the pursuit either of “health or...enhancements”.  His conviction is that these practices 
should be sought because they are good for the affected individuals, and while “equality of opportunity is 
something we should try to maximize in the delivery of improvements in health or in functioning...it seems only 
tenuously and contingently connected to our reasons for so doing” (2007: 47).  Therefore, in his view, while we 
should “attempt to ensure equal opportunity to access [the] goods” of enhancement, these goods are morally 
desirable goods in their own right, and not simply because they could improve upon the equality of opportunity 
offered by the natural lottery, although this could be a “separate...additional reason to support the moral right to 
healthcare” (2007: 48). 
39
 The normal function model of healthcare, which shall be considered later in this chapter in the context of goal 
compatibility arguments against genetic enhancement, and extensively in the following chapter with regard to 
the treatment-enhancement distinction, is one such theory. 
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inequalities which do not constitute deviations from normal functioning may also decrease 
fair equality of opportunity.  One could therefore formulate an argument which suggests that 
society is obliged to provide enhancements which are directed towards the achievement of 
such equality
40
.  The introduction of genetic enhancement technologies may therefore demand 
a rethinking of our notions of justice.  In some sense, the “natural distribution” of abilities 
would no longer be “simply [a] natural fact” (Rawls 1971: 87).  If we develop the ability to 
alter this natural distribution, this state of affairs, too, would fall within the province of a 
theory of justice, and “natural” goods could also be available for redistribution41.  
 
Savulescu echoes the point that genetic enhancement could be used to reduce inequality, by 
drawing our attentions to two alternatives: “We can allow our lives to be determined by the 
natural lottery, or by wealth.  Both of these lead to injustice”.  In contrast to this, he suggests 
that “[j]udicious use of enhancement, based on a rational policy” can, in fact, operate to 
reduce inequality and injustice (2006: 336).  
 
Even if we do not make active use of genetic enhancements to reduce inequality, some critics 
argue that it would still be possible to regulate the use of these technologies in such a way that 
unjust inequality would be limited.  Faust points out that “society has many ways to monitor, 
evaluate, regulate (or ban) change”, and goes on to draw comparisons between the regulation 
of in-vitro fertilisation and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (much of it self-imposed by the 
relevant service providers) which militates against sex-selection (2008: 411).  Savulescu 
makes a similar point, by rejecting the argument that the use of genetic enhancement will 
necessarily lead to a situation in which “the rich get richer, the rich get smarter, the smarter 
get smarter, and the smarter get richer” (2006: 334).  Rather, he argues that “how 
enhancement technologies are made available is up to us...We have the power to dictate 
policy on the employment of enhancement technology” (2006: 335).  Thus, the inequality 
likely to result from genetic enhancement could be at least partially countered by introducing 
social policies to militate against this (Bostrom 2004: 503, Resnik 1994: 37).  Buchanan goes 
even further than this, and calls into question the “framing assumption” that enhancement 
interventions would necessarily be “market goods” which could only be accessed by those 
individuals who could afford them.  He argues that “[h]istorically, governments have shown a 
                                                 
40
 I will develop such an argument in the next chapter. 
41
 Rawls makes such a tentative suggestion of this nature, although not explicitly with regard to genetic 
enhancement: “In the original position...the parties want to insure for their descendants the best genetic 
endowment...The pursuit of reasonable policies in this regard is something that earlier generations owe to later 
ones” (1971: 92). 
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keen interest in increasing productivity”, leading them to devote resources to goods which 
serve this end, such as “education and public health”.  The same could, and probably would, 
be the case for enhancements which would tend to increase productivity (Buchanan 2011: 37).  
To assume that technological enhancements would necessarily be accessible only to the rich, 
and that this would exacerbate social inequality, may be an overly negative assumption.  
 
Building on the point that that some enhancements would be likely to increase productivity, 
the argument has been made that genetic enhancement could have positive effects on society 
collectively, even if enhancement is not universally available (Newson & Williamson 1999: 
345), as the benefits of genetic enhancement, such as improved efficiency in production and 
research and an associated increase in general well-being
42
, would also be accrued to those in 
society who are not enhanced (Buchanan 2008: 10, 2011: 36).  We can imagine a situation, 
for example, in which the cognitive enhancement of some individuals would increase the rate 
of research into the treatment of disease, or lower the prices of goods and services, which 
would benefit everyone.  Buchanan suggests that: 
 
[A] balanced consideration of the pros and cons of enhancement should take seriously the fact 
that some of the most discussed kinds of enhancements will create the potential for increases 
in the well-being of very large numbers of people, including those who do not have the 
enhancement (2008: 11).  
 
If it is the case that enhancement would benefit everyone in society, regardless of whether 
they were themselves enhanced, this would seem to satisfy conceptions of justice such as 
Rawls‟s difference principle, as the social goods offered by enhancement, even when 
distributed unequally, would benefit even those who were unable to access enhancement 
technologies.  This would satisfy the Rawlsian prescription that “the social order is not to 
establish and secure the more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the 
advantage of those less fortunate” (Rawls 1971: 65).  The possibility of moral enhancement, 
particularly of those in positions of power, is another example of an enhancement that would 
probably improve the lot of everyone in society, by, for example, reducing the likelihood that 
human beings will cause widespread harm by the misuse of advanced scientific techniques, or 
by increasing the propensity of human beings to take action to reduce global inequalities and 
to preserve ecological environments (Persson & Savulescu 2011).   
                                                 
42
 Buchanan suggests that the enhancements most likely to achieve this would be cognitive enhancements, 
enhancement that extend human life, enhancements that “compress morbidity and disability near the end of life”, 
and enhancements that improve the functioning of the human immune system (2011: 45). 
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However, even if, as the above arguments suggest, genetic enhancement will not necessarily 
lead to injustice within societies, the question as to the just distribution of enhancement 
globally, and the possibility that genetic enhancement will exacerbate inequalities between 
societies, must still be considered.  Critics such as Buchanan argue in this regard that the 
opposite could be true – in other words that genetic enhancement could “help [to] close the 
gap between [people of more developed countries] and people of less developed countries” 
(2008: 17) – he uses the example of enhancements which could strengthen the immune 
system.  However, whether this would be likely to be the case in the face of current global 
trends in terms of expenditure on healthcare in various parts of the world remains to be seen.   
 
Harris argues in this regard that while there are no easy answers to ensuring equitable 
distribution to genetic enhancement, globally or otherwise, the benefits of genetic 
enhancement are such that research and application of enhancement technologies should not 
be postponed until they could be available to all, as this would “considerably delay” the 
achievement of the valuable and beneficial consequences of such technologies (2007: 31).  In 
his discussion of one particular type of enhancement, that of life extension, he makes the 
following point: 
 
The introduction of any new complex and/or expensive technology raises [the problem of just 
distribution].  The impact on global justice or on justice within societies is important and must 
be addressed; it is a principled objection, but not an objection in principle to the introduction 
of life-extending therapies.  The principle requires that strenuous and realistic efforts be made 
to provide the benefits of the technology justly and as widely as possible, not that the benefits 
be denied because of the impossibility of ensuring adequate justice of provision (2007: 63).  
 
Thus, critics argue that while the question of the equitable distribution of genetic 
enhancement technologies is an important one for public policy and requires more 
consideration, this is an argument primarily about the distribution of the goods of genetic 
enhancement and does not constitute a definitive argument against the use of enhancing 
technologies (Caplan 2009: 200, Sandel 2007: 16), particularly as a ban on the use of 
enhancing technologies would imply limiting autonomy (Bostrom 2004: 503).  Some critics 
even argue that the discussion around inequality of access to enhancement implies an 
acknowledgement that enhancements are, in themselves, beneficial goods which we desire 
(Bostrom & Sandberg 2009b: 329, Dees 2007: 379).  In other words, we should differentiate 
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between moral arguments about the technology of “genetic enhancement itself and its 
distribution” (Allhoff 2005: 44).  This suggests that while the possibility of the just 
distribution of genetic enhancement certainly needs to be carefully considered, particularly in 
a context where the goods of healthcare are already distributed unequally (in other words, in 
the context of an existing “distributive scheme” (Allhoff 2005: 45) which is either already 
unjust, or which, applied to the technology of genetic enhancement, would be unjust), the 
difficulties likely to be encountered in this regard do not imply that the technology of genetic 
enhancement should be rejected outright.  In fact, a blanket ban may even exacerbate the 
problem of inequality, as those who are wealthy enough will be able to access enhancement 
technologies through a potential black-market.  In contrast, where “the legitimacy of 
enhancement is recognized, new regulatory institutions can be developed to facilitate the 
wider and more rapid diffusion of highly beneficial and safe enhancements” (Buchanan 2011: 
19). However, critics of genetic enhancement raise a further problem with regard to its 
potential to bring about difference.  This is that enhancement technologies may contribute 
towards or be used in the service of prejudice and discrimination, or that the novel changes 
which they will produce in human beings may engender new forms of discrimination. 
 
Genetic enhancement will rely upon or engender discrimination 
 
The problem as to genetic enhancement‟s possible association with discrimination has two 
parts.  Firstly, critics have suggested that specific uses of genetic enhancement may rely upon, 
and therefore perpetuate existing societal prejudices.  Secondly, they speculate as to whether 
genetic enhancement could engender new forms of prejudice based upon the presence or 
absence of enhanced characteristics.   
 
The first possible association between the use of genetic enhancement and discrimination 
considers the problem in the context of pre-existing prejudice prevalent in society.  The 
question is whether technologies aimed at genetic enhancement may come to be used in 
specific ways which are motivated by discriminatory attitudes.  A related issue is the concern 
that if such usage is sustained or widespread, this may perpetuate, uphold or maintain 
prejudice. 
 
This concern is, in fact, an issue which has been debated in bioethics for some time, and is not 
unique to the debate around genetic enhancement.  There has often been an expression of 
unease as to the possible uses which could be (or are) made of certain biomedical 
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technologies, particularly those technologies which are selective, such as pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis followed by in vitro fertilization, and prenatal screening followed by 
selective abortion.  These concerns have focused primarily upon two forms of discrimination 
– discrimination based upon gender, and discrimination based upon disability.   
     
There is some evidence that the use of screening technologies has, in some instances, been 
motivated by discriminatory attitudes towards women or the disabled.  For example, in 
countries such as India and China, the bias towards male children has resulted in a trend 
towards sex-selective abortion (Arnold, Kishor & Roy 2002, Junhong 2001, Sen 2003, Sudha 
& Irudaya Rajan 1999, Zhu, Lu & Hesketh 2009).  One can also make the argument that 
prenatal screening and selective disability for abortion, in some cases, relies upon or 
perpetuates discriminatory attitudes towards the disabled (Hall 2008).    
 
In the same way, it is possible that the use of genetic technologies could contribute towards or 
rely upon discrimination or prejudices that are already present in society (Juengst 1998: 42), 
turning “reproduction into another means of expressing prejudice” (Agar 2004: 148)43.  
Imagine that a genetic intervention is developed which would enable one to choose to alter 
one‟s skin colour (Mwase 2005: 86), or to alter one‟s sexual orientation.  In a world in which 
racism and homophobia remain problematic, individuals might choose to alter these 
characteristics for themselves or for their children (Brock 1998: 64), thereby “colluding with 
social prejudice [and] worsening its effects” (Agar 2004: 109-110), in order to escape social 
disadvantages that result from such prejudice, or because of feelings of inferiority which 
result from continued exposure to it, or, in the case of parents choosing to alter their child‟s 
sexual orientation, because they themselves subscribe to such discriminatory attitudes.  If 
regular use were to be made of such interventions, this would reinforce and strengthen 
negative stereotypes and prejudice in society.  It would also avoid the issue of prejudice and 
the demand it makes upon us to enact positive change at a societal level by instead 
circumventing the problem of prejudice through genetic alteration (Agar 2004: 149, Juengst 
1998: 42). 
 
Agar points out that the problem with using genetic interventions in the service of 
discriminatory attitudes is not a problem which stems from the technologies themselves, but 
rather rests in pre-existing discriminatory attitudes – making use of genetic interventions 
                                                 
43
 Little makes a similar point with regard to the ethical problems of cosmetic surgery which is driven by 
“suspect norms”, and regards the practice of such surgery as constituting a kind of “complicity” with such norms 
(1998).  
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motivated by these discriminatory attitudes is to “seek biotechnological solutions to problems 
that have nothing at all to do with genes” (2004: 151).  We cannot discount the possibility that 
enhancement technologies will be used to express our “uglier attitudes”, but this is true of 
many activities (Martin & Peerzada 2005: 27) and does not constitute a moral argument 
against such activities in themselves.  Our focus should therefore be on changing these 
attitudes, rather than rejecting any intervention which could conceivably express them.  Agar 
acknowledges that simply recognising that certain harms are caused by morally unacceptable 
prejudices, such as racism or homophobia, does not reduce the reality of the experience of 
those harms.  However, he rejects the argument that parents (and presumably individuals on 
their own behalf) should be allowed to make use of enhancement technologies “to spare their 
children the harms...inflicted by racists and homophobes” (2004: 156), as he finds it difficult 
“to imagine a successful fight against prejudice in the very society in which there is a widely 
exercised freedom on the part of parents to remove from their children the characteristics that 
would make them objects of prejudice”, and that the harm to society that this would imply 
could not be justified (2004: 157).  He therefore argues for a ban or limit to be placed on such 
genetic interventions, although some critics suggest that such a ban would conflict with 
reproductive autonomy
44
.   
 
The second problem raised by critics with regard to the practice of genetic enhancement and 
its possible association with discrimination is the question as to whether it is possible that 
discrimination may be caused by the use of enhancement, where such discrimination is based 
upon the differences brought about by enhancing interventions.  This problem has been raised 
by Anderson, who points out that discrimination may be directed either towards those who 
make use of medical technologies to bring about genetic improvements, or against those who 
either cannot or will not make use of them (1989: 689).  The possibility of discrimination 
against a “genetically challenged” underclass of society is often raised as an objection against 
genetic enhancement (Moore 2000: 117).  Some critics even suggest than in its worst 
manifestations, such discrimination could lead to the enslavement of one group by the other, 
or even to genocide (Annas 2001). 
 
Savulescu disputes the suggestion that discrimination is a necessary outcome of the use of 
genetic enhancement, as he believes that this attitude relies upon a simplistic form of “social 
                                                 
44
 It is worth noting that these genetic technologies cannot actually be described as enhancements – they are, in 
fact, neutral alterations, which are only beneficial in the presence of prejudicial attitudes which inflict unjustified 
harm upon those with certain characteristics.     
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determinism” which holds that we have “no control over social attitudes and practices”.  He 
argues, in opposition to this, that our treatment of the enhanced and the unenhanced is entirely 
our choice, and that is also our responsibility to ensure that policies are put in place to protect 
the interests of all (2006: 335).  According to this view, the possible consequence of 
discrimination between the enhanced and the unenhanced is not a direct consequence of the 
use of genetic technologies.  Rather, it is linked to the human tendency to discriminate on the 
basis of difference, and it is this tendency that must be continually guarded against, both as it 
manifests itself today, and as it could manifest itself in the future through the use of genetic 
enhancement.    
 
Social pressure to enhance and the “Tragedy of the Commons” 
 
A further negative consequence associated with the qualitative differences which genetic 
enhancement will bring about is the possibility that “personal freedom may be threatened as 
people feel obliged to avail themselves of [enhancing] technolog[ies]” (Baylis & Robert 2004: 
12) in order to avoid finding themselves worse off than others in society (Gardner 1995: 72).  
Thus the choice as to whether to make use of enhancement technologies, whether for self-
improvement or for the improvement of one‟s children, will no longer be truly free, but will 
be heavily influenced by societal pressure (Kass 2003: 16, Borenstein 2009: 520, Robertson 
2003: 479), which will require enhancement in order to maintain the ability to compete with 
others. 
 
However, if this social pressure results in a high take-up rate for genetic enhancement, this 
will, according to critics, raise two further concerns, both of which relate to the so-called 
“Tragedy of the Commons, in which genuine and sought-for gains to individuals are nullified 
or worse, owing to the social consequences of granting them to everyone” (Kass 2001: 19).  
The first of these is the possibility that genetic enhancement will bring about increased 
homogenization, while the second is that many decisions in favour of enhancement will 
render the technology self-defeating. 
 
The possibility that genetic enhancement will bring about homogenization (Agar 2004: 134) 
is based upon the concern that popular or dominant conceptions of the good life and our “lack 
of imagination as designers” (Kamm 2009: 128) will result in the use of genetic 
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enhancements which conform strongly to a limited number of genetic models
45
.  If many in 
society make similar choices, this will in turn reduce valuable diversity and lessen the 
possibility for genuine freedom and individuality (Kass 2003: 16). 
 
Singer disagrees that this is likely to be a problem.  He points out that “only if [genetic 
enhancement] was very widely used for a long time in a way that tended to focus on a small 
number of genotypes” would the problem of homogenization arise, and if this started to 
happen, we would be able to take note of this and take action to prevent it (2009: 284).  Harris 
also calls into question whether homogenization would result to the extent which critics of 
enhancement suggest.  While he concedes that there is a possibility that use of genetic 
enhancement could reduce some differences (granted that all or most people are enhanced) he 
is not convinced that this will introduce concerning levels of conformity – as people‟s 
capacities and skills differ, so the augmentation of these skills will also differ in similar ways 
(2007: 128), and the enhancement of general purpose capacities and abilities need no more 
lead to homogenization than compulsory education (Fox 2007: 23).   
 
Social pressure to enhance may, however, have another undesirable consequence.  Critics 
suggest that if the practice of genetic enhancement is motivated by a desire to gain a 
competitive advantage, widespread use could lead to the technology becoming self-defeating 
(Brock 1998: 60, Juengst 1998: 42, Robertson 2003: 475, Singer 2009: 282).  Any 
competitive advantage which a particular enhancement would give would be nullified by 
universal access to such an enhancement, and this would result in a situation where “no one‟s 
position would change” (Parens 1998a: S8), or in which the “biological arms race” sparked by 
the use of enhancement technologies would simply result in a “level playing field” 
(McKibben 2003: 23).  
 
It is suggested, for example, that the enhancement of the characteristic of height would be 
“collectively self-defeating” (Sandel 2004: 53).  If many people were to make use of genetic 
technologies to enhance height, others would become “shorter relative to the norm” (Sandel 
2004: 53), which would provide a good motivation for them to make use of an enhancement 
conferring height in their turn.  However, this would nullify the competitive advantage of the 
enhancement, as everyone would now be tall (to the extent that this term would maintain its 
meaning).    
                                                 
45
 The possibility that genetic enhancement may be motivated by social prejudices, as discussed in the previous 
section, may also contribute towards homogenization. 
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Brock criticises this position by pointing out that there are “non-competitive” benefits or 
“intrinsic goods” which could be conferred by genetic enhancement (cited in Parens 1998a: 
S8).  In other words, he argues that is not always correct to assume that genetic enhancement 
would be sought for competitive benefit.  The “positional value” of enhancements can be 
contrasted with their “independent value” (Agar 2004: 127) or “intrinsic value” (Singer 2009: 
282), which does not vary with regard to whether it is possessed by others.  It may be true that 
one could seek an enhancement of intelligence in order to perform better than others in tests 
or in the workplace.  Greater levels of intelligence, however, could also be sought in order to 
be more capable of enjoying various pursuits.  For example, Parens suggests that higher levels 
of concentration would enable one to better appreciate Shakespeare.  This would be beneficial 
for the individual concerned without reference to the advantage it might give one over others 
(1998a: S9).  Harris & Chan support this view, claiming that “there are many valid reasons to 
seek out enhancements other than to gain an edge over one‟s competitors.  Enhancements are 
good for the enhanced individual independently of any competitive advantage they also 
confer” (2008: 338).  In other words, the qualitative differences bestowed by genetic 
enhancements are “instrumentally good for us when and because [they] enable...us to realise 
our ends more reliably and effectively” (Persson & Savulescu 2008: 162), and this benefits us 
whether or not they (also) confer a competitive advantage, although in practice, it is likely 
that many or most enhancements will confer combined competitive and instrumental 
advantages (Agar 2004: 128).   
 
A different point of view is offered by Buchanan.  He argues, in contrast to the position that 
enhancements could be self-defeating, that some enhancements would in fact be likely to have 
a “network effect” (2011: 48).  This implies that the usefulness or benefit of the enhancement 
would increase, rather than decrease, as more individuals have it.  An improvement of 
cognitive functioning could be an example of such an enhancement, as “[l]arge numbers of 
individuals with increased cognitive capabilities will be able to accomplish what a single 
individual could not”, as in the current situation of herd immunity (2011: 48).  Widespread 
use of genetic enhancement would be good for all concerned in this context.   
 
Harris, however, argues that concerns as to the possibly self-defeating nature of genetic 
enhancements misunderstand the moral motivation for enhancement in the first place.  
Enhancements, in his view, should not be sought for competitive advantage.  Rather, their use 
should be motivated by the desire to confer “absolute... goods” which are “good for people 
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not because they confer advantage on some but not on others” but simply because they are 
beneficial for the enhanced person.  Thus, according to this view, the possibly self-defeating 
nature of genetic enhancement is only a problem for those who (illegitimately) seek 
enhancements for positional advantage, and is not problematic “for the enhancing 
technology” itself (2007: 29). 
 
Does the possibility of bad consequences preclude genetic enhancement? 
 
The consequentialist arguments summarised above raise concerns as to the possible negative 
consequences of genetic enhancement, for individuals and societies.  Critics of these 
arguments suggest that they do not provide definitive reasons to avoid genetic enhancement, 
although they may emphasise the need for caution, or indicate that measures should be taken, 
in terms of social policy, to provide safeguards against the risks posed by enhancement 
technologies (Cooke 2003: 35).  Some critics also emphasise that we should not 
underestimate the possible benefits of genetic enhancement, not only for the individual, but 
also for society (Buchanan 2008: 3, Buchanan 2011: 18, Fenton 2010: 150, Mehlman 2003: 
154).   In other words, in conducting a risk-benefit analysis of the possible practice of genetic 
enhancement, we should consider the “social cost of not making use of enhancement 
technologies” (Buchanan 2008: 3, 2011: 37).  Graham expresses this as follows: 
 
We cannot rationally advocate a ban on some piece of biotechnology on the grounds that the 
outcomes could be catastrophic, without at the same time acknowledging that banning it could 
also be catastrophic...Everything turns on the (no doubt tedious) business of calculating 
respective costs and benefits (2002: 130). 
 
This might suggest that even in the presence of risk, the development and use of genetic 
enhancement technologies could still be morally justified.  However, this does not imply that 
the possible negative consequences of genetic enhancement should be dismissed or ignored, 
and this has in fact not been the case in the literature which argues against a complete 
rejection of genetic enhancement – “writers who reject the view that we should never engage 
in biomedical enhancement uniformly recognise that the risk of unintended bad consequences 
is a serious problem” (Buchanan 2011: 179).  This acknowledgement need not imply that we 
should reject the enhancement project entirely, or that it is prima facie morally illegitimate.  It 
merely implies that the moral application of enhancement technologies should take these 
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possibilities into account and try to introduce measures and safeguards to counteract the risk.  
What such a moral application of enhancement might look like will be the topic of Chapter 5.     
 
Goal compatibility arguments  
 
The final group of arguments against the use of genetic enhancement is concerned with the 
incompatibility of the pursuit of enhancement technologies with the posited goals of 
medicine.  These arguments rely upon a model of medical practice developed by Norman 
Daniels, among others (Daniels 1985, Daniels 2000, Sabin & Daniels 1994: 10), which I will 
consider extensively in the next chapter.  According to this model, “medicine‟s primary goal 
is to restore people to the normal function that disease and disability diminish and which is 
the necessary condition for them to pursue their life plans” (Parens 1998b: 4).   
 
The central focus of the normal function model of medicine is the determination of the 
requirements of “justice in the design of a health care system” (Daniels 1985: ix).  In other 
words, proponents of this model seek to answer the question as to what kinds of interventions 
members of society are entitled to receive under a just model of healthcare (Beauchamp & 
Childress 2009: 248, Sabin & Daniels 1994: 5).  The answer to this question links “the 
requirements of justice to a broad entitlement to services needed to protect or restore species 
typical functioning” (Buchanan et al. 2000: 310), as such functioning provides the basis for 
“fair equality of opportunity” (Daniels 1985: x).  It argues that the “moral goal” of medicine 
is the “remov[al] of impediments to full participation in society” (Agar 2004: 82), and that 
this determines which services we are morally obliged to assist people in obtaining (Daniels 
2000: 309).  
 
The standards of the normal function model of medicine therefore exclude the pursuit of 
genetic, or other forms of technological enhancement, from the sphere of the “proper goals of 
medicine” (Parens 1998a: S1), as enhancement does not merely seek to restore normal 
functioning, but to improve upon such functioning.  While the argument as it stands above 
does not necessarily imply that technological enhancement is intrinsically unethical – merely 
that genetic enhancement does not constitute a moral obligation in the context of just 
healthcare – it does suggest that the goals of genetic enhancement are incompatible with the 
goals of medicine, implying that the practice of technological enhancement should be 
excluded from the practice of medicine altogether.  
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Of course, doctors already exceed the goals of medicine in this sense.  Some medical 
professionals offer interventions such as “nontherapeutic cosmetic surgery” (Silver 1997: 
219).  Thus the use of medical technologies in the service of enhancement is hardly 
unprecedented. 
 
Parens argues that even if we do regard the participation of the medical profession in 
enhancement interventions as unethical, this does not necessarily imply the moral exclusion 
of the practice of technological enhancement in other contexts.  He illustrates this point by 
asking us to imagine that there exists a group of people called “schmocters” practicing 
“schmedicine”.  This group does not claim to operate within the sphere of activity of medical 
practice, and their activities are therefore not bound by what the normal function model 
considers to be appropriate medical goals.  Their main focus is instead “using new 
biotechnologies to enhance human capacities” (Parens 1998a: S6).  It would seem that in this 
context, the practice of genetic enhancement would be morally acceptable.  As Buchanan 
points out, “even if one accepts the controversial view that enhancement is not a „proper‟ end 
of medicine, that tells us nothing about whether enhancement is morally permissible” (2011: 
27).        
 
However, Daniels makes a further suggestion, which could exclude the practice of genetic 
enhancement altogether.  This suggestion is related to the idea that the goal of achieving 
species-typical functioning is morally laudable and desirable because of the great benefits that 
the achievement of “fair equality of opportunity” offers.  These benefits are, according to 
Daniels, so great as to justify the risks of medical treatment, even where such treatment might 
be particularly risky, as in the case of therapeutic genetic interventions.  However, the 
improvement of “normal” traits, by this standard, does not justify taking such risks, because 
when “we are trying to improve on an otherwise normal trait, the risks of a bad outcome, even 
if small, outweigh the acceptable outcome of normality” (2009: 38). 
 
With Daniels‟s insistence that a risk-benefit analysis of genetic enhancement will exclude its 
ethical acceptability, we return to the consequentialist arguments discussed in the previous 
sections.  As has been indicated, not all commentators agree that the risks of genetic 
enhancement will necessarily outweigh its benefits.  However, the normal-function model has 
been subject to critique on another level.  Some critics question whether Daniels‟s argument 
as to the goals of medical practice, particularly with regard to its reliance on the notion of 
normal or species-typical functioning, is tenable.  The concept of normal functioning is 
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central to goal compatibility arguments against genetic enhancement, but this concept may be 
more fluid than it appears.  Silvers, for example, argues, from a disability rights perspective, 
that what is normal is determined not by some natural standard, but by a particular social 
structure (1998: 116).  Other critics take issue with the distinction, made on the basis of a 
clear delineation of this concept, between morally required treatment and morally dubious 
enhancement.  Buchanan, for example, criticised the idea that morality directs us towards the 
achievement or preservation of normal functioning, and does not require us to reach beyond 
this goal.  As he puts it, “[n]ormal functioning...is simply functioning that is typical of the 
organism as it happens to be now”, without reference to what we value (2011: 3-4) and a 
tendency to prize normal functioning above all else is to “confuse human good with what 
evolution delivers” (2011: 4).  Harris, too, fails to see why the achievement of normality 
should circumscribe the motivations for medical interventions.  Rather, he argues that “the 
most usual motive for using technology to intervene in the natural lottery of life is for the sake 
of the harms this will prevent or the goods that this will bring about” (2007: 54), and that 
enhancement technologies are compatible with these goals.  Thus, critics of the argument 
against genetic enhancement from the perspective of the incompatibility of its aims with the 
proper goals of medicine argue that normality may not be the standard by which the ethical 
acceptability of genetic and other interventions should be judged.  This idea will be subject to 
further interrogation in the following chapter. 
 
Conflicting views on the moral acceptability of genetic enhancement 
 
As the variation of the arguments thus far considered has indicated, there is a great deal of 
disagreement as to the ethical acceptability of the practice of genetic enhancement.  As has 
been shown, some critics express moral discomfort at the prospect of the development of this 
technology as a result of its potential to undermine human nature.  However, opponents of 
these arguments regard this discomfort as misplaced, and do not feel that this is a convincing 
argument against genetic enhancement, as many of the arguments against genetic 
enhancement from human nature, consistently applied, would also call into question the 
ethical status of other practices which we regard as morally desirable, such as the practice of 
medicine, child-rearing and education.  Others are concerned about the possible negative 
consequences of the practice of genetic enhancement.  While critics of this argument regard 
some of these posited risks as unrealistic, others are indeed acknowledged as realistic 
possibilities, and these could merit the introduction of policies and guidelines to guard against 
such negative consequences.  Finally, there is the suggestion that the pursuit of genetic 
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enhancement is incompatible with proper medical practice.  However, this argument is 
criticised on the basis of its reliance upon the concept of normal functioning, a critique which 
I will extend.   
 
The preceding sections of this chapter have sought to provide an outline of the types of 
argument which are advanced against the development and practice of genetic enhancement.  
I will now move on to a discussion of two kinds of arguments in support of the moral 
acceptability of genetic enhancement.     
 
Two groups of arguments in favour of genetic enhancement 
 
As indicated above, many critics do not find the arguments against genetic enhancement, as 
described in the previous sections of this chapter, to be convincing.  The rejection of these 
arguments alone seems to imply the moral acceptability of genetic enhancement.  Those who 
support this conviction, however, offer two positive arguments to support their position, 
which differ in degree.  Firstly, some critics argue that members of society should be free to 
choose in favour of enhancement, for themselves or their children, if they so desire, on the 
basis of the principle of respect for autonomy.  Secondly, others argue that genetic 
enhancement is not merely ethically acceptable, but ethically desirable or obligatory, as a 
result of its tendency to promote human welfare.   
 
I will firstly consider the arguments in favour of the moral acceptability of enhancement on 
the basis of autonomy.  Secondly, I will consider the contribution of two critics who regard 
genetic enhancement to be an ethical obligation. 
 
Genetic enhancement is morally acceptable 
 
The position that genetic enhancement is an acceptable practice, which at the very least 
should not be excluded or disallowed as a legitimate choice, rests upon the principle of 
respect for autonomy.  This is one of the four principles of medical ethics, as formulated by 
Beauchamp and Childress (2009: 103).  Personal autonomy amounts to “self-rule that is free 
from both controlling interference by others and from certain limitations such as inadequate 
understanding that prevents meaningful choice” whereby “[t]he autonomous individual acts 
freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan” (2009: 99).   
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The principle of respect for personal autonomy is therefore used to support the contention that 
competent persons should be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination, as 
described by Moore as follows: 
 
As sovereign and autonomous agents, especially within the liberal tradition, we are afforded 
the moral and legal space to order our lives as we see fit.  As long as respect for others is 
maintained we are each free to set the course and direction of our own lives, and to develop 
our capacities and talents accordingly (2000: 101).   
 
The right to self-determination, as described above, therefore seems to include the right to 
choose genetic enhancement, if this accords with one‟s conception of the good life. 
 
Respect for autonomy could be regarded in different contexts as a negative obligation, which 
implies that “[a]utonomous action should not be subject to controlling constraints by others”, 
or as a positive obligation, which would include the obligation to “disclose...information” and 
to take “actions that foster autonomous decision making...[by] making options available” 
(Beauchamp & Childress 2009: 104).  In the context of genetic enhancement, the duty to 
respect personal autonomy is regarded by most critics as a negative obligation
46
.  It would 
therefore not demand an obligation on the part of the state to provide enhancement services to 
everyone, in part because of the “great cost and limited benefit” of such an undertaking 
(Buchanan et al. 2000: 208).  It would also not imply “an entitlement to the cooperation of 
anyone”, but would stipulate that if others, for example researchers or healthcare providers, 
choose to willingly cooperate with individuals in the pursuit of genetic enhancement, 
interference in the exercise of that right should be prohibited (Harris 2007: 74).  
 
There is a particular component of the right to autonomy which specifically supports the 
moral acceptability of choosing to genetically enhance one‟s (future) children.  This 
component of autonomy is referred to as the right to reproductive autonomy. 
  
The posited right to reproductive autonomy
47
 holds that the right to “freedom in activities and 
choices related to reproduction” (Roberts, cited in Buchanan et al. 2000: 206) is underpinned 
                                                 
46
 Whether the right to genetic enhancement could be considered a positive obligation will be considered later in 
this dissertation.  Some of the arguments discussed in this chapter, such as the suggestion that genetic 
enhancement could be used as a tool to reduce social inequality, could imply that this would be the case. 
47
 Savulescu and Kahane formulate the principle of procreative autonomy as follows: “If reproducers have 
decided to have a child...then any procreative option selected by reproducers is morally permissible as long as it 
is chosen autonomously” (2009: 279). 
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by the general principles of personal autonomy, including the interests that we have in self-
determination and the promotion of our well-being (Buchanan et al. 2000: 214-220).  
Reproductive choices are inextricably linked to well-being, because “reproduction is an 
experience full of meaning and importance for the identity of the individual and her physical 
and social flourishing” (Robertson 2003: 450).  The principle of reproductive autonomy thus 
recognises that parents have interests in when they choose to reproduce and in what type of 
children they will have, because these factors will fundamentally affect their lives (Brock 
2005: 382, Robertson 1983: 408-410).  The right of prospective parents to makes choices in 
favour of genetic interventions which will influence, to some extent, the characteristics of 
their future children, is, according to proponents of the moral acceptability of genetic 
enhancement, assumed by the principle of reproductive autonomy. 
 
Of course, this principle equally implies that parents should not be obliged to make use of 
such interventions.  Agar emphasises this conviction in his advocacy of “liberal eugenics”.   
He argues that genetic engineering could be used to “dramatically enhance reproductive 
choice”, but that parents should not be obliged to choose in favour of genetic enhancement: 
 
Prospective parents may ask genetic engineers to introduce into their embryos combinations of 
genes that correspond with their particular conception of the good life.  Yet they will 
acknowledge the right of their fellow citizens to make completely different eugenic choices.  
No one will be forced...to genetically engineer their embryos (2004: 6). 
 
Respect for autonomy, including autonomy in the sphere of reproductive choices, enables 
competent persons to order their lives according to their own conceptions of the good.  
However, the right to exercise autonomy is not an absolute right.  This right could be 
overridden by “competing moral principles” (Beauchamp & Childress 2009: 105).  Such 
competing moral principles include the moral duty which we have to respect the interests of 
others.  This conviction follows Mill‟s doctrine that interference in the freely-chosen activities 
of individuals is warranted only when the interests of others are likely to be negatively 
affected (Mill 1956: 92, Singer 2009: 280).  Thus the right to autonomy, including the right to 
reproductive autonomy, could “conflict with other rights and interests” (Brock 2005: 381), 
and if it can be shown that the exercise of reproductive liberty “is seriously harmful to others 
or to society” (Harris 2007: 74), this would justify the restriction of such harmful reproductive 
choices.   
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As the preceding sections of this chapter have shown, there is disagreement among critics as 
to whether the practice of genetic enhancement would be detrimental to the interests of others.  
Many commentators argue, as indicated previously, that the interests of other members of 
society, or the interests of society as a whole, do provide a reason to avoid genetic 
enhancement, or at least to limit the right to autonomy by disallowing or regulating certain 
types of enhancement.  The right to exercise reproductive autonomy in the context of genetic 
enhancement is limited not only by the interests of society, however, but also by the interests 
of the future child who the enhancement intervention will affect, as suggested above in 
arguments which reject some forms of genetic enhancement on the basis that they would 
curtail the child‟s right to an open future.   
 
However, if the interests of the child set limits on the right to reproductive autonomy in the 
context of decisions in favour of genetic enhancement, there is another possibility to be 
considered.  By this standard, these same interests could weigh in favour of a positive moral 
requirement to make use of enhancement technologies.  The remaining arguments which I 
will examine in this chapter consider this possibility.  
 
Genetic enhancement is a moral requirement 
 
The argument that genetic enhancement is a moral requirement, obligation or duty, proceeds 
from the conviction that enhancement is beneficial, and contributes to well-being.  According 
to those who support this argument, we have good reason to benefit others and to promote 
their well-being, and this suggests that we should choose in favour of genetic enhancement 
for others for whom we are responsible (for example, dependent children) or that we should 
assist others in the pursuit of genetic enhancement if we are able.   
 
I will consider two arguments in favour of the moral desirability of genetic enhancement.  The 
first is advanced by Julian Savulescu, and is supported by his principle of procreative 
beneficence.  This argument is primarily concerned with the posited parental obligation to 
choose genetic enhancement on behalf of one‟s children.  Secondly, I will examine the 
contribution of John Harris, who argues that genetic enhancement is a general moral good.     
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The principle of procreative beneficence  
 
Julian Savulescu first advanced the principle of procreative beneficence in the context of the 
ethical debate around the possible genetic selection of one‟s future children at an embryonic 
level through the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and in vitro fertilization 
(IVF).   He formulates this principle as follows: 
 
If couples (or single producers) have decided to have a child, and selection is possible, then 
they have a significant moral reason to select the child, of the possible children they could 
have, whose life can be expected, in light of the relevant available information, to go best or at 
least not worse than any of the others (Savulescu & Kahane 2009: 274)
48
. 
 
The child “whose life can be expected to go best” is also referred to as “the most advantaged 
child” (Savulescu & Kahane 2009:275). 
 
This principle implies that parents should not choose to bring into existence a child who is 
likely to suffer from disease or disability, if it is possible to instead bring into existence a 
healthy child.  However, it also implies that parents should select the child who is most 
advantaged genetically in terms of non-disease traits or characteristics, if they have access to 
this information.  Savulescu‟s argument here is based upon the conviction that there are some 
“non-disease genes [that] affect the likelihood of leading the best life”, and that we have a 
reason to use information which is obtainable about these genes when making reproductive 
choices (2001: 413).  We have reason to do so either because this will maximise well-being, 
as the child with the best prospects will benefit more than other possible children by being 
brought into existence, or because it will bring about the best outcome (Savulescu & Kahane 
2009: 277).   
 
In the context of the ethical debate surrounding the selection of future children on the basis of 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, Savulescu‟s goal is to formulate a principle which explains 
the wrongness of certain reproductive decisions which are non-person-affecting.  The problem 
of non-person-affecting wrongs was initially posed by Parfit (1984: 352), who points out that 
it is difficult to explain the wrongness of any action that has resulted in the existence of a 
person whose life is worth living, even if the alternative existed to bring about the existence 
                                                 
48
 This principle was modified slightly from the original formulation, which stated that “couples (or single 
producers) should select the child, of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, 
or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information” (Savulescu 2001: 413). 
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of a different person who would have enjoyed a much greater quality of life.  Parfit uses the 
example of a woman who is advised by her doctor to wait to conceive, as a temporary ailment 
would result in the birth of a child with severe disabilities, whereas this could be avoided by 
delaying conception for a month.  If the woman ignores this advice, our instinct is to regard 
this as morally blameworthy behaviour.  However, it is difficult to explain why this should be 
the case, given that the life of the child with severe disabilities is worth living.  This child has 
not been harmed by being brought into existence, as the alternative to its conception was non-
existence
49
.  The decision to delay conception would have resulted in a different child‟s 
existence, and thus the severely disabled child has not been harmed by its mother‟s decision.  
Her action in refusing to delay conception is therefore not person-affecting, as there is nobody 
who has been made worse off by it.   
 
Savulescu seeks to argue that despite this, the principle of procreative beneficence implies 
that some form of “harmless wrong-doing” (2001: 418) has nonetheless been perpetrated.  He 
argues that there is indeed a moral reason for parents to choose not to have a child likely to 
have severe disabilities if it is possible to instead have a child who will enjoy normal 
functioning.  This moral reason lies in the obligation to maximise well-being or bring about 
the best outcome, which also implies that parents should choose the child with the most 
advantageous personal characteristics, even in contexts where disease traits are not at issue.  
Savulescu and Kahane contend that “[m]ost people will agree that there is a moral defect in 
parents who intend to conceive a child but are indifferent to whether their future child will be 
born with the potential for a good life”.  If this is the case, they suggest “it would seem that 
they should also have reason to aim to have children who are more advantaged rather than 
leave this to chance or nature” (2009: 276).   
 
An initial objection to Savulescu‟s principle of procreative beneficence is advanced by critics 
who argue that the notion of impersonal wrongdoing, while intuitively appealing, is in fact 
implausible.  Although we might instinctively feel that choosing to bring into existence a 
child with worse prospects than other possible children is wrong, the fact that no one is 
                                                 
49
 David Benatar (2006) argues, in contrast to this, that we are always harmed by being brought into existence, 
regardless of our particular traits or characteristics.  He bases this argument on the “asymmetry of pleasure and 
pain”, and suggests that, while the absence of pain is a positive good, the absence of pleasure cannot be bad 
unless there is some existing person who experiences the absence of pleasure as a deprivation.  Before we are 
brought into existence, there is no such existing person, and therefore, the fact that it is always “better never to 
have been” implies that we ought not to reproduce at all.    
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harmed by this choice might suggest that this moral intuition is unreliable (Bennett 2009: 266, 
Herissone-Kelly 2006: 166).   
 
I will not consider the merits of this objection here, as the application of the principle of 
procreative beneficence to genetic enhancement circumvents the problem of non-person-
affecting wrongs.  The duty to maximise well-being and to produce the best child possible 
posited by the principle suggests that parents should genetically enhance their future children 
if they have the opportunity, as Savulescu regards enhancement as an intervention which 
“increase[s] human well-being” (2006: 326) as “[m]any of our biological and psychological 
characteristics profoundly affect how well our lives go” (2005: 37).  However, the 
maximisation of well-being in this case accrues to a specific child – the selection here is not 
between alternative children, but between two sets of characteristics for a future person.  
Therefore decision-making in the context of genetic enhancement is person-affecting, which 
seems to suggest that the obligation to enhance stands even in the face of the above objection. 
 
Savulescu stops short of an argument which suggests that the moral obligation to genetically 
enhance or to select the best child justifies coercion.  Rather, it is a moral obligation of the 
sort which justifies persuasion, comparable to the obligation implied by “[y]ou should stop 
smoking” (2001: 415).  The moral obligation implied by the principle of procreative 
beneficence, according to Savulescu‟s argument, is limited by the competing principle of 
procreative autonomy discussed above, although there are no easy answers as to how these 
principles should be balanced (2001: 425).  It could also be limited by the conflicting interests 
of others, such as the parents of the prospective child or their existing children (Savulescu & 
Kahane 2009: 278).   
 
Savulescu‟s final analysis is that we must not only take moral responsibility for the 
consequences of a decision in favour of enhancement, but also for the consequences of a 
decision to forego enhancement.  If we have the opportunity to practise genetic enhancement, 
and we fail to do so, we must accept responsibility for the results of the genetic lottery.  He 
believes that the potential of genetic enhancement to “do better than chance”, combined with 
the moral requirement to maximise well-being and to bring about the best outcome, implies a 
moral obligation to enhance (2004: 16, 2005: 39, 2007: 285).  Those who advocate a ban on 
technologies which would enable parents to select or create the best child must therefore hold 
themselves “responsible for the outcome, even if nature delivers it” (2007: 288).   
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Critics have taken issue with the principle of procreative beneficence in that its conception of 
the “best life” is “undetermining”.  The difficulty in determining which complex set of 
characteristics would be likely to result in “the best life”, and the “diversity of 
preferences...and beliefs” about what constitutes such a life, implies, according to these 
critics, that it “would not...be possible to identify the rational choice with respect to any 
particular feature of an embryo or possible child” (Parker 2007: 28; see also De Melo-Martín 
2004: 79, Herissone-Kelly 2006: 166)
50
.   
 
Savulescu rejects the argument that the multiplicity of conceptions of the good life renders us 
incapable of making qualitative judgements as to which characteristics will contribute to well-
being.  He argues that there are “general-purpose means...that are valuable no matter what 
kind of life a person leads” (2007: 284), and that we regularly make judgements about the 
relative value of certain capacities.  These judgements are evident in our references to 
“virtues, strength[s] of character and character flaws [that] all represent characteristics, which 
our normative language represents as being good or bad”.  Again, he questions whether “our 
ignorance of what makes a good life [is] really so great...that we want to leave the distribution 
of such traits to chance” (2007: 285).  Rather, Savulescu argues that we can say with some 
degree of certainty that some general-purpose enhancements will increase the likelihood of 
leading a good life and will maximise well-being, and this gives us a moral reason to seek 
such enhancements for our children. 
 
I will now consider another argument which suggests that genetic enhancement is a moral 
obligation.  In this case, the obligation stems from the simple contention that enhancement is 
beneficial.   
 
Enhancement is good for you! 
 
John Harris‟s main point of departure is that the primary motivation, and the only necessary 
motivation, for choosing to intervene in the natural lottery, is the moral obligation to benefit 
others and to avoid harming them (2007: 50, 2007: 54).  If we recognise such an obligation, 
we should accept that genetic enhancement is a moral duty, because enhancements are 
                                                 
50
 Critics of Savulescu‟s argument also raise other points in opposition to the moral acceptability of 
enhancement, which have already been discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter, such as the 
contribution of frailty towards the experience of a good life (Parker 2007: 282), concerns about social justice 
(Birch 2005: 20, De Melo-Martín 2004: 80), the self-defeating nature of the selection of certain characteristics 
(Birch 2005: 24, De Melo-Martín 2004: 79), and the possible reduction of children‟s autonomy (Birch 2005: 22).  
As these arguments have been summarised elsewhere, I will not repeat them here. 
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beneficial in that they “are so obviously good for you” (2007: 36).  The goodness of 
enhancement is implied by its very definition: “[i]f it wasn‟t good for you it wouldn‟t be an 
enhancement” (2009: 131).   
 
Harris‟s argument that “the most usual motive for using technology to intervene in the natural 
lottery of life is for the sake of the harm this will prevent and the goods this will bring about” 
(2007: 54) also leads him to deny that there is a morally relevant difference between treatment 
and enhancement – for him, “the overwhelming moral imperative for both treatment and 
enhancement is to prevent harm and confer benefit” (2007: 58).  As “human enhancement is 
good by definition”, and because enhancements benefit the enhanced individual, this moral 
imperative implies that “enhancements are a moral duty” (2007: 185) in an equivalent way to 
interventions aimed at the treatment of disease and disability.  Therefore, Harris argues that 
enhancement is morally obligatory simply by virtue of its tendency to promote the welfare of 
human beings (Sparrow 2011: 32), which is also the motivation for the practice of therapeutic 
medicine.  The pursuit of enhancement is, for Harris, simply a natural extension of this 
practice.  
 
While Harris argues for the morally obligatory nature of genetic enhancement, his 
presumption in favour of liberal freedoms and the principle of respect for autonomy prevents 
him from regarding genetic enhancement as a matter for state coercion.  Harris argues that 
“citizens should be free to make their own choices in the light of their own values, whether or 
not these choices and values are acceptable to the majority”.  Interference with this freedom 
can only be justified by “good and sufficient reasons”, such as the likelihood that serious 
harms will occur without such interference (Harris 2007: 155).  
 
This seems to indicate a tension in Harris‟s argument that is also present in the application of 
the principle of procreative beneficence to genetic enhancement (Sparrow 2011: 33).  Both 
Harris and Savulescu regard genetic enhancement to be a moral obligation, but neither see 
this as an obligation that is a matter for state interference or coercion, as a result of the 
competing principle of autonomy.  Is this a logically coherent position?  Harris argues that 
intervention in the autonomous decision-making of others is only merited by the possibility 
that serious harms would occur in the absence of intervention.  However, it seems that Harris 
does imply that a failure to enhance could cause harm to others.      
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The implication that a failure to enhance could be harmful is firstly supported by Harris‟s 
rejection of the argument that there is a significant moral difference between “acts and 
omissions”.  In other words, Harris argues that the consequences which are brought about by 
taking action, and consequences which are brought about by refraining from taking action, are 
morally equivalent, a view which he regards as “incontrovertible” (2007: 80).  In Harris‟s 
estimation, “[a]ll actions are redescribable as omissions and vice versa” (Bortolotti and Harris 
2006: 37).  Considering the example of proxy medical consent in situations where patients are 
incapable of consenting to medical procedures for themselves, he argues that those who make 
decisions on behalf of incompetent patients in this context are obligated to consent to such 
procedures as these would be in the patient‟s “best interest”.  A failure to consent, which 
would thereby deprive a person of beneficial medical treatment through inaction, “would 
harm [the incompetent patient]” (2007:81).  In other words, a failure to provide an 
intervention which would promote the welfare of a person, where such an intervention is 
readily available, amounts to harming the affected person. 
 
However, as indicated above, Harris argues strongly that there is a continuum between 
“treating or curing dysfunction and enhancing function”, as both of these interventions 
promote human welfare.  This, combined with the conviction that “the withholding of a 
benefit that could be conferred harms the potential recipient” so that “to withhold a benefit is 
always damaging [and is] always something a decent person has a moral reason not to do” 
(2007: 189), implies that to withhold enhancement where it could be conferred, and certainly 
to restrict the rights of others to make use of enhancement interventions, would inflict harm.  
If Harris‟s conception of the “harm-benefit continuum” (Bortolotti & Harris 2006: 49) as 
described above is correct, the implication is that the moral obligation to enhance is supported 
both by the principle of beneficence (the duty to benefit others), but also by the generally 
more stringent claim of nonmaleficence (which implies that we should not harm others) 
(Beauchamp & Childress 2009: 150).   
 
This might suggest, in opposition to Harris‟s disavowal of the possibility of state intervention, 
that the state would be justified in intruding upon personal or reproductive autonomy to, at the 
very least, actively encourage the use of genetic enhancement, in order to prevent the harm 
that would otherwise be incurred.  Sparrow worries that these implications of Harris‟s 
argument are undeniable, and that this might result in a system of coercive state eugenics 
(2011: 40).   
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However, there may be a problem with the logic of Harris‟s argument.  Bayles suggests that it 
does not follow “[f]rom the fact that a person would be better off were one to act in a certain 
way...that failure to so act harms him”, and that this kind of reasoning collapses “the 
distinction between harm and non-benefit” (Bayles 1976: 298).  Harris‟s argument seems to 
conflate the moral obligation that implies that one should not inflict harm with the obligation 
that one should promote good, by arguing that “the reasons we have not to harm others...are 
continuous with the reasons we have for conferring benefits on others if we can” so that “to 
decide to withhold a benefit is in a sense to harm the individual we decline to benefit” (Harris 
2001: 386).  However, as indicated, the legitimacy of this reasoning is questionable.      
 
It is precisely this component of Harris‟s argument which I would like to examine further in 
the following chapter.  Harris argues that there is a continuum between causing benefit and 
avoiding harm, and that this provides a moral reason to genetically enhance humans.  While 
this argument can be criticised on the basis of its conflation of harm and non-benefit, I would 
like to suggest that the enhancement debate, particularly in its interrogation of the principle of 
normality as briefly described above, does, in fact, lend itself towards an interpretation of 
harm which suggests that failing to confer the benefit of enhancement is harmful.  I would 
like to argue that this is because the distinction between bringing about harm by omission and 
failing to bring about benefit is based upon the notion of “normality” – this concept sets limits 
on the kind of behaviour which can be regarded as harmful.  If it can be shown that normality 
is a fluid concept, or that it is unreliable as a moral marker of the border between avoiding 
harm and conferring benefit, this has implications for the moral status of genetic (and other) 
enhancements, and might suggest that society would be justified in intervening in personal 
autonomy to encourage the practice of genetic enhancement.  It would also, however, have 
important implications for the way in which these concepts are currently used in bioethics.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The arguments described above have provided some indication of the divergence of views in 
the enhancement debate.  Those who argue against the development and practice of genetic 
enhancement approach this argument from a number of different perspectives.  However, 
what all these perspectives have in common is the distinction which they make between the 
moral acceptability of therapeutic interventions, and the morally dubious nature of 
enhancement interventions.  The reasons for this distinction vary from the tendency of 
enhancement interventions to undermine human nature or to bring about bad consequences, to 
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their incompatibility with the proper goals of medicine.  Those who disagree with these 
arguments think that the practice of genetic enhancement is acceptable on the basis of the 
principle of respect for autonomy.  However, some go even further than this and argue that 
enhancement, because of its tendency to promote welfare, is a moral obligation, although not 
an obligation that justifies state intervention or coercion.  I would like to situate my argument 
within these latter positions, but I will suggest that these arguments, particularly in the 
questioning of the distinction between withholding benefits and causing harm which is 
expressed by John Harris, fail to fully acknowledge that the full implication of such a position 
may indeed justify some form of social intervention in personal autonomy which would 
favour genetic enhancement.       
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4  In Support of the Moral Obligation to Enhance  
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters, I have provided a simple overview of the nature of genetic 
functioning, with emphasis upon the probable limits that the nature of this functioning 
imposes upon the development of genetic engineering, and particularly, genetic enhancement.  
I have also summarised the most prevalent schools of argument against genetic enhancement, 
and have tried to show that anti-enhancement arguments which protest against genetic 
enhancement in terms of its inherent moral undesirability fail to provide decisive moral 
reasons to avoid altogether the development of such technologies.  However, some of the 
arguments against genetic enhancement which focus upon the possible negative consequences 
of its use, while they do not constitute a persuasive argument against genetic enhancement 
under all circumstances, are worthy of further consideration, and may suggest that 
governments should institute safeguards in the form of policies which would curtail, or 
exercise control over, some possible uses of enhancement technologies.  I will return to this 
topic in the following chapter.  
 
At the end of the previous chapter, I considered two positive arguments, offered by Julian 
Savulescu and John Harris respectively, in favour of the use of genetic enhancement.  I would 
now like to provide my own argument which supports similar conclusions.  I wish to show 
that (some) enhancement technologies are not only morally acceptable, but are also positively 
morally desirable, and that this moral desirability imposes some degree of moral obligation 
upon us, either personally or as a society, to provide such enhancements.     
 
The development of this argument will proceed primarily by means of a critique of the 
position which holds that the distinction between treatment and enhancement is morally 
significant.  I want to suggest that the moral weight given to this distinction is dubious, 
because the reasons which underlie the posited moral obligation to provide (some) medical 
therapies are identical to, or continuous with, the motivations for providing enhancing 
interventions.  I will do so by interrogating the notion, prevalent in bioethics literature, and 
influentially developed by Norman Daniels, that we are obligated to improve human 
functioning, via medical technology, only up to a point where that functioning falls within the 
range of normality, or species-typicality, because this range of functioning is closely related 
to the achievement of one‟s fair share of the normal opportunity range.  I choose to develop 
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my argument via such an interrogation because, firstly, the normal function model expresses 
an attitude towards enhancement that is prevalent in society, and secondly, a critique of this 
attitude is revealing as to the usual moral impetus for medical therapy, which, I will argue, 
similarly motivates genetic enhancement. 
 
My critique in this regard will have two parts.  Firstly, I will argue that some functional 
limitations, which are the result of normal variation, limit opportunity in a way which is 
comparable to the effect of some diseases and disabilities upon persons.  In this case, our 
moral obligation to provide enhancing interventions which improve functioning within the 
normal range is equivalent to our obligation to provide treatments.  The failure to provide 
treatment and enhancement is similarly harmful to moral agents when this failure results in a 
similar limiting of opportunity, and the moral obligation to intervene is supported in both 
cases by a commitment to egalitarianism.   Secondly, I will argue that the moral desirability 
that we attribute to medical treatment and environmental enhancements results from a 
recognition of the fact that our natural, species-typical functioning, as determined by 
evolution, can, and should, be improved upon in accordance with human interests.  In other 
words, we have a prima facie moral obligation to improve the capacities of moral agents in 
ways which will expand their opportunity ranges and impact positively upon their well-being.  
This prima-facie obligation extends to the use of enhancement technologies to improve upon 
normal functioning in general, and a failure to acknowledge this may be harmful to human 
persons. 
 
My aim in this chapter is not to provide an argument which supports a moral obligation to 
enhance across the board.  In the following chapter, I will attempt to provide some idea of the 
range of enhancements that I consider to be morally obligatory, and the conditions under 
which this moral obligation holds.  I do not exclude the possibility that the use of some 
enhancing interventions could, indeed, be morally reprehensible, where these interventions do 
not result in the promotion of well-being overall, but instead limit one‟s range of 
opportunities, or where they result in morally questionable trade-offs with other important 
human values.  Even where I do suggest that the provision of enhancements is morally 
desirable, I do not think that the prima facie obligation which accrues as a result of this moral 
desirability cannot be trumped by other ethical considerations – in other words, that we may 
have more important obligations to which the obligation to enhance would be secondary.   
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 91 
 
The conclusions I hope to offer here are clearly relevant to the enhancement debate, but their 
significance is not necessarily limited to this sphere.  This argument has important 
implications for the way in which we think about our moral motivations for action generally, 
particularly with regard to the lines that we draw between morally obligatory behaviour and 
behaviour that is morally acceptable but not required.  I would like to show that the 
development of enhancement technologies both inspires and requires a revision of traditional 
ethical reflection upon our actions, as it holds the possibility that characteristics which greatly 
impact upon how well our lives go, but which were previously beyond the scope of mankind‟s 
influence, will now fall, at least partially, within the sphere of human control.  This implies 
that we should interrogate whether the moral boundaries which we traditionally construct are 
objective, and based upon good ethical reasoning, or whether they are structured in terms of 
some normative idea of the status quo, and should therefore be revisited in the light of these 
new technological possibilities.   
 
The moral boundary between treatment and enhancement 
 
The conceptual distinction between treatment and enhancement is commonly regarded as a 
moral boundary (Little 1998: 162).  Specifically, it is seen as marking the limits of our moral 
obligations.  It is relatively uncontroversial to claim that there is some level of prima facie 
obligation attached to the provision of medical treatment.  In other words, it is frequently 
argued that we ought to seek to ameliorate the negative impact of disease and disability upon 
moral agents if we are able.  This conviction is expressed both in terms of the obligations 
which we regard as constitutive of personal morality, and in terms of the obligations which 
we attribute to society or to the state
51
.  However, one rarely encounters the argument that we 
should be obliged to provide biotechnological or genetic enhancements to moral agents, even 
when such enhancements could have the potential to greatly improve persons‟ lives.  Rather, 
enhancement is usually regarded either as permissible, but not obligatory, or as positively 
                                                 
51
 For example, we generally think that parents or caregivers are morally obliged to seek medical treatment for 
their children when this is required (Savulescu 2005: 37), and their withholding of such treatment often results in 
state intervention (Diekema 2004: 243).  The moral controversy surrounding the South African government‟s 
delay in the rollout of antiretroviral medicine (Koenig 2006: 1378) indicates that many people also think that 
governments have some level of obligation to provide (at least) some kinds of medical treatments to their 
populations.  I do not wish to assume here that this moral obligation holds under all circumstances, for all 
people, and for all sorts of interventions, but rather that a general feeling exists that there is some kind of moral 
desirability attached to medical treatment that results in some level of moral obligation on the part of moral 
agents to provide it, if they are in a position to do so.  This general feeling does not seem to be present in the case 
of enhancement. 
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undesirable
52
, so that interventions which transgress the border between treatment and 
enhancement are regarded as raising a “moral warning flag” (Daniels 2000: 320).  These 
common polar moral attitudes indicate that the moral relevance of the distinction between 
treatment and enhancement is widely acknowledged (Mahowald 2006: 21). 
 
In this section, I will interrogate this distinction, firstly, by describing the conceptual basis 
upon which it rests.  This conceptual basis necessarily invokes the category of normal or 
species-typical functioning.  I will then identify the justification provided for the moral 
relevance of the treatment-enhancement distinction, which constructs normality as a 
normative boundary concept, before going on to criticise this justification. 
 
The treatment-enhancement continuum: where do we draw the line? 
 
The distinction between treatment and enhancement remains a central feature of the ongoing 
discussion about enhancement in bioethics literature (Resnik 2000: 365).  As indicated above, 
making such a distinction and insisting upon its moral relevance is necessary in order to 
differentiate between morally desirable medical treatment and morally optional or undesirable 
enhancement.  
  
The emphasis upon the distinction between treatment and enhancement sometimes results in a 
tendency to treat these two concepts as though they stand in opposition to one another 
(Juengst 1998: 31, Lin & Allhoff 2008: 35) - in other words, as though they are antonyms.  In 
fact, as is recognised by other critics (Kiuru & Crystal 2008: 329, Mahowald 2006: 2), and as 
I noted in my introductory chapter, treatment and enhancement exist along a continuum, as 
interventions which have a great deal in common.  Both are biotechnological interventions 
which are directed towards the improvement of functioning.  
 
What, then, is the basis of the conceptual distinction between these two sorts of similar 
interventions?  Or, to put it another way, what is the cut-off point, on the scale of functioning, 
after which an improving intervention ceases to be a treatment and becomes an enhancement?  
 
                                                 
52
 Kass expresses the feelings of many about enhancement when, after affirming the moral desirability of 
medical treatment, he warns that “the powers made possible by biomedical science can be used for non-
therapeutic or ignoble purposes, serving ends that range from the frivolous and disquieting to the offensive and 
pernicious” (2003: 9) 
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To determine this cut-off point, we can recall the sliding scale of functioning which I 
introduced at the outset of this dissertation.  We can imagine the level of functioning
53
 of an 
individual person as being represented by a horizontal, straight line, the defining, but 
excluded, left boundary of which would be the death, or non-existence, of the individual, as 
this constitutes a complete absence of function.  From this zero point, the level of functioning 
moves from that which is least advantageous to human beings to a level which is most 
advantageous (Mahowald 2006: 21).  Both therapeutic and enhancing interventions are 
directed towards moving the level of functioning of a particular human being to the right.   
 
Treatments are those interventions which seek to ameliorate (the effects of) illness, disease 
and disability in order to allow the individual to achieve a state of health.  In other words, 
therapeutic interventions operate on the left-hand portion of the line, moving functioning 
towards the centre.  Enhancement, on the other hand, seeks to go beyond the achievement of 
health.  It targets human functioning in a way which has nothing to do with disease 
conditions, but which is instead aimed at the improvement of normal functioning.  Enhancing 
interventions, then, are those that move functioning towards the right from the point on the 
line which represents healthy, normal functioning.    
 
Therefore, while treatment is aimed at the achievement of normality by the correction of 
states of disease or disability which diverge negatively from this functional standard, 
enhancement is as an intervention which reaches beyond this goal to improve upon normal 
levels of functioning (Berger & Gert 1991: 673-674, Colleton 2008: 2, De Grazia 2000: 36, 
Kiuru & Crystal 2008: 329, Kline 2007: 16, Mehlman 2003: 53, Schwartz 2005: 18).  Normal 
functioning, in other words, is the point on the line which separates interventions which count 
as treatments from those which count as enhancements
54
.   
                                                 
53
 I (somewhat simplistically) refer here to the overall functioning of the individual, rather than the functioning 
of a particular subsystem.  While both therapy and enhancement are in fact directed towards the improvement of 
the functioning of particular subsystems, I assume that those interventions which we pursue (and certainly those 
that we ought to pursue) are those which would bring about overall improvement via the local improvement of 
particular functions.  This assumption will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, as it is fundamental to my 
argument.   
54
 Juengst has sought to offer an alternative delineation of the concepts of treatment and enhancement by making 
reference, not to some ideal of functional normality, but to the etiology of the condition which a specific 
intervention is directed towards preventing or treating.  His contribution suggests that we should define 
interventions primarily with regard to whether or not their objective is to treat or prevent disease (Mehlman 
2003: 55), where disease is defined as “a biological process that moves from discoverable causes (genes, germs, 
or environmental insults) through a robustly confirmable process of pathogenesis that yields characteristic signs 
and symptoms that, in turn, reduce function below species-typical norms” (Juengst 1997: 138).  This accords 
with the commonsense view that treatment is at its most basic level, an intervention which aims to ameliorate 
disease and to restore health (Kalokairinou 2011: 179, Resnik 2000: 366).  However, as Juengst acknowledges, 
this delineation of the treatment-enhancement distinction requires taking up a rather old fashioned view of 
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We can therefore, based on the discussion thus far, represent the continuum between 
treatment and enhancement in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1 
 
              Human function 
Death 
  Treatment      Enhancement 
                                              Normality 
 
 
The usefulness of the category of normal functioning, and particularly its role in determining 
the distinction between treatment and enhancement, as outlined above, has been influentially 
developed by Daniels (1985, 2000, 2009), who builds on the work of Boorse (1975, 1977).  
Boorse describes “health as [the] absence of disease”, and diseases and disabilities as 
“internal states that depress a functional ability below species-typical levels”.  In other words, 
diseases and disabilities are states that represent a negative divergence from “normal 
functioning” (Boorse 1977: 542).  Daniels concurs with this notion of health as “the absence 
of disease”, where “diseases are deviations from the natural functional organization55 of a 
typical member of a species” (1985: 28).   
 
In other words, normal functioning encompasses “the performance by each internal part [of 
the human organism] of all its statistically typical functions with at least statistically typical 
efficiency”, which is defined as an efficiency level “within or above some chosen central 
region of their population distribution” (Boorse 1977: 558-559).  Disease or disabling 
conditions, then, are those conditions which negatively impact upon the capacity of biological 
subsystems to perform the functions which, by their design, they are directed towards 
performing
56
.  For example, asthma constricts and inflames the airways, and thereby reduces 
                                                                                                                                                        
diseases as “entities in their own right, reifiable as processes or parts in a biological system, with at least as much 
ontological objectivity and theoretical significance as the functions that they inhibit” (1997: 125).  In addition, 
this model of treatment, while it may serve to define what we mean by therapeutic interventions, cannot show 
why we should treat disease without referring to its impact upon functioning.    
55
 Daniels states that “[t]he task of characterizing this natural functional organization falls to the biomedical 
sciences” (1985: 28).  
56
 This description of human biology is akin to Aristotelian teleology, although this relation is not something that 
I can pursue here.  See Foot (2001: 33-34) for a description of how “Aristotelian categoricals (life-form 
descriptions relating to the species)” allow us to establish “norms” against which to judge whether a particular 
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the breathing capacity of the lungs.  The function of the lungs, arising from their natural 
evolutionary design, is to bring oxygen into and expel carbon dioxide from the body, and this 
disease condition compresses the functional ability of these organs below species-typical 
levels.   
 
The motivation for medical treatment, under this view, is the achievement of normal 
functioning in individual human beings.  We regard disease and disability as undesirable 
because they “interfere with one or more functions typically performed within members of the 
species” (Boorse 1975: 58) resulting in “the patient‟s ability to function [being] well below 
that of a typical person” (Colleton 2008: 2).  Disease is “an adverse departure from species-
typical normal functioning” (Holtug 1999: 137) which treatment seeks to correct for.  
Therefore, “[h]ealth care needs will be those things we need in order to maintain, restore, or 
provide functional equivalents (where possible) to normal species functioning”57 (Daniels 
1985: 32).  The conceptual distinction between treatment and enhancement, then, on the basis 
of the notion of normality, “draws a line between services or interventions meant to prevent or 
cure (or otherwise ameliorate) conditions that we view as diseases or disabilities and 
interventions that improve a condition that we view as a normal function or feature of 
members of our species” (Daniels 2000: 309).  An enhancement, by this standard, is any 
“intervention that improves a subsystem in some way other than repairing something that is 
broken or remedying a specific dysfunction” (Bostrom and Sandberg 2009b: 312). 
 
However, there is, of course, no single standard or level of functioning which constitutes 
normality for everyone.  Rather, normal functioning encompasses a wide range of human 
functionality, within which there exists a great deal of variation.  This variation is still 
regarded as falling within the range of normality as long as it accords with “a generally 
uncontroversial baseline of species-normal functional organization” (Daniels 1985: 31), 
although the extent to which a particular characteristic can deviate from the population mean 
and still be considered normal is not always clear (Mehlman 2003: 53).   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
individual‟s functioning is “as it should be, or, by contrast, to a lesser or greater degree defective in a certain 
respect”.  
57
 This definition leads Daniels to incorporate environmental, non-biotechnological interventions under the 
category of health-care needs.  These include “adequate nutrition and shelter; sanitary, safe, unpolluted living 
and working conditions; exercise, rest, and some other features of life-style; [and] non-medical personal and 
social support services” (1985: 32), although he does not expand on these inclusions. 
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To determine what is normal for a particular individual, one must consider not only the 
broader range of species normality, but also the functioning that is typical for that individual‟s 
specific reference class.  This reference class is “a natural class of organisms of uniform 
functional design; specifically, an age group of a sex of a species” (Boorse 1977: 555).  
Functioning is normal if it falls within the range of functioning that is typical for other 
members of one‟s reference class.     
   
Therapy, it then seems, is directed towards the improvement of human functioning, where this 
diverges from normality, to at least the minimum level of functioning which could be 
regarded as normal or species-typical for an individual‟s particular reference class.  However, 
some interrogation of this idea shows that even this does not sufficiently describe the goal of 
therapeutic interventions.  If an individual with an IQ of 140 is afflicted with a disease that 
negatively affects her mental functioning, but where this reduced level of functioning is still 
within the range of normal species-typical functioning for her reference class, so that her level 
of mental functioning is equivalent to that of a person with an IQ of 90, one would be unlikely 
to dismiss her need for medical treatment.  Rather, one would seek, by treating her disease, to 
restore her functioning to what it would have been in the absence of the disease.  Even an 
intervention which restored her mental functioning to the level where her IQ score would be 
110 would only be regarded as a partial success.  Conversely, the normal function model does 
not regard the goal of medical practice to be an improvement of the level of functioning from 
the lower to the mid or upper ranges of reference class-typical functioning in situations where 
the individual‟s position in those lower ranges is the result of the natural lottery and not of 
disease or disability. 
  
Therefore, therapy aims to achieve, in a particular individual, the level of functioning that 
would have pertained for that individual, as a result of the genetic lottery, in the absence of 
disease or disability.  In other words, the normal function model regards therapy to be 
directed towards “getting people back to „normal‟ [by] restoring an individual‟s functional 
capacity to the species-typical range for their reference class, and within that range to...the 
particular capability level which was the patient‟s genetic birthright” (Juengst 1997: 129).  
This restores to the individual “that portion of the normal range [of functioning that] his skills 
and talents would have made available to him were he healthy” (Daniels 1985: 34). 
 
This of course implies that improvement of functioning from one level to another may count 
as treatment in the case of one individual and enhancement in the case of another, even where 
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the ultimate result achieved is directly equivalent and where the method of intervention is 
identical.  Whether the given intervention counts as a treatment or enhancement depends upon 
the individual‟s original share of the genetic lottery in the absence of disease or disability.  A 
person whose functioning falls within the lower ranges of normal functioning for their 
reference class, where this is the result of genetic accident and not a disease condition, would 
be enhanced by an intervention which improved this functioning, regardless of whether or not 
this improvement exceeded the upper ranges of normal functioning for their reference class.  
Thus, as Kamm points out, it is not only “improvements that no human being has yet 
evidenced” which are perceived as enhancements, but also improvements to one‟s given 
position in the genetic lottery to a level which could be regarded as quite normal for other 
people more advantaged by this lottery (2005: 5).  
 
To illustrate this curious feature of the treatment-enhancement distinction, we can consider a 
well-known example (Buchanan et al. 2000: 115).  Two boys have a predicted adult height of 
160 cm, which is within the lower ranges of species normality.  However, one of the children 
has been diagnosed with growth hormone deficiency resulting from an earlier brain tumour, 
which has resulted in reduced production of growth hormone by the pituitary gland in 
comparison with the level of growth hormone which would have been produced in the 
absence of the tumour.  Therefore, without the disease condition, the child‟s predicted adult 
height would be greater.  The other child‟s maximum capacity for growth is simply the result 
of his inherited genetic constitution.  In both cases, hormone injections could increase 
predicted adult height.  However, in the first case, this would be considered a therapeutic 
intervention, and in the second, an enhancing intervention, despite the fact that the results, and 
the method via which they are achieved, would be identical.  
 
Thus, one could represent the range of therapeutic and enhancing interventions schematically 
in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 
 
                                      Human function 
Death 
      Treatment  Normal function 
          Enhancement 
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As is evident, the line between treatment and enhancement is not identical for everyone, and 
there is some overlap between these two sorts of interventions.  The particular position of this 
line on the continuum of human function is determined for a given individual by genetic 
accident. 
 
However, it is not always easy to determine where the line between treatment and 
enhancement falls for a given individual, as we cannot always establish the constitution of a 
person‟s genetic birthright, in the absence of disease and disability, with certainty.  This is 
especially the case for congenital conditions.  The recent controversy surrounding Oscar 
Pistorius‟s inclusion in the South African Olympic squad (Imray 2012) illustrates this.  Born 
without fibulae, double amputee Pistorius runs on prosthetic blades.  Because we cannot 
know what Pistorius‟s natural ability would have been in the absence of his congenital 
condition, we cannot accurately determine whether these blades are “functional equivalents” 
to normality (Daniels 1985: 32), or enhancing interventions which improve upon his given 
genetic level of function.  In this case, the Court of Arbitration for Sport, which was 
responsible for deciding whether Pistorius could compete in able-bodied events as a normal 
competitor, attempted to evaluate his functioning (for example, his metabolic rate, his running 
action, and the vertical force which he creates during movement) by comparing it to other 
members of his reference class (male able-bodied athletes of a similar age) (McArdle 2008).  
This indicates that under circumstances where congenital conditions make it difficult to 
determine what a patient‟s genetic birthright would be in the absence of disease or disability, 
the appropriate goal of medical therapy would be to achieve for that patient at least the 
minimum level of functioning which would be normal for their reference class.      
 
Even in cases where we can identify the distinction between therapeutic and enhancing 
interventions with some level of certainty, it is still not clear why such a distinction should be 
morally relevant (Buchanan 2011: 26, Dees 2007: 377, Quigley & Harris 2010: 128).  This 
mere conceptual designation “is of no moral significance” in and of itself (Buchanan 2011: 
27).  We must therefore now examine the motivation for the conviction that the distinction 
between treatment and enhancement matters morally.  In other words, why might there be 
some degree of moral obligation attached to medical treatment, directed towards the 
achievement of normal functioning, but not to biotechnological enhancement which reaches 
beyond normal functioning?  
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The moral significance of normality 
 
As noted previously, enhancement is often treated as a “moral boundary concept” (Juengst 
1998: 29).  This implies that defining a particular intervention as a treatment or as an 
enhancement plays both a “descriptive and normative role” (Juengst 1998: 30).  In other 
words, under this view, the treatment-enhancement distinction not only tells us what a given 
intervention is, but provides us with some measure of guidance about what we ought to do. 
 
The general contention here is that the “[p]rovision of therapeutic interventions is 
broadly...morally obligatory, while [the] provision of enhancing interventions is, at most, 
optional” (Mahowald 2006: 33).  Therefore, “the line between therapy and enhancement is the 
line where medical necessity stops and optional or elective procedures begin” (Colleton 2008: 
73). 
 
This contention seems to endure even in the face of the widespread acknowledgement 
(Buchanan 2011: 26, Chadwick 2008: 25, Gifford 2008: 44, Glover 1984: 31-32, Mehlman 
2003: 53-55) that the line between treatment and enhancement can be problematic.  This 
indicates that while there is some overlap between these two conceptual categories as a result 
of the fact that they exist upon a continuum, as pointed out above, this does not necessarily 
imply that the distinction collapses altogether (Lin & Allhoff 2008: 36).  While it may be 
“fuzzy” at times (Mahowald 2006: 22), the treatment-enhancement distinction, founded on 
the notion of normal functioning as the absence of disease, is, “for the general run of cases”, 
clear enough (Daniels 1985: 30).  The question remains, however, as to why normality should 
be considered a normative goal, beyond which we are not required to go. 
 
The divergent attitudes towards the moral desirability of treatment and enhancement are all 
the more difficult to explain when we consider the following.  Not only are these sorts of 
interventions similar in type, in that they are directed towards bringing about an upwards 
movement upon the continuum of human function, but they also appear to be similarly 
motivated.  This similarity lies in the fact that both treatment and enhancement are directed 
towards bringing about a change in the physical condition of a particular individual that is 
better for that individual than their previous condition.  In other words, both treatment and 
enhancement are desirable, from the perspective of the affected individual, because they 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 100 
 
contribute towards an increased level of well-being
58.  The “overall expectation” of both 
treatment and enhancement, then, is that they will “improve the life of the individual in some 
way” (Mahowald 2006: 24).  
 
However, the conviction remains that other moral agents are only under a moral obligation to 
intervene, via medical technology, to improve the functioning of others up to the level of 
normality.  Beyond this, interventions may be desirable from the perspective of the individual, 
but they are not considered to be morally desirable from the perspective of others.  Proponents 
of this ethical distinction explain this discrepancy by referring to the importance of the 
achievement of normal functioning in protecting a fair range of opportunity.    
 
Daniels, whose discussion of the treatment-enhancement distinction is primarily directed 
towards the delineation of the category of medical necessity (2000: 309), and the 
determination of the requirements of justice with regard to the provision of healthcare (1985: 
17), argues strongly that there is a “special connection” between “normal species functioning 
[and] the opportunity range open to an individual” (1985: 45).  In other words, “protecting 
normal functioning contributes to protecting opportunity” (Buchanan et al. 2000: 122). 
 
The level of functioning which a particular individual enjoys determines the opportunities 
which are available to them in a relatively obvious way - the higher that level of 
functioning
59, the greater their range of opportunity.  One‟s range of opportunity is also 
closely associated with well-being, as the wider this range, the greater the number of 
opportunities available for preference fulfilment. 
 
Of course, both treatment and enhancement, viewed as interventions which increase the level 
of human functioning in a particular individual, will tend to increase the opportunity range 
available to that individual.  Both interventions would therefore be beneficial to a given 
individual, as they tend to increase the availability of opportunities for preference fulfilment 
and therefore increase well-being.  However, we do not usually think that we are always 
obligated to maximise the well-being of all moral agents.  Rather, we assess the “importance 
of claims” that moral agents make upon us by referring to a “scale which gives more weight 
                                                 
58
 Of course, it is not always the case that treatment and enhancement will, in fact, ultimately result in an 
increased level of well-being – both these interventions can go wrong or fail to achieve their aims.  However, 
they are, at the very least, directed towards the achievement of this goal.   
59
 Again, I refer here to the level of overall functioning, as determined by the level of functioning of relevant 
subsystems.   
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or importance to certain kinds or categories of preferences over others” (Daniels 1985: 36).  
One of our strongest interests is in not being unfairly disadvantaged by a gross discrepancy in 
our range of opportunities in comparison to others.  This sort of disadvantage is precisely 
what results when functioning diverges sharply from a species-typical norm.  Normality, then, 
is regarded to be a normative goal because it provides us with some kind of fair baseline of 
opportunity which minimises unjust disadvantage likely to result from functional divergence 
from this standard.         
 
The normal function model therefore argues that treatment is morally desirable primarily 
because it enables people to “become normal competitors, free from disadvantages caused by 
disease or disability” (Sabin & Daniels 1994: 10).  As such, it is closely related to 
egalitarianism (Mahowald 2006: 23).  We have some level of moral obligation, imposed upon 
us by the demands of justice, to provide moral agents with a fair share of the normal 
opportunity range.  The normal opportunity range for a particular society is “the array of life 
plans reasonable persons in it are likely to construct for themselves” (Daniels 1985: 33).  
Disease and disability constrict these available life plans in a way that is disadvantageous to 
those affected.  As these are “conditions that we are generally not responsible for” (Buchanan 
et al. 2000: 114), we should attempt to correct for them via medical treatment in order to 
facilitate a reasonably fair societal distribution of opportunity
60
.  Medical treatment, then, is 
morally desirable because it aims to provide moral agents with, at least, “a fair go” in 
comparison to others (Mackie 1985: 87). 
 
Enhancements are not directed towards the achievement of a normal opportunity range for a 
specific individual.  As such, while they may be beneficial to that individual, they do not 
serve to counter unfair disadvantage and are therefore not required by justice.  This is why 
proponents of the normal function model do not think that the provision of enhancement is 
desirable from a moral point of view, or that it constitutes a moral obligation.  
 
However, the normal function model must now deal with the problem of normal human 
variation.  Differing levels of function, where these levels fall within the range of normality, 
can nonetheless constrict or expand one‟s range of opportunity, and therefore one‟s 
                                                 
60
  The egalitarian basis of the normal function model suggests that “it will be more important to prevent, cure, or 
compensate for those disease conditions which involve a greater curtailment of an individual‟s share of the 
normal opportunity range” (Daniels 1985: 35).  In other words, the greater the negative impact which disease or 
disability has upon functioning, the greater the strength of our moral obligation to provide medical treatment to 
correct for it.  
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opportunities for preference fulfilment and one‟s possible level of well-being.  As Daniels 
acknowledges, this effect upon well-being seems to be “morally arbitrary”, as “we do not 
deserve advantages or disadvantages” which are attributable to “genetic accident” (1985: 40) 
any more than we deserve the disadvantage which results from disease or disability.  Why 
should we be required to correct for “mental retardation” via treatment to restore mental 
functioning to the ranges of normality in order to combat unfair disadvantage, but not to 
correct for the disadvantage which accrues as a result of “mere dullness”, when these two 
sorts of disadvantage do not appear to be “qualitatively different” (1985: 34).  In other words, 
if our natural genetic inheritance is not something which we can be said to deserve, and we 
are able to intervene to improve this genetic inheritance, why should we not regard this, too, 
as a requirement of justice?  In this regard, “[e]nhancement to benefit the [genetically] worst 
off would be an effective way of achieving a laudable aim” (Sandberg & Savulescu 2011: 
106). 
 
Daniels acknowledges that this is a problem area for the normal function model, but 
nonetheless maintains that “[o]nly where differences in talents and skills are the results of 
disease and disability, not merely normal variation, is some effort required to correct for the 
effects of the „natural lottery‟” (1985: 34).  In this regard, “the unequal distribution of human 
capacities” is regarded to be a given “fact that health care will not change” (Sabin & Daniels 
1994: 10).  It is impossible to equalise opportunity entirely, because “[t]he share of the normal 
range open to an individual is...determined in a fundamental way by his talents and skills”, 
and this is simply given by the genetic lottery.  We can never entirely correct for the 
inequality resulting from natural variation – this is a brute fact of life which, according to the 
normal function model, falls outside the boundaries of our moral responsibilities.  We are 
morally obliged to reduce the disadvantage resulting from disease and disability, but “[f]air 
equality of opportunity does not require opportunity to be [exactly] equal for all persons” 
(Daniels 1985: 33).  This point is strengthened by the conviction that we must balance 
concerns about fairness with other concerns about “efficiency” (Buchanan et al. 2000: 132).  
In a context where resources are limited, the normal function model seeks to draw a relatively 
uncontroversial line which defines the limits of our obligations to others, and relies upon the 
common conviction that “not all unchosen competitive disadvantages are unfair and require 
elimination or compensation” (Buchanan et al. 2000: 129).  We are morally obliged, under 
this view, to respect and promote the “fundamental interest” which people have in “protecting 
their share of the normal range of opportunities” (Daniels 1985: 36), but we are not obliged to 
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provide moral agents with more than this, even when their share of the normal opportunity 
range is smaller than that of others.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In this section, I have sought to describe the basis of the distinction between treatment and 
enhancement, and to determine the motivations for regarding this distinction as morally 
relevant.  This motivation appears to be the conviction that we ought to promote and maintain 
normal functioning, because this sort of functioning gives moral agents access to their fair 
share of the normal opportunity range, the possession of which human beings have a 
fundamental interest in.    
 
I now want to go on to problematise the argument described above.  To do this, I will firstly 
make some preliminary remarks about the constitution of what we regard to be species-typical 
functioning. 
 
The genesis of normal functioning 
 
Normal functioning is characterised by two seemingly conflicting features, which call into 
question the normative force attributed to it by the normal function model.  These features 
complicate the moral relevance of the distinction between treatment and enhancement, and 
suggest that we may have to re-examine the limits of our moral obligations to others, as I will 
argue later in this chapter. 
 
Firstly, I will discuss the genesis of species-typical functioning via the contingent process of 
evolution, and secondly, I will note the role of human action in constructing normality.  The 
former calls into question the idea that our natural biological functioning is in any way 
morally desirable from a human perspective, while the latter shows that human beings have 
recognised this by shaping normal standards of human functioning according to what they 
value.       
 
My goal in this section is not to argue that the content of normality cannot be determined.  I 
do not wish to call into question the substance of the concept itself, although I will argue that 
its borders are fluid and subject to change, both via evolution and by directed human action.  
Rather, I want to create the grounds for doubt that normality is a category that can or should 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 104 
 
tell us what we owe to other moral agents, in terms of the moral distinction it supposedly 
grounds between interventions which are aimed at achieving this level of functioning, and 
interventions which go beyond it. 
 
With this in mind, I will discuss each of the features of normality identified above in turn.   
 
Species-typical functioning as the result of evolution 
 
The characteristics which we regard as typical of our species are, to a large extent
61
, 
determined by the process of evolution.  This has two important implications which are 
problematic with regard to the normative status attributed to species-typical functioning.  
Firstly, this sort of functioning, as a result of the evolutionary process, is morally arbitrary - 
evolution is “indifferent to how well our lives [go]” (Savulescu 2005: 38).  Secondly, species-
typical functioning, as subject to the ongoing process of evolution, is not fixed. 
 
The assertion that species-typical functioning is morally arbitrary is not intended to suggest 
that evolution is an entirely random process.  Rather, this process, which has shaped the 
constitution of the human species over millennia, tends towards the maximisation of 
reproductive fitness - the path which evolution has taken has been determined by the demands 
of “[s]urvival and reproduction”.  However, this does not imply that evolution necessarily 
tends towards the improvement of the human organism, from the perspective of what humans 
“rightly value” (Buchanan 2011: 4).  In other words, as Dawkins puts it, “[n]atural selection 
does not see ahead, does not plan consequences, has no purpose in view” (1986: 21).  Normal 
human functioning is “an accident” (Silver 1997: 32) – a by-product of the process of 
evolution, wherein “gains and losses are simply advantages and disadvantages from the point 
of view of gene survival” (Glover 1984: 34). 
 
What we take to be normal functioning, then, is “simply functioning that is typical of the 
organism as it happens to be now, as a result of the highly contingent path its species has 
traversed so far” (Buchanan 2011: 3-4).  This is a given which we must deal with.  However, 
because evolution does not proceed with a view to the maximisation of human well-being, 
there is no reason to believe that this sort of functioning is valuable, or that it ought to be 
preserved.  It is clearly the case that evolution has contingently resulted in aspects of 
functioning that we do value and appreciate.  However, there are also features of our naturally 
                                                 
61
 I will argue in the next section that these characteristics are also partially constructed by human action. 
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given human natures that are less valuable from a moral perspective, and which we seek to 
transcend.  This is the case not only in terms of our moral sensibilities, which often come into 
conflict with our natural instincts, but also in terms of imperfections in our biological design 
(Powell & Buchanan 2011: 51)
 62
.   
 
The second implication of the genesis of normal functioning via evolution is that this sort of 
functioning is, to some extent at least, fluid.  It is the result of millennia of change, and 
remains constantly in the process of change (Harris 1992: 171).  Because changes to the 
constitution of our species-typical functioning occur in a way that is tremendously slow, these 
changes are unobservable in a human lifetime.  However, the study of evolutionary biology 
teaches us that while biological human nature may be staid, it is not rigid.  In other words, 
“species-typical functioning is a shifting boundary” (Chadwick 2008: 28).  While we can 
speculate, we cannot know what implications future evolutionary changes will have for 
human functioning. 
 
Does this suggest that human beings should attempt to direct the ongoing process of evolution 
if they are able?  Some critics argue that we should avoid this temptation.  Evolution, they 
say, may be morally blind, but this does not guarantee that our goal-directed interventions will 
be likely to improve upon it.  Fukuyama is one such critic.  He warns that “doing nature one 
better isn‟t always that easy; evolution may be a blind process, but it follows a ruthless 
adaptive logic that makes organisms fit for their environments” (2002: 98).  
 
However, as pointed out above, the process of evolutionary adaption is directed solely by the 
goal of reproductive fitness.  There is nothing to suggest that the sort of functioning which 
this process results in is “optimal functioning...or even satisfactory functioning...from the 
standpoint of what we value” (Buchanan 2011: 4).  Human beings do not only value 
reproductive fitness.  In fact, under some circumstances, they might value other sorts of 
functioning more than reproductive fitness.  Glover provides this example to illustrate this 
point: 
 
If we could engineer a genetic change in some people which would have the effect of making 
them musical prodigies but also sterile, this would be a hopeless gene in terms of survival, but 
this need not force us, or the musical prodigies themselves, to think of the change as for the 
                                                 
62
 Powell and Buchanan, in this regard, cite examples of flawed biological design in humans such as the urinary 
tract in males, the sinus, the inability to synthesize Vitamin C, the pharynx, and the birth canal‟s passage through 
the pelvis (2011: 51-52).   
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worse.  It depends on how we rate musical ability as against having children, and evolutionary 
survival does not dictate priorities here (1984: 34).  
 
The implication of all of this is that, because evolution has not necessarily resulted in morally 
optimal functioning (in other words, functioning that maximises human well-being), we could 
be justified in, or oven obligated to, improve this functioning if we are able.  This may be in 
the interest of (future and existing) moral persons.  In other words, morality may require us to 
take action to direct the development of species-typical functioning according to our values 
and in the interests of human beings, rather than passively accepting the ongoing and morally 
arbitrary changes to this functioning via the blind process of evolution
63
.  
 
In addition, the claim that “[t]here are good prudential reasons to defer to the natural order of 
things and not to think that human beings can easily improve on it through casual 
intervention” (Fukuyama 2002: 97) implies the rejection of a wide range of interventions 
which human beings have already enacted upon their environment and their own natures, 
which are foundational to human culture, and which have constructed, to a large extent, what 
we think of as normal human functioning.  I will discuss this construction of the category of 
normal functioning via human action in the following section. 
 
The role of human intervention in the construction of normality 
 
What do we mean when we talk about normal functioning?  Is this sort of functioning purely 
the brute result of evolution?  In other words, is what we regard to be normal functioning 
simply a natural given? 
 
It is immediately evident that this is not the case, by the standards of the normal function 
model itself.  This model posits normality as being the state which human beings are in, in the 
absence of disease and disability.  However, susceptibility to disease and disability is a 
fundamental feature of normal, natural functioning, and these conditions are likely to affect 
most human beings at some point in their lives.  The absence of disease and disability cannot 
be achieved without human intervention, in the form of the provision of medical treatment 
and preventative measures.  In other words, “diseases that cause the need for therapy are also 
„natural‟” (Witthøft Nielsen 2011: 25).  Dysfunction as a result of disease and disability is a 
species-typical feature of human functioning. 
                                                 
63
 I will develop this tentative suggestion later in this chapter. 
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Susceptibility to disease and disability is, like any other complex aspect of human 
functioning, partially attributable to one‟s genetic disposition and partially attributable to 
environment.  As such, diseases and disabilities cannot be regarded as external invaders that 
must be fought off by medical treatment in order to restore a pre-existing state of affairs, 
given by nature.  Rather, the predisposition to diseases and disabilities, and individual 
resistance and reaction to particular diseases, is variable, and depends to a large extent on 
one‟s inherited genetic makeup, which determines, along with the given environment, how 
one‟s functioning will be affected by these conditions.   
 
Human beings regard disease and disability as undesirable, both because it is often associated 
with suffering, and because, through its negative impact upon the level of human functioning, 
it constricts the range of opportunity available to those affected by it
64
.  Despite the fact that 
human susceptibility to disease is an entirely normal and species-typical aspect of human 
functioning, we therefore attempt, via various therapeutic interventions, to counter the effects 
of these conditions.  The use of medical therapy to counter disease and disability is, in many 
populations and for many disease conditions, so widespread as to be almost universal.  This 
widespread availability and application of medical treatment has, within these populations, 
altered what we think of as normal functioning. 
 
To illustrate this, we can consider the example of pregnancy and childbirth.  These processes 
are, of course, fundamental components of normal human functioning.  The World Health 
Organisation estimates that around 15% of women develop serious complications during 
pregnancy and childbirth which could lead to mortality or severe disability in the absence of 
medical treatment (cited in Johanson, Newburn & Macfarlane 2002: 892).  In other words, it 
is relatively normal to develop serious complications during childbirth.  These may be 
attributable to natural susceptibility to infection, pre-existing disease conditions which are 
aggravated by pregnancy (Hoyert 2007: 3), or may be directly obstetric in nature.  In the latter 
case, many of these complications are probably related to sub-optimal evolutionary design 
which has resulted in “the birth canal passing through the female pelvis”65 (Powell & 
                                                 
64
 Again, I will return to this point later in this chapter. 
65
 This suboptimal design probably results from the strong selection in the history of human evolution for 
“bipedalism, due in part to the scattering of resources and the inefficiency of knuckle-walking as a means of 
locomotion”.  The survival advantage gained by bipedalism outweighed “the substantial costs associated  with 
the reconstruction of the hominid skeleton in order to accommodate this new form of locomotion, including 
some of the highest rates of neonatal and maternal birth mortality in the animal kingdom” (Powell & Buchanan 
2011: 57). 
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Buchanan 2011: 52).  However, the development and availability of medical treatments for 
these complications lower the risk of pregnancy and childbirth considerably, so that maternal 
mortality is no longer normal where such care is widely available to the population.  This is 
illustrated by the discrepancy in maternal mortality rates in the United States between 1915 
(607.9 deaths per 100,000 live births) and 2003 (12.1 deaths per 100,000 live births), which 
indicates the drop in these rates as medical technology advanced (Hoyert 2007: 1).  In 1990, 
average maternal mortality ratios were 27 per 100,000 live births in “more developed 
countries” and 480 per 100,000 in “less developed countries”, with “ratios as high as 1,000 
per 100,000 live births for eastern and western Africa” (Johanson, Newburn & Macfarlane 
2002: 892), which suggests that the widespread availability of advanced medical care in 
developed countries dramatically reduces the statistical likelihood of dying as a result of 
pregnancy or childbirth
66
.    
  
These examples indicate that the development and application of medical technology has in 
fact changed what we think of as normal functioning.  We no longer think of maternal 
mortality as a relatively normal occurrence.  The content of the category of normal human 
functioning, where this is defined in terms of statistical typicality, as well as what we think of 
as being the norm, is not what it was “100 years ago” (Witthøft Nielsen 2011: 26), nor is it 
standard across all populations.  The availability of medical treatment, therefore, does not 
merely assist us in achieving a pre-existing, given standard of normal functioning by 
combating disease conditions which cause us to diverge from this standard, but actually 
determines what this standard is.    
 
The role of medical treatment in determining the content of normal functioning is also evident 
in the phenomenon of increased life expectancy.  Fukuyama notes that life expectancy at birth 
in the United States rose from “48.3 years for men and 46.3 years for women in 1900 to 74.2 
for men and 79.9 for women in 2000” (2002: 57).  This is partially attributable to the 
increasingly successful treatments that have been developed for a range of conditions which 
previously would have (quite naturally) shortened life.  The increase here is considerable ˗ life 
expectancy increased by more than 50% in a century in the example cited above ˗ and 
indicates the way in which the range of available “lifesaving therapies” actually function as 
“life-extending therapies” (Harris 2007: 61, my italics) which, taken together, significantly 
alter the statistically normal human lifespan.  We therefore cannot claim that “our idea...of 
                                                 
66
 Of course, these discrepancies are also partially attributable to environmental improvements not directly 
related to medical treatment.  I will discuss the role of human manipulation of the environment in the 
determination of the constitution of normal functioning later in this section. 
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normal life-expectancy” is determined only by species-typical functioning, as given by 
evolution (Chadwick 2008: 28).  Rather, the increase in “normal” life expectancy over the last 
century, and the difference in life expectancies between the developed and developing worlds, 
shows that the constitution of normality is, to a large extent, influenced by human 
intervention, which includes the development and widespread use of medical technologies.  
 
These examples call into question the conception of “freedom from disease” as a “value 
neutral notion” (Boorse 1977: 572).  Rather, the pursuit of medical treatment is driven by a 
recognition that susceptibility to disease and disability are aspects of our natural, biological 
humanity, as determined by evolution, that are undesirable because of the effect which they 
have on our well-being.  Only human values can ground this evaluation.  The achievement of 
a particular level of functioning as a result of the amelioration of disease has no significance 
independent of the value which is attributed to such a level of functioning by human beings.  
In this sense, human interventions, in the form of medical therapies, alter our conception of 
what it means to be “naturally human” through the use of technology (Witthøft Nielsen 2011: 
26), by reshaping the category of statistically normal human functioning in accordance with 
what human beings value. 
 
We do not only interfere with our naturally given functioning via the means of medical 
treatment, however.  Our manipulation of our environments also determines, to some extent, 
what is normal for human beings.  For millennia, the human species has interacted with, and 
altered aspects of, their environment in a way which has contributed to the development of 
culture and the constitution of human nature.  The drive to improve ourselves is not new.  In 
fact, it can be said to have characterised human history and the movement towards civilisation 
from the outset (Harris 2007: 15).   
 
In other words, human transformation and manipulation of the environment have been 
foundational to the development of civilisation, and its results are constitutive to our way of 
life to such an extent that they are, in any practical sense, irreversible (Buchanan 2011: 40).  
Such transformations and manipulations include the development of agronomy, science and 
literacy.  The benefits which have accrued to human beings as a result of these enterprises 
include improved nutritional levels, and in turn “greater resistance to disease and longevity”, 
increased cognitive capabilities and increased capacities to interact with and communicate 
with others (Buchanan 2011: 38).  These developments have fundamentally altered what we 
think of as normal functioning.  Buchanan elaborates upon this point as follows: 
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We now consider literacy, the use of computers, and the ability to engage in large-scale 
coordinated, complex activities through the functioning of institutions to be „normal‟ 
capabilities for human beings, but for most of the time in which human beings existed they 
were not (2011: 41).   
 
These interventions have also had a direct contribution towards the constitution of our 
biological functioning as a species: 
 
Human action has shaped human biology and altered the genome as long as there have been 
human beings: a series of non-biomedical enhancements of human capacities, from the 
agrarian revolution, to the emergence of cities and political institutions, to advances in 
transportation technologies, has triggered processes of natural selection and mixed previously 
isolated gene pools (Buchanan 2011: 1-2). 
 
In other words, human activity influences, to some extent, the course of evolution.  
Environmental interventions have had an effect upon where and how we live and who we (are 
able to) come into contact with, and have also resulted in vast numbers of individuals 
“surviving to reproduce who otherwise would not [have]” (Buchanan 2011: 41), and this has 
altered the constitution of our gene pool.  This indicates that normal human biology is the 
result of a complex interaction between evolutionary determined characteristics and 
environmental interventions.  The long-established tendency of human organisms to act upon 
and alter their environments is probably partially the result of evolution, as a characteristic 
which seems to be innate to human beings (Miller 2005: 171), and this natural tendency, in 
turn, results in the environmental advances described above, which then have some impact 
upon the ongoing course of human biological evolution (Ereshefsky 2007: 60), and so on.   
 
Not only does human manipulation of and interaction with the environment have some impact 
upon the course of evolution, but evidence suggests that these interventions also have some 
impact upon the biological (as opposed to the cultural or societal) functioning of individual 
human beings.  The development of agriculture and the associated improvement in nutrition 
have “facilitated neurological development” (Buchanan 2011: 39).  Scientific research made 
possible by the development of literacy, numeracy, and cooperative institutions have resulted 
in improvements to our living conditions that have altered our average height and life 
expectancy (Lewens 2009: 354).  In addition, studies indicate that “[t]he acquisition of 
reading and writing skills...change[s] the brain organization of cognitive activity in general, as 
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well as specific abilities”.  These studies “provide...hard evidence on how culture changes the 
brain and how the environment can influence brain development” (Ostrosky-Solís 2004: 3; 
see also Buchanan 2011: 39, Harris 2007: 15). 
 
All of the above suggests that what we regard to be normal human functioning is not static, 
and neither is it equivalent to natural biological functioning as the given result of evolution.  
Rather, normal functioning, and our conception thereof, is partially constituted by human 
intervention, both in terms of the development and use of medical therapies, and the 
manipulation of the environment. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The constitution of normal human functioning via human intervention, and the discrepancy 
between this sort of functioning and the natural biological functioning given by evolution, 
entails, in a sense, a recognition of the first feature of normal human functioning discussed 
above, namely, that the sort of functioning which evolution results in is not necessarily 
“optimal functioning...or even satisfactory functioning...from the standpoint of what we 
value” (Buchanan 2011: 4).  The aspects of statistically normal human functioning which are 
a result of human intervention, and the differences between this functioning and that which is 
given by our biological makeup, are an indication of the extent to which human beings 
attempt to shape their own natures and influence their own functioning in accordance with 
what they value.   
 
In other words, we do not simply accept the opportunity range bestowed upon us by nature, 
but act upon our own natures, and the environments in which we live, to expand this range of 
opportunities, because this contributes towards our level of well-being.  Daniels indirectly 
recognises this when he notes that the normal opportunity range of a given society, as “the 
array of life plans reasonable persons in it are likely to construct for themselves”, is not 
simply a function of brute biology, but is also “dependent on key features of the society – its 
stage of historical development, its level of material wealth and technological development, 
and even important cultural facts about it” (1985: 33).  This indicates the way in which human 
beings do not simply accept what they are given, but habitually make changes to themselves 
and to the world in order to increase their opportunities for well-being, and, in so doing, 
change the content of normal human functioning. 
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Normal human functioning is therefore not a category that is fixed.  Rather, the content of this 
category changes as “people alter their conception of what it means to be normal, and as the 
characteristics of the population change over time” (Mehlman 2003: 54).  To a very great 
extent, these characteristics are altered by human intervention, directed by human values.  The 
question must then be asked: do these interventions not constitute a form of enhancement of 
normal functioning?  And if so, how can we meaningfully introduce a distinction between 
these sorts of intervention and those which we usually refer to as enhancements? 
 
In the light of the discussion above, I now want to return to the moral significance of the 
treatment-enhancement distinction.  I want to make an argument for the moral desirability of 
enhancement interventions, and suggest that there may be some (limited and prima facie) 
level of moral obligation attached to the provision of such interventions, in precisely the same 
way that there is some level of moral obligation to provide medical treatment.  These similar 
sorts of moral obligation are based upon what the normal function model itself explicitly and 
implicitly regards to be the motivations for medical treatment – the imperative to fairly 
distribute opportunity, and the value attached to an increased range of opportunity.   
 
The moral obligation to enhance 
 
In this section, I want to argue that the normal function model cannot convincingly motivate 
the contention that our moral obligations towards others are limited to the provision of means 
whereby they can achieve normal functioning.  Rather, I will suggest that enhancement is 
morally desirable in a way which makes its provision a prima facie moral obligation, both 
where this enhancement improves functioning within the normal ranges, and where it reaches 
beyond these ranges.   
 
My argument in this regard is divided into two parts.  Firstly, I will argue that the limiting of 
opportunity which results from differences in capability levels within the ranges of normal 
functioning is not qualitatively different from that which results from disease and disability.  
Indeed, in some cases, it may be directly equivalent.  In other words, natural variation can 
disadvantage individuals by restricting opportunity in a way that is comparable to the effects 
of (some) diseases and disabilities.  Because of this comparable limiting of opportunity, the 
moral principles explicitly adhered to by the normal function model may lead to the 
conclusion that we ought to make use of enhancement technologies to counter the 
disadvantage caused by natural variation when these technologies become available, just as 
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we should make use of medical technologies to counter the disadvantage arising from disease 
and disability.   
 
Secondly, I will suggest that our moral obligations are not limited to the provision of 
interventions which tend to counter disadvantages experienced by moral agents in comparison 
with others, although this may be an important primary goal.  The possible future availability 
of interventions which could improve upon elements of our species-typical functional design 
would, I will argue, impose an obligation upon us to provide such interventions.  We ought to 
seek these enhancing interventions because they are morally desirable, in that they will be 
likely to expand opportunity and promote well-being.  As such, the obligation to enhance does 
not arise in isolation.  Rather, the moral motivations for genetic and other forms of 
biotechnological enhancement are continuous with the moral motivations for medical 
treatment and for the environmental interventions which improve human lives.  As I will 
attempt to show, both of these sorts of interventions are in fact enhancements, where an 
enhancement is regarded to be any intervention that is directed towards the improvement of 
species-typical functioning directed towards the promotion of human well-being.   
 
After I have made the case for a general obligation to enhance, I will go on, in the final 
section of this chapter, to work out the details of this obligation in greater detail.  In doing so, 
I will suggest that the rejection of enhancement technologies is harmful to human persons.  A 
failure to provide enhancements which would counter disadvantage in ways that are 
equivalent to the effects of treatment imposes harms upon moral agents that are equivalent to 
the harms imposed by a failure to provide (some kinds of) medical care.  In addition, a more 
general failure to provide enhancements, even if these are not directed at the achievement of 
fair equality of opportunity, harms moral agents by putting them, via this omission, into a 
worse position than could otherwise have been the case.    
 
Egalitarian enhancements and the promotion of fair equality of opportunity 
 
The normal function model, as described earlier in this chapter, argues that we have a moral 
obligation to treat disease and disability because these conditions cause negative divergence 
from species-typical functioning.  This negative divergence in turn limits an individual‟s 
opportunity range “relative to that portion of the normal range his skills and talents would 
have made available to him were he healthy” (Daniels 1985: 34).  Moral agents have a 
fundamental interest in maintaining or achieving the level of functioning which is normal (for 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 114 
 
them) in the absence of disease and disability, because this is closely related to their ability to 
enjoy “fair equality of opportunity” (Daniels 1985: 33). 
 
This argument makes two assumptions.  Firstly, it assumes (or seems to suggest) that the 
limitation of opportunity imposed by disease and disability is generally of a greater magnitude 
than the limitation of opportunity imposed by discrepancies in natural variation.  Secondly, it 
assumes that even when inequalities within the range of normal functioning impose 
comparative limits on opportunity, this discrepancy in opportunity ranges is not unfair to an 
extent that requires correction via the technological improvement of functioning.  I will 
consider each of these assumptions in turn.  
 
What limits opportunity? 
 
The assumption that disease and disabling conditions limit opportunity to a greater extent than 
natural human variation is, in a general sense, correct.  This general tendency is at the root of 
the normal function model‟s emphasis upon the moral importance of treating the former 
conditions.  However, I want to suggest that the moral significance attributed to the treatment-
enhancement distinction constructs a dichotomy between states of disease or disability, on the 
one hand, and discrepancies in normal variation, on the other, that is unreasonable.  This 
dichotomy is unreasonable because normal variation can impose limits on opportunity which 
are qualitatively similar, and sometimes roughly equivalent, to those imposed upon by some 
disease conditions.   
 
To show why this is so, I need to revisit a distinction which I earlier put aside in my 
description of the treatment-enhancement distinction.  In this description, I referred to the 
effect of therapeutic and enhancing interventions upon the overall level of functioning of the 
individual.  However, these interventions achieve this effect via their primary goal of 
improving local functioning, or the functioning of particular subsystems
67
.  For example, a 
treatment that restores or improves one‟s ability to hear improves a particular functional 
ability of a particular biological subsystem – the hearing capacity of the auditory system.  The 
improvement of this particular functional ability in turn improves the ability of the individual 
                                                 
67
 I will acknowledge in the next chapter that not all improvement of local functioning necessarily results in an 
improvement of overall functioning, or at least not in a way that applies universally (the effects of some 
enhancements will be desired by some of us but not by others).  I will argue that this is an important measure by 
means of which we must determine whether particular enhancing interventions are morally obligatory (or, when 
not chosen, morally problematic). 
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to function in general, by expanding the means available for interaction with others, and by 
raising the level of their communicative abilities.  The ability to communicate effectively is 
foundational to our ability to function effectively in society in general
68
, and the improvement 
of this ability therefore widens the individual‟s opportunity range overall. 
 
Clearly, not all dysfunction impacts upon one‟s available range of opportunities to the same 
extent.  While some functional limitations constrict their related opportunity ranges almost 
altogether, other instances of functional limitation have a negligible, or non-existent, impact 
upon opportunity.  Glover explains this as follows: 
 
[A] limitation of functioning creates disability only if (on its own or via social discrimination) 
it impairs capacities for human flourishing.  It would not be a disability if there were a failure 
of a system whose only function was to keep toenails growing.  With arrested toenail growth, 
we flourish no less (2006: 9). 
 
As Glover notes, the extent to which functional limitation impacts upon opportunity range is 
partially dependent on the particular conditions of the society or environment in which we are 
situated.  The normal opportunity range, as noted earlier, is the array of life plans within a 
society which members of that society could reasonably construct for themselves.  In a 
society which is not literate, dyslexia does not constrict opportunity because it does not 
deprive the individual affected by it of any opportunities that they might otherwise have had 
(Buchanan et al. 2000: 123).  The relation between the conditions of society and the extent to 
which functional limitation restricts opportunity is foundational to theories which hold that 
disability is (partially) socially constructed.  These theories argue that “some physical and 
mental inabilities or losses of functioning” are “more disabling” under particular social 
circumstances, which include “the way society works in terms of its physical set-up, and...the 
sorts of social interaction and ways of living that are expected of its members (Gillam 1999: 
164).  Alison Davis explains this as follows:  
 
If I lived in a society where being in a wheelchair was no more remarkable then wearing 
glasses and if the community was completely accepting and accessible, my disability would be 
an inconvenience and not much more than that.  It is society which handicaps me, far more 
seriously and completely than the fact that I have spina bifida (cited in Newell 1999: 172).       
 
                                                 
68
 The use of sign language by persons who are deaf operates as a functional equivalent to hearing, in this regard.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 116 
 
I do not want to suggest that I subscribe to the view that (all) limitation of species-typical 
functioning restricts opportunity only, or mostly, as a result of societal circumstances.  I 
merely want to point out that functional limitation impacts upon one‟s range of opportunities 
in a way which is related to the contribution of that particular function to one‟s overall ability 
to function in a given society.  Functional limitation of subsystems that are responsible for 
locomotion or sight will greatly restrict one‟s range of opportunities, without intervention, in 
every human society that we can think of, as these are foundational to our ability to function 
and survive as a species.  Functional limitation of cognitive subsystems which enable literacy, 
however, will, as noted above, only restrict opportunity in literate societies
69
.  Functional 
limitation of the subsystems that facilitate toenail growth, however, will not restrict 
opportunity in any society that human beings have formed thus far.      
 
This does not imply that the functional limitation of toenail growth, as caused by disease, is 
any less a departure from species-typical normality than functional limitation of our ability to 
see or walk.  Diseases which impact negatively upon the ability of a particular bodily 
subsystem to fulfil the function which its natural evolutionary design directs it towards - in 
this case, the function of toenail growth - result in a divergence from normal, species-typical 
functioning regardless of whether this functional limitation restricts opportunity.  The point I 
am trying to make here is that not all local limitation of function, attributable to disease or 
disability, results in a reduction of one‟s level of functioning overall (one‟s ability to function 
in society), and that where the level of overall functioning is reduced, the extent of that 
reduction is different for different conditions.   
 
Of course, it is still the case that the achievement of species-typical functioning, via the 
eradication of the local functional limitation caused by disease and disability, is closely 
related to the achievement of an otherwise unavailable range of opportunities, even if not 
every limitation of function significantly impacts upon opportunity.  However, I would like to 
argue that it is not necessarily the case that only disease and disability constrict one‟s 
opportunity range in a way that it is significant.  Sometimes, these conditions do not impact 
negatively upon one‟s ability to function in society in a way which is any more extreme than 
the negative impact upon societal function imposed by normal variation in human capability 
sets.  I will try to illustrate this.   
 
                                                 
69
 This assumes that the cognitive subsystems which are associated with our ability to read and write do not also 
ground other functional abilities, such as verbal communicative skills, which are important in non-literate 
societies.  
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Some of us are afflicted by disease conditions that inhibit our level of functioning to such an 
extent that very few life plans are available to us.  Some of us are highly advantaged by the 
genetic lottery and have a very wide array of available life plans that we could reasonably 
hope to pursue.  Most of us fall somewhere between these two points.  Perhaps we suffer from 
diseases or disabling conditions that, while they constrict our functioning, and therefore 
opportunity range, to some extent, nonetheless leave a wide range of opportunities for the 
pursuit of our idea of the good life open to us.  However, even if we are not affected by 
conditions that can be described as diseases or disabilities (although the overwhelming 
majority of us will be affected by these conditions at some point), our particular 
characteristics will impose some limitations upon the life plans which we can reasonably hope 
to pursue, to a lesser or greater extent.  In other words, “[n]early all of us who have no 
recognized disability, perhaps all of us, still have functional limitations” in comparison to 
others (Glover 2006: 10), and these functional limitations act to constrict our personal 
opportunity range. 
 
Despite the fact that our non-disease characteristics usually impose some degree of functional 
limitation upon us, we “count functional limitations as disabilities” which we are obliged to 
treat “only when there is a contrast with normal human functioning” (Glover 2006: 11).  (To 
reiterate, normal human functioning, here, is construed as the (wide) range of individual 
levels of human functioning that results from the genetic lottery in the absence of disease and 
disability).  We do this despite the fact that normal variance in human functioning may result 
in considerable discrepancies in capability sets and therefore considerable differences in 
individual opportunity ranges.   
 
Do we make these distinctions because disease and disability always result in greater 
discrepancies in individual opportunity ranges than normal human variation in ability?  I 
would like to suggest that, despite the fact that this may be an aggregate tendency, it is 
relatively common for (some) differences in normal human variation to impose an equivalent, 
or greater limit upon one‟s normal opportunity range, in comparison to others, than (some) 
disease conditions.  In other words, there may be attributes that do not constitute a departure 
from the range of normal, species-typical functioning, which nonetheless negatively impact 
upon one‟s range of opportunities in a way which cannot be regarded as any less fundamental 
than the effect of (some) diseases or disabilities.  
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Before I go on to make this argument, however, I would like to note that there are obviously 
many diseases and disabilities which impose or threaten to impose a greater constriction upon 
one‟s level of functioning and opportunity range than any possible variation in non-disease 
capability sets.   To illustrate this, and to start to show where the effect of normal variation is 
comparable to that of disease and disability and where it is not, I refer back to the schematic 
representation of human functioning given in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 
 
                                      Human function 
Death 
      Treatment  Normal function 
          Enhancement 
 
Clearly, those conditions which result in a level of functioning which could be placed on the 
extreme left-hand portion of the line are not comparable to the effect of normal human 
variation.  For example, diseases that threaten life, and therefore threaten to obliterate one‟s 
functioning and range of opportunity altogether, are obviously not comparable to natural 
variations that impose some functional limitation.  Seriously disabling conditions such as 
anencephaly and Tay-Sachs are examples of conditions which would be placed at the far left 
of the range of human function, although we can think of many others.  Anencephaly, “a 
condition where the top half of the brain is completely absent” implies the complete absence 
of consciousness, whereas Tay-Sachs “implies early degeneration, accompanied by a great 
deal of suffering, and death before the age of four” (Hall 2008: 11).  These conditions 
preclude the achievement of any opportunity range comparable to that resulting from any 
level of normal human variation, and there are a wide range of diseases, illnesses and 
disabilities which threaten life or constrict human functioning in ways which are similarly 
incomparable to normal human variation.  
 
Nonetheless, I do not believe that this fact invalidates the point I am trying to make here.  Of 
course, there are some diseases and disabilities which cause functional limitation that is not 
comparable to the limitation caused by human variation.  But I do not think that this is the 
case for all diseases and disabilities.  It is true that “[a]ll disabilities involve functional 
limitation” (Glover 2006: 8).  However, the extent to which this local functional limitation 
constricts one‟s opportunity range differs with regard to the degree to which this affects our 
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ability to function in society overall.  By this standard, the functional limitation imposed by 
disease or disability may, in some cases, be comparable to the functional limitation imposed 
by normal human variation.  
 
This is, of course, most evident when a particular level of overall functioning falls within the 
range of normal human variation, but is the result, in the case of one individual, of disease or 
disability, and in the case of another individual, of normal human variation.  In this case, the 
overall level of functioning for one individual, in the presence of disease and disability, is 
equivalent to the overall level of functioning for another individual, where all subsystems are 
functioning normally (in other words, where all subsystems are at least minimally fulfilling 
their functions in accordance with their natural design).  
 
This is precisely the situation in the example discussed earlier in this chapter, in which two 
children present with a directly equivalent level of predicted adult height.  In one case this is 
the result of a disease condition, and in the other case a result of normal human variation.   
Local functional limitation, in comparison to others, is present in both children.  In the first 
case, there is a limitation of local function, resulting from disease, in comparison to the 
species-typical ability of the pituitary gland to secrete growth hormone.  In the second, there 
is a limitation of local function, resulting from natural variation, in comparison to a greater 
capacity for growth in others more advantaged by the genetic lottery.  But the impact of this 
local functional limitation upon the level of general functioning is exactly the same in each 
case, and to the degree that shortness constricts one‟s available range of opportunities, the 
extent of that restriction in each case is identical
70
.  
 
Of course, it is easy to make such a judgement in this case, because the equivalent effect is 
grounded upon the physical characteristic of height, which is quantifiable.  We can probably 
think of similarly quantifiable examples, such as the possibly equal impacts of some diseases 
and levels of normal variation upon capabilities such as sight, flexibility, strength, hearing, 
and so on.  As Boorse states, “there are whole broad classes of undesirable physical 
conditions, conditions that restrict one‟s physical well-being, which do not appear as diseases 
in medical texts. It is undesirable to be mildly below average in any valuable physical quality” 
(1977: 544).  In cases where disease affects these characteristics to an extent which is not 
outside the ranges of normal variation, the undesirable impact is equivalent.   
 
                                                 
70
 This assumes, of course, that the social context is relevantly similar.  
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However, even when the functional limitation imposed by disease and natural variation is not 
directly equivalent in a way which is quantifiable, we can still make comparative judgements 
about the limitation imposed by natural variation, on the one hand, and disease on the other.  
Even when the undesirable effects of disease are not identical to those of natural variation, in 
that they do not affect physical functioning in exactly the same way, we can still make 
comparative judgement values about their relative impacts upon opportunity.  Boorse, for 
example, argues that “shortness [as a result of natural variation] may reduce a person‟s quality 
of life much more, in the long run, than a minor allergy or viral infection” (1977: 544-545). 
 
 Thus far, we have spoken about the possibly equivalent impact of natural variation and 
disease upon our physical characteristics.  However, how can we evaluate the impact of 
natural variation upon opportunity with regard to our complex behavioural characteristics
71
?  
 
While we can never measure this effect in a way which is akin to our measurement of height, 
for example, this does not imply that we cannot make some kind of evaluative judgements 
about the extent to which certain behaviours limit opportunity in comparison to others within 
the higher normal ranges.  Sometimes these judgements will simply be attributable to 
common sense – for example, the conviction that a high capacity for empathy will better 
enable us to relate to others and will make relationship-forming easier, and that functional 
limitation of this capacity will conversely restrict one‟s opportunities in this regard.  
However, we can also call upon evidence from empirical studies that suggest that lower levels 
of some behavioural abilities restrict one‟s available range of opportunities to a very great 
extent.      
 
One such study attempted to determine the impact of levels of impulse control - or the ability 
to delay gratification - upon one‟s general chances of success in life.  The experiment 
proceeded by showing preschool age children “two sets of reward objects” - one 
marshmallow as opposed to two.  The children were then told that if they waited a certain 
amount of time (about fifteen minutes), they could have two marshmallows.  However, if they 
chose not to wait, they could only have one (Mischel, Shoda & Peake 1988: 688-689).  The 
                                                 
71
 This is further complicated by the fact that it is difficult to determine the relative contributions of environment 
and one‟s genetic constitution to the formation of such characteristics, as was noted in Chapter 2.  This is of 
course also true with regard to quantifiable characteristics such as height, but variability of the phenotype as a 
result of environmental influences is most strongly evident with regard to complex behavioural traits 
(Charlesworth 2001: 682, Resnik 1994: 30).  Despite this complication, it is likely, as was also noted in Chapter 
2, that natural variation in our genetic constitutions does have some impact, and probably a significant impact, 
upon the eventual determination of our behavioural characteristics, and it is this impact which I am considering 
here.  
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study found that the extent to which children were able to delay gratification (measured by the 
length of time they “were willing to delay for a preferred outcome”) predicted their “cognitive 
and social competence and coping as adolescents” (Mischel, Shoda & Peake 1988: 692): 
 
[T]hose who delayed longer are more verbally fluent; use and respond to reason; are attentive 
and able to concentrate; are planful and think ahead; are competent and skilful; are resourceful 
in initiating activities; are self-reliant and confident; become strongly involved in what they 
do; can be trusted and are dependable; are self-assertive; are curious, exploring, and eager to 
learn; and show concern for moral issues (Mischel, Shoda & Peake 1988: 690).   
 
The children who delayed longer were also better able to cope with stress and less likely to 
display characteristics regarded to be negative, such as immaturity, jealousy, and poor social 
skills (Mischel, Shoda & Peake 1988: 690).  In other words, those children with a high 
capacity for impulse control were, as adolescents, outperforming those children who were less 
able to delay gratification to a very noticeable extent.     
 
While any attempt to measure the effects of complex behavioural traits in this way is 
complex, the results of this study strongly suggest that one‟s level of impulse control has a 
highly significant impact upon how well our lives go, and that those with low levels of this 
trait are functionally limited, in terms of their ability to flourish in society, in comparison to 
those with higher levels.  Other studies suggest that traits such as intelligence and the ability 
to self-motivate may have analogous predictive values (Gagné & St Père 2002, Rowe, 
Vesterdal & Rodgers 1998, Sternberg, Grigorenko & Bundy 2001).  In other words, we could 
be disabled by a low level of functioning with regard to particular capabilities which have a 
strong contribution towards our ability to function overall, even if such a level of functioning 
falls within the normal ranges (Savulescu, Sandberg & Kahane 2011: 13-14).   
 
Taking into account the above, it is difficult to argue that the effect of lower capability levels 
in valuable behavioural traits on opportunity ranges is any less profound than the effect of 
some diseases and disabilities, even where these diseases and disabilities significantly limit 
function.  These effects may also be more difficult to counter via the means which are 
available to us at present.  For example, a lack of mobility certainly limits functioning in a 
way that limits opportunity.  We attempt to correct for this via the provision of functional 
equivalents to normality (for example, wheelchairs or prosthetics) and via the structuring of 
society (making buildings structurally accessible to wheelchair users and introducing 
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workplace policies which foster employment opportunities for those who are disabled).  
While a limitation of locomotive functioning clearly still limits opportunity, because it closes 
off some life plans to those affected by it which could otherwise have been pursued, it does 
not, alone, negate the possibility of human flourishing.  It is very hard to make evaluative 
judgements about the extent to which different functional limitations impact upon one‟s range 
of opportunities.  However, the studies cited above allow us to tentatively suggest that low 
levels of impulse control, for example, may affect one‟s chances for success in life, and limit 
one‟s range of opportunities in comparison to others, in a very generalised way that can (at 
least) be compared to the similar limits imposed by some disabilities, even when these are 
significant.  We can try to counter these effects by manipulating characteristics 
environmentally
72
 (for example, by imposing discipline).  However, the strong predictive 
trends towards low levels of flourishing which result from the very early presence of an 
inability to delay gratification, as documented by the study above, indicate that this 
characteristic is at least partially resistant to such environmental manipulation. 
 
It seems that we can conclude without too much controversy that “[m]any of our biological 
and psychological characteristics profoundly affect how well our lives go” (Savulescu 2005: 
37).  If the opportunity range for a given individual is the array of life plans which that 
individual could reasonably hope to pursue, then the opportunity range variance between 
individuals is clearly vast.  What I have tried to show here is that the impact which our 
characteristics have upon our capacity to flourish depends not at all upon whether they result 
from disease conditions or natural variation, but is rather directly related to the extent to 
which these characteristics constrict our range of opportunities in comparison to others.  It 
therefore seems that, if we propose, as the normal function model does, that we are morally 
obliged to counter the disadvantageous limiting of one‟s opportunity range in comparison to 
others by disease and disability, we should be equally obliged to intervene to counter the 
comparable disadvantage imposed by natural variation, where the local functional limitation 
resulting from this natural variation inhibits our general functional ability to an equal extent.  
This obligation accrues, in other words, in the area of overlap, indicated in Figure 2, between 
treatment and enhancement.   
 
                                                 
72
 We do often think that the improvement of functioning via environmental manipulation is morally obligatory, 
especially where failure to provide such environmental intervention may limit a person‟s opportunity range in 
relation to others.  For example, children are legally required, in many countries, to attend school and receive a 
basic education until a certain age.  Parents who severely neglect their children are also subject to legal action 
(Gelles & Shwartz 1999: 97).  Even where the state does not intervene, we frequently make personal moral 
judgements about the behaviour of parents and caregivers who “bring up their children badly”.   
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However, we must now turn to the second assumption inherent in the normal function model.  
As noted above, this model assumes that even when inequalities within the range of normal 
functioning impose limits on opportunity, this is not unfair.  It therefore matters not that 
disease conditions and natural variation in ability might result in equal disadvantage in terms 
of an equally limited level of general functioning.  The fact remains that we are obliged to 
intervene in the former case, but not the latter, because we are only required to correct for 
unfair disadvantage.  Can this proposition be defended?     
 
Is limited opportunity resulting from natural variation fair? 
 
The contention of the normal function model is this: 
 
Fair equality of opportunity does not require opportunity to be equal for all persons. It requires 
only that it be equal for persons with similar skills and talents.  Thus individual shares of the 
normal range will not in general be equal, even when they are fair to the individual.  The 
general principle of fair equality does not imply levelling individual differences
73
 (Daniels 
1985: 33). 
 
The question is, if via the advent of genetic enhancement technologies, we are able to 
intervene in a relatively cost-effective way to level those individual differences which impact 
severely upon one’s opportunity range in a way that is comparable to disease or disability, 
why are we not obliged to do so?  Why do only those “differences in talents and skills [that] 
are the results of disease and disability, not merely normal variation [require] some...effort to 
correct” (Daniels 1985:34)?  It is unclear why this should be the case, given that a comparable 
difference in talents and skills has a comparable effect upon well-being, and imposes a 
comparable disadvantage, regardless of the cause of that difference.  The distinction made 
between treatment and enhancement, where their effect upon the range of opportunities is 
comparable, seems to be a morally arbitrary standard for determining our moral obligations, 
because it seems to imply that “one should be troubled by a disadvantage that precludes a 
                                                 
73
 Note that the moral obligation to enhance which I am arguing for here does not imply that all individual 
differences should be levelled, nor it is likely that the enhancement project could ever achieve this, taking into 
account the complexities of genetic functioning discussed in Chapter 2.  Rather, we are obliged to enhance, for 
the sake of equality of opportunity, only where it can be shown that the functional ability to be enhanced has 
some significant impact upon the range of opportunities available to us, and that the proposed intervention will 
therefore positively impact upon our range of opportunities by lessening the disadvantage in this range which we 
experience in comparison to others.  This moral obligation does not accrue to a wide range of variation in 
functional abilities and individual characteristics where this does not apply. 
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person from reaching the [normal] minimum, but not at all by the disadvantage that is 
compatible with reaching it” (Holtug 1999: 140).   
 
This moral arbitrariness is supported by two other factors.  These factors are, firstly, the 
normal function model‟s tendency to rate the strength of our relative obligations to provide 
medical treatment according to the extent of the limitation that a given condition imposes 
upon us, and secondly, the fact that the model makes some allowance for the correction of the 
unequal distribution of natural capacities via environmental means. 
 
The normal function model does not regard the strength of our moral obligation to provide 
treatment to be equal for all conditions.  Rather, it rates the moral importance of such 
treatment according to a particular standard.  This standard takes into account the degree to 
which our normal opportunity range is limited by a particular disease or disability - in other 
words, “how good or bad a person‟s health state is for that person” (Bognar 2008: 97).  The 
greater the curtailment imposed by disease and disability upon our opportunity range, the 
greater the moral imperative to treat the relevant condition.  This ranking of our moral 
obligations derives from a conviction that “we must judge the relative well-being of 
individuals or groups in order to assess the urgency or importance of claims they make on us” 
(Daniels 1985: 36).  However, this seems to deprive the distinction between treatment and 
enhancement of its moral significance.  If, as I have tried to show, the relative disadvantage 
resulting from natural variations and disease conditions can, in some cases, be identical, this 
is surely worthy of equal moral consideration.  To say that the overall functioning of two 
individuals is limited in comparison to the overall functioning of another individual to 
precisely the same extent, but that we are only obliged to intervene in one case, seems to 
dismiss the imperative to “judge the relative well-being of individuals or groups in order to 
assess the urgency or importance of claims they make on us” (Daniels 1985: 36).  In cases 
where natural variation limits overall functioning to a greater extent than a particular disease, 
the insistence that we are only required to correct for the latter condition seems ludicrous.  
Neither the functional limitation of disease and disability, nor the functional limitation of 
natural variation, are characteristics that people deserve, in that “they did not choose to 
develop [such limitations]” (Sabin & Daniels 1994: 10).  In other words, the limitation of 
opportunity is not deserved and not fair in either case.  I cannot see any reason for suggesting 
that our moral obligation to intervene applies in one case and not the other, given that the 
level of limitation is the same, simply because the cause of that limitation differs. 
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Daniels seems to indirectly recognise this.  Following Rawls, he implies that we could indeed 
be required by justice to counter for the moral arbitrariness of undeserved natural 
disadvantages by environmental means, for example, by redistributing resources or making 
special allowances for the naturally disadvantaged within “the educational system” (1985: 
46).  If this is the case, though, why should we not also be required to make use of 
technological interventions to counter for natural disadvantages in the same way? 
 
Daniels later concedes this point, and acknowledges that the treatment-enhancement 
distinction cannot “map unqualifiedly onto the moral boundary between obligatory and 
nonobligatory services” (2000: 313), so that “sometimes concerns about equality of 
opportunity might oblige us to provide some genetic interventions even when they...[are] not 
treatments of disease” (2000: 314).  This possibility is hinted at by Rawls himself: 
 
[I]t is...in the interest of each to have greater natural assets.  This enables him to pursue a 
preferred plan of life.  In the original position, then, the parties want to insure for their 
descendants the best genetic endowment (assuming their own to be fixed).  The pursuit of 
reasonable policies in this regard is something that earlier generations owe to later ones, this 
being a question that arises between generations.  Thus over time a society is to take steps at 
least to preserve the general level of natural abilities and to prevent the diffusion of severe 
defects...We might conjecture that in the long run, if there is an upper bound on ability, we 
would eventually reach a society with the greatest equal liberty the members of which enjoy 
the greatest equal talent (1971: 92-93).  
 
Despite his concession, Daniels nonetheless maintains that “the levelling of the playing field 
goes only so far” (2000: 316).  Daniels‟s position here seems to rely on the supposition that 
the demands of efficiency would run contrary to the imperative to radically equalize 
opportunity (in other words, that it would, from a Rawlsian social contract perspective, “be 
better for contractors...to mitigate the effects of [natural] inequalities by redistribution of other 
important goods”, as redistribution via genetic enhancement technologies could be inefficient 
and would ultimately make everyone worse off (Daniels 2000: 317). 
 
Of course, morality demands that we take such concerns into account.  I do not want to 
suggest that the moral obligation to enhance in order to bring about equality of opportunity is 
a primary obligation that trumps all others.  This must be balanced against other concerns, 
such as efficiency.  In the context of the finite availability of resources, it will still be more 
important to mitigate the effects of diseases and disabilities that curtail opportunity to a 
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greater extent than natural variation.  However, where the effects of (particular) diseases and 
disabilities are equivalent to the effects of (some forms of) natural variation, the prima facie 
moral obligation to correct for this effect is the same.  This moral obligation may, of course, 
come into conflict with concerns about efficiency, and this must necessarily be weighed up in 
the case of each proposed intervention.  However, an attitude that holds that inequalities in 
our natural capacities are fair because they are simply natural givens that we are presented 
with, is, or will be, an anachronism in a context where we have the ability to directly 
determine, via genetic intervention, the partial constitution of these abilities.  We think we are 
obliged to take environmental action to improve the range of opportunities people will have 
by manipulating their non-disease characteristics, via interventions such as education and 
discipline.  We think we are obliged to provide some restitution or correction for undeserved 
socio-economic inequalities (Daniels 1985: 34).  We think we are obliged to restore or 
achieve species-typical functioning for people, where their divergence from this standard of 
functioning unjustifiably limits their overall ability to function in society.  Are our natural 
capacities really the only exception to this general moral obligation to equalise opportunity, or 
is this exclusion simply a hangover from a time when any direct manipulation of our genetic 
characteristics seemed impossible?       
 
In other words, when rating our moral obligations to intervene in and improve the functioning 
of individuals, what should count is not whether a condition constitutes a divergence from the 
patient‟s genetic birthright in the absence of disease or disability.  Instead, what should count 
is the impact which the individual‟s level of functioning has upon the level of disadvantage 
which they are likely to experience.  It may be the case that disease and disability in general 
constricts opportunity to a greater extent, and that “meeting health-care needs [therefore has] 
a definite tendency to promote happiness” (Daniels 1985: 27), but this does not imply that we 
should therefore stick to a hard-and-fast rule which holds that we are morally obliged to treat 
but not to enhance in cases where both interventions will similarly contribute to fair equality 
of opportunity.  
 
Nature does not take notions of “fairness” into account with regard to the distribution of 
natural capabilities (Savulescu 2006: 331).  However, human beings do.  Where we are in a 
position to improve natural capabilities, the principle of fairness seems to require that we 
ought to do so. 
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Thus far, I have argued that enhancement is obligatory in cases where natural variation limits 
opportunity in a way that is comparable to the effects of disease and disability.  Given that 
medical treatment is seen to be morally desirable because it promotes equality of opportunity 
by countering disadvantage (according to the normal function model), enhancing 
interventions which have an analogous effect would be desirable for precisely the same 
reasons. 
 
However, I now want to go further than this.  Enhancement may not only be morally required 
because it could promote equality of opportunity, but also because it is good for us in a more 
general sense. 
 
Beneficial enhancement and the promotion of well-being 
 
The preceding argument suggests that the equalisation of opportunity via enhancement and 
therapy is comparably morally obligatory in like cases.  However, the obligation to enhance, 
as imposed upon us by the requirements of justice, never demands that we go beyond the 
upper ranges of normality
74
.  We are not obligated to provide enhancement interventions, 
under this view, to those who are most advantaged by the genetic lottery, because their high 
level of overall functioning implies that their opportunity range is not (significantly) limited 
in comparison with anyone else.  Indeed, fair equality of opportunity might make such 
enhancement morally impermissible, because the higher level of functioning which it would 
achieve for some would disadvantage others by comparison. 
 
Does this imply that enhancement beyond the upper ranges of species-typical functioning is 
therefore forever off-limits?  I want to argue that, on the contrary, a case can be made for a 
prima facie moral obligation to provide these sorts of enhancements too, although this ethical 
imperative can come into conflict with, and justly be overruled by, competing moral 
principles that are of greater importance.  The moral obligation in this case stems from the 
obligation to promote the well-being of other moral agents in ways which do not have to do 
with frivolous or particular individual preferences.  Because enhancement, through its 
widening of one‟s opportunity range, achieves this effect, this intervention is morally 
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 Wilkinson (cited in McConnell 2011a: 2) distinguishes between “non-disease avoidance” enhancement within 
the normal ranges whereby one “choos[es] a trait the absence of which would not constitute having a disease” 
but which would not exceed normality, and “super-normality” enhancement , whereby “traits are improved 
beyond the normal range for humans”.  The argument that I have put forward thus far justifies the first kind of 
enhancement but not the second. 
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desirable.  In this regard, enhancement is simply the latest development in a series of human 
interventions which have altered our naturally given level of functioning in accordance with 
human values.   
 
I would like to suggest that species-typical functioning, as it is constructed by the normal 
function model, cannot function as a minimum standard against which we judge divergent 
levels of human functioning and determine our moral obligations.  This is because it is the 
result, as it currently stands, of a series of human interventions which have characterised 
civilisation from the outset, which have aimed to improve natural, evolutionarily determined 
functioning.  This improvement has occurred against the background of the dual recognitions 
that our naturally given functioning is not optimal from the perspective of our level of well-
being, and that we ought to promote the level of human well-being, simply because it is good 
for us.  Normal human functioning, as it currently stands, is highly unlikely to be the climax 
of this process, nor ought it to be.  
 
Is health (the only thing that is) desirable? 
 
To illustrate why this is so, we can return to the work of Boorse.  Boorse‟s development of the 
concept of health is adapted by Daniels to develop a theory about the moral obligations 
attached to the provision of healthcare.  However, this conception of health, as the normal, 
species-typical functioning of human beings, where such normal functioning is constituted by 
the performance of subsystems in accordance with their natural design (1975: 77) cannot, 
according to Boorse himself, function as a standard in terms of which we can determine the 
limits of our moral obligations.  This is, first of all, because not all disease conditions are 
(seriously) undesirable.  In this regard, Boorse distinguishes between disease (as a deviation 
from functional health) and illness (a normative description of an undesirable state which 
results from disease, and which impacts upon the overall functioning of the individual and 
merits special moral consideration) (1975: 56).  While it may be the case that “essentially all 
serious physiological diseases will satisfy the...requirement of an illness, namely, 
undesirability for its bearer” (1975: 60), there may be some disease conditions (for example, 
the mild infections intentionally caused by vaccinations) which are on balance desirable 
(1975: 61).  Other conditions, such as diseases which cause infertility and do not affect 
functioning in any other way, are not necessarily undesirable to those affected by such 
conditions – the desirability or undesirability of such a condition would depend upon their 
context (1975: 53)  
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In other words, Boorse suggests that “[h]ealth is not unconditionally worth promoting”.  Even 
more importantly for the argument I wish to make here, however, is his suggestion that “what 
is worth promoting [is not] necessarily health” (1975: 60, my italics).  This can be illustrated 
as follows.  
 
In attempting to develop a definition of health as the achievement of normal functioning in 
accordance with naturally given design, Boorse develops an analogy between the state of 
health in a human organism and a vehicle in good working order.  We regard a vehicle to be 
in good working order when its functioning accords with its design, or when each of its 
component parts adequately perform their designated function.  Similarly, the human 
organism is healthy when all its component subsystems are functioning in a way that accords 
with its natural design.  However, as Boorse notes, the fact that all parts of a vehicle are 
functioning as they are designed to does not suggest that the design of the car as a whole is in 
itself a good one (1975: 59). 
 
We can develop Boorse‟s analogy here further.  The designers of a vehicle presumably have 
some type of normative intention that a vehicle will function well
75
.  However, the design of 
the human organism is largely attributable to the process of evolution.  As noted in an earlier 
part of this chapter, there is no reason to think that evolution, which tends towards the 
maximisation of reproductive fitness, has produced a design that is good from the perspective 
of what human beings value.  This suggests that good health, as the absence of disease and 
disability and the performance of human functional subsystems in accordance with their 
natural design, does not tell us everything about what could be desirable for human beings.  In 
fact, this natural design may contain elements that are undesirable from the perspective of 
what we value
76
, and which we ought to improve upon if we are able. 
 
Treatment as enhancement 
 
One way in which human beings have recognised that normal functioning, in accordance with 
evolutionary design, is not necessarily optimal functioning, is precisely through the 
                                                 
75
 This may of course be combined with concerns about, for example, cost, and what counts as a good design 
will depend upon what people find to be most valuable.  For instance, some people would prefer a fuel-efficient 
vehicle , others would be more concerned about the engine‟s power and maximum speeds, while some would be 
most concerned about safety, or some combination of these values. 
76
 We can refer here again to Powell and Buchanan‟s list of examples of sub-optimal human evolutionary design 
(2011: 51-52). 
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development of medicine.  To illustrate this, I want to point out that, if we regard 
susceptibility to disease, disability and environmental injury to be a universal human 
characteristic, as surely we must
77
, it will become clear that therapy too is an enhancement of 
species-typical functioning. 
 
As noted earlier, it is entirely normal, in terms of our species-typical, evolutionarily 
determined functioning, to be vulnerable.  We are naturally susceptible to disease, which our 
normally functioning immune systems cannot always fight off.  Our normally functioning 
bodies are naturally vulnerable to environmental insults which can disable and destroy us.  
Our normally functioning genetic hereditary systems result in mutations (the grounds for 
evolutionary change) which sometimes disadvantage us by causing us to be born with genetic 
disorders.  These same normal mechanisms of hereditary endow the vast majority of us with 
genes that increase our likelihood of developing certain forms of dysfunction.  None of these 
features of natural humanity are in any way divergences from the overall general functioning 
that is species-typical for the genus Homo sapiens.  Some of us may be more advantaged in 
this regard, in that we may be stronger, or more robust.  But even those of us in the upper 
ranges of functional ability to resist disease remain, to a great extent, vulnerable to disease 
conditions and disabilities.  There is no such thing as perfect health, because it is not in our 
natures to be perfectly healthy, at least not forever, and this holds for all of us. 
 
It is in this context that we can point out that vaccinations are an enhancement rather than a 
treatment by the standard of the normal function model, because they improve upon the 
normal, species-typical human capacity to resist disease (Buchanan 2011: 47).  However, I 
would like to point out that it is not only vaccinations that are enhancements by this standard, 
but all medical treatments. 
 
Let us first take the example of the human capacity to resist environmental insults.  Imagine a 
situation in which a pedestrian is involved in a traffic accident.  Because his body‟s functional 
design is naturally vulnerable to force which his bones are not strong enough to withstand, his 
tibia and fibula bones are badly fractured (let us imagine that this individual‟s bone strength is 
in the highest ranges of normality).  Without an intervention which sets and immobilizes these 
bones (for example, the use of a plaster cast) the bones will heal naturally anyway, but they 
will not heal as quickly (because of unintentional movement) and, because the fracture is a 
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 Our mortality, after all, is based upon this universal characteristic. 
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severe one
78
, they could heal in a suboptimal position which will restrict future function.  This 
is an example of a relatively simple human intervention, which we call medical treatment, 
which aims to restore normal functioning.  In fact, this intervention increases a particular, 
normal functional ability in human beings – the ability of the bones to heal – above species-
typical levels (healing is quicker and more successfully restores function than would be the 
case without intervention).    
 
If this does not seem clear, we can consider the human susceptibility to bacterial infections.  
Many bacteria are helpful with regard to human functioning, for example food digestion, so 
this susceptibility is an entirely normal aspect of human functioning.  However, sometimes 
infection by harmful bacteria causes illness, and we can treat such infection via antibiotics.  
This is clearly an improvement of the human functional ability to resist harmful bacterial 
infections – the systems which are responsible for resisting infection would not so easily be 
able to do so in the absence of the therapeutic intervention.  In addition, intervention in the 
form of the provision of antibiotics when we recognise the effects of harmful bacteria 
enhances the normal ability of the body to distinguish between harmful bacteria (from our 
perspective) and beneficial bacteria, and to treat these two sorts of bacteria differently. 
 
In other words, medical treatment functions as an enhancement of the species-typical ability 
of human beings to resist disease, disability, and environmental insult.  It is directed towards 
the achievement of functioning, in each subsystem of the body, that accords with its natural 
functional design.  This idealised functioning, however, is not normal, nor is it species-
typical.  We are all susceptible to conditions which impact upon this functioning, and the 
increased ability to resist or to correct for these conditions, as a result of medical treatment, 
constitutes an enhancement of our normal level of functioning.  In other words, “all successful 
therapies are enhancing” (The President‟s Council on Bioethics 2003: 14-15). 
 
If susceptibility to disease is a normal aspect of human species-typical functioning, why do 
we think that the provision of medical treatment is morally important?  Is it because, as the 
normal function model suggests, we have a duty to protect the fundamental interest which 
people have in achieving and maintaining their fair share of the normal opportunity range in 
the absence of disease and disability? 
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 The fracture is serious despite the fact that we have imagined this individual‟s bone strength to be in the 
highest normal ranges, because the force of the accident was such that it would have had this result even in the 
context of the lowest possible normal levels of bone vulnerability.   
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There are two reasons why this cannot fully explain the moral motivations for the provision of 
medical treatment.  Firstly, the alternative description of treatment as enhancement which I 
have offered above implies that one‟s share of the normal opportunity range, as determined by 
the genetic lottery, includes one‟s divergent capacity to resist, and one‟s genetic tendency 
towards, particular diseases and disabilities.  This can be illustrated by once again referring 
back to the case of two children with equivalent predicted adult heights.  In this case, both the 
genetic susceptibility to cancer and the genetic tendency towards shortness are determined by 
natural variation in functioning which is entirely normal (Buchanan et al. 2000: 116).  
Therefore, medical treatment in the former case (and in fact in every case) constitutes an 
enhancement of the affected individual‟s natural and normal resistance to disease.   
 
Suppose, we accept this argument, and acknowledge that treatment is a form of enhancement.  
Suppose, too that we accept the argument in the previous section, and accept that 
enhancements which contribute towards fair equality of opportunity are obligatory to the 
same extent as analogous treatments.  Treatment, if we accept these arguments, promotes fair 
equality of opportunity not just by removing particular limits to opportunity (by countering 
the effects of specific diseases) but also by generally enhancing one‟s level of resistance to 
disease.  In other words, where an individual‟s susceptibility level to disease (as constituted 
by their environment and their genetic constitution) disadvantages them in comparison to 
others who are less susceptible (or in comparison to those of us who are most healthy), the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity gives us a good reason to intervene to correct this 
disadvantage, and this reason holds even if we regard treatment to be a form of enhancement.  
However, nothing that I have said yet gives us any reason to improve species-typical 
functioning beyond the upper ranges of normality.  Indeed, the imperative to promote equality 
of opportunity suggests, if anything, that this could be morally problematic unless such an 
improvement was available to all. 
 
I agree that the principle of fair equality of opportunity gives us a good moral reason to 
provide healthcare (and to provide some kinds of enhancement, as I have suggested above).  
We have a fundamental interest in not being at an unfair disadvantage in terms of our 
opportunity range, and other moral agents ought to respect and promote that interest.  
However, I don‟t think that this is the only reason that healthcare is morally desirable, and this 
brings me to my second critique of the normal function model‟s description of the motivations 
for the posited moral obligation to treat.    
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The moral imperative to promote well-being 
 
To illustrate this critique, I would like to pose two similar thought experiments.  The first one 
is, in fact introduced by Daniels (1985: 55), in his defence of the normal function model 
against the accusation that it is guilty of circular reasoning
79
 (Buchanan 1984: 64, Stern 1983: 
345). 
 
Daniels asks us to imagine that “a disease is widespread, even universal in a society”.  He 
suggests that this disease is a form of “anaemia which affects all and is debilitating across the 
board”.  It would seem that in this case, “impact on the normal opportunity range will not tell 
us how important it is to treat this disease, since it hurts all individuals equally”.  In other 
words, the disease does not disadvantage anyone in comparison to others, and therefore has 
no impact on fair equality of opportunity – everyone‟s opportunity is equally affected.  
Daniels insists that the “opportunity account” is still helpful, because “it is not only a 
principle governing competitive advantage”.  The moral importance of treating this disease 
arises because the condition “keeps each individual from carrying out any life plans that 
otherwise would be reasonable in his society” (my italics). 
 
However, one could respond to this by asking: so what?  Why does it matter that the life plans 
that would be available in the absence of the anaemia are not available, if they are not 
available for everyone?  Assuming that the condition does not result in other consequences 
which are morally undesirable, for example, physical suffering, why should we take action to 
ameliorate its effects?  Presumably not all life plans can be closed, as the sufferers are still 
living and performing basic functions within their society.  Their life plans may be very 
limited in comparison to what would be available in the absence of the condition, but they are 
not limited in comparison to the life plans available to others, as these are all similarly 
constricted, and so the imperative to intervene cannot result from the principle of fair equality 
of opportunity. 
 
Nonetheless, our moral intuition is that such an imperative does exist.  What is its basis?  This 
basis is simply that an increased range of opportunity is valuable to moral agents in and of 
itself, because of its tendency to promote well-being.  We have a fundamental interest in an 
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 This accusation suggests that the normal function model cannot determine our moral obligations as to the 
provision of medical treatment, because the availability of health care partially constructs the normal opportunity 
range.  The moral desirability of the achievement of this opportunity range therefore cannot be used to suggest 
that health care is morally obligatory without circularity. 
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increased level of well-being, simply because it is good for us, and independent of whether 
this increased level contributes to fair equality of opportunity. 
 
We can further illustrate this by thinking of another example.  I have suggested that 
susceptibility to disease is a normal aspect of human functioning, even within the upper 
ranges of functional ability to resist disease.  The level of susceptibility to disease differs as a 
result of normal human variation.  Within a given society, let us imagine that there is one 
individual - call her A - who we can identify as having the lowest levels of susceptibility to 
disease, or conversely, the highest capacity to resist disease.  The normal function model 
suggests that we are required by the principle of fair equality of opportunity to counter the 
effects of disease and disability because these are likely to result in unfair disadvantage, or 
detract from the affected individual‟s fair share of the opportunity range, and moral agents 
have a fundamental interest in avoiding these results.  Imagine that we are given a choice 
between intervening in human functioning in two sorts of ways, and these interventions will 
be similar in terms of cost, safety, and efficacy.  If we choose Intervention X, this will raise 
everybody‟s capacity to resist disease to be equivalent to that of person A, and nobody will be 
unfairly disadvantaged by their comparatively greater risk of developing diseases.  Only those 
diseases that would have affected A, despite her greater resistance levels, will now affect 
everybody.  These diseases will not cause physical suffering, but will limit overall 
functionality to some small extent and will therefore impact negatively upon opportunity for 
everyone in exactly the same way.  The negative impact upon opportunity in these cases will 
not be as significant as that which would have accrued (unequally) in the absence of the 
intervention, but it will still be present, although equal in magnitude for everyone.  If we 
choose Intervention Y, however, we can increase everyone‟s ability to resist disease, 
including A‟s80.  We would therefore enhance the capacity to resist disease beyond the 
highest ranges of normality in society
81
.  In this case, the total negative impact upon 
opportunity which will result from disease will be smaller than in the case of Intervention X.  
 
                                                 
80
 Both Intervention X and Intervention Y could have their own (possibly morally problematic) consequences 
which would have to be taken into account, in a real world scenario.  For example, these interventions could 
result in considerable life extension for everyone, which could cause huge practical problems (although we 
would still be somewhat susceptible to disease, and vulnerable to environmental insults, so this would not result 
in immortality).  However, for the sake of the thought experiment, we should put these to one side for the 
moment, and assume that these high levels of resistance to disease would not affect the normal human life span 
as it currently stands.  I am trying to establish only whether we have a prima facie obligation to enhance, which 
would have to be balanced against other practical and ethical considerations that I will consider in the next 
chapter.  
81
 This is exactly what happens in the case of vaccinations, as noted earlier, although we obviously cannot 
vaccinate against all or even most diseases at present. 
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It seems counter-intuitive to suggest that there is no moral difference between choosing 
Intervention X and Intervention Y (although that moral difference might not be small).  We 
ought, it seems, to choose Intervention Y.  The only explanation for this conviction is that 
there is always a moral obligation, when we have to make a choice between two available 
ranges of opportunities for moral agents, to choose the greater range, because this greater 
range is more likely to promote well-being, and this moral obligation holds even where the 
greater range of opportunities exceeds that available within the upper ranges of species-
typical normal functioning.  This moral obligation, can of course, be outweighed by other 
competing moral obligations that are more important. 
 
Of course, this moral obligation comes into effect only where there is a greater range of 
opportunities conceivably available which we can reasonably hope to achieve by a given 
intervention.  The reverse applies too: as soon as there is a conceivable greater range of 
opportunities available for a moral agent that we can reasonably hope to achieve by means of 
a given intervention, we are morally obligated to provide that intervention. 
 
Thus medical treatment is not only morally required because it contributes towards fair 
equality of opportunity, although this is one of its primary goals and partially explains its 
moral desirability
82.  It is also required because it is good, in and of itself, to improve one‟s 
overall functioning, which widens the range of opportunities of moral agents and tends to 
promote their well-being.  The moral desirability of health is therefore strongly related to its 
tendency to promote well-being.  However, “if it is well-being not health that is intrinsically 
valuable”, this suggests that “human enhancement [is also a] moral obligation” (Savulescu 
2005:37), because “the empirical link between the enhancement of human capabilities and 
increases in well-being is strong” (Buchanan 2011: 45).  In other words, “[i]f we have an 
obligation to treat and prevent disease [based on a duty to promote well-being], we have an 
obligation to try to manipulate [human] characteristics to give an individual the best 
opportunity of the best life” (Savulescu 2005: 38).   
 
                                                 
82
 I have not considered the moral desirability of medicine in terms of its tendency to prevent or alleviate 
suffering.  I do think that this consideration explains the moral importance of medical treatment independently of 
any other effect which it might have.  However, the morally significant interest which we have in avoiding 
suffering cannot explain why there should be any moral importance attached to the treatment of diseases and 
disabilities which do not cause suffering (Down syndrome which presents with no associated health problems, 
for example, or congenital blindness), and for these sorts of conditions, there must be some other moral principle 
at stake.  (I am referring here to the experience of physical pain rather than emotional suffering, as I think this 
latter kind of suffering is closely associated with pain itself, or with the limiting of opportunity, particularly in 
comparison to others).  
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The imperative to promote opportunity and well-being which I have posited here lies behind 
the drive which has characterised human life from the outset – to improve, via environmental 
and medical interventions, the living conditions, capabilities, and level of natural functioning 
of human beings.  As Hobbes famously pointed out, life in its natural state is “solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short” (1968: 41).  We take action to improve the natural state bestowed 
upon us by evolution not only because we think it is good to counter disadvantage, or because 
it is good to reduce suffering, although these are both important moral goals.  We take action 
to improve ourselves, and to manipulate the world around us, to enable us to function more 
effectively, simply because better is good for us.  It is good for us to be able to communicate 
more successfully and with more ease, to be stronger and fitter, to be more resistant to 
disease, to be more intelligent, and to be better able to control our natural impulses.  These 
things are good for us because they widen our range of opportunities for preference 
fulfilment, because they enable us to better achieve our (individual) goals, and because they 
contribute towards our well-being.  Enhancement, directed at the promotion of human well-
being, should therefore be placed in “the historical context of human development” 
(Buchanan 2011: 44). 
 
The imperative to promote well-being also explains why many people think we are morally 
obliged to provide medical services such as contraception and non-therapeutic abortion.  As 
both Daniels (1985: 31) and Boorse (1977: 545) acknowledge, the conditions which these 
interventions “correct for” (fertility and pregnancy) are absolutely normal in terms of human 
functioning – in fact, they are a sign that the relevant bodily subsystems that govern these 
processes are functioning exactly as they ought to in terms of their evolutionary design.  By 
the standard of the normal function model, then, these reproductive services do not qualify as 
healthcare needs (although Daniels suggests they may be morally important for other 
reasons).  They actually inhibit or limit particular local functions associated with 
reproduction.  However, when they are desired, they enhance overall functioning by 
improving our natural species-typical ability to control fertility and to separate sexual 
intercourse, which we value in and of itself, from child-bearing.  This expands our range of 
opportunities, by giving us decision-making power over when and if we will have children 
(which is of fundamental value in determining how well our lives go) and by promoting our 
capacity to enjoy interpersonal relationships.  Contraception and abortion are not morally 
required because we have a fundamental interest in achieving our fair share of the normal 
opportunity range.  They may, however, be morally required because their availability tends 
to promote human well-being.   
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I have tried to make the argument that we always have a moral obligation, when we have to 
make a choice between two available ranges of opportunities for moral agents, to choose the 
greater range, because this greater range is more likely to promote well-being.  I have tried to 
show that this moral obligation holds even where the greater range of opportunities exceeds 
that available within the upper ranges of species-typical normal functioning.  Placed in this 
context, it seems that we always have a prima facie obligation to enhance.  The term 
“enhancement” should be taken to mean any intervention which tends to promote the well-
being of the human person overall, by improving their functioning in comparison to the 
species-typical level of functioning bestowed upon us by evolution.  By this standard, medical 
treatments, beneficial manipulations of the environment, and interventions which improve our 
functioning beyond levels which are currently regarded to be normal, are all morally 
obligatory enhancements.   
 
However, it is important to note that the moral obligation which accrues is not equal in every 
case, any more than it is equally morally important to treat cystic fibrosis and a cough.  The 
strength of our moral obligation depends on the effect of the intervention on one‟s range of 
opportunity, and the resultant effect on their well-being.  In the next chapter, I will attempt to 
provide some rough guidelines as to how we should rate our moral obligations in this regard, 
as well as defining the category of morally obligatory enhancements in greater detail.  I will 
also make some comments about other moral obligations which could invalidate the prima 
facie moral desirability of enhancement which I have established here.     
 
Are all interests equal? 
 
Before I go on, however, I must consider one objection to this argument, which I hope to 
counter with some further remarks.  One could object to the moral obligation I have posited 
above by suggesting that it is too demanding.  If, as I seem to have suggested, we are always 
obligated to promote the well-being of moral agents, what is to stop me from demanding that 
you fulfil your obligation to promote my well-being by sending me on a five-star all expenses 
paid holiday to Hawaii?  
 
I think there are two reasons why this objection fails.  The first has purely to do with practical 
application – by being too demanding, the general obligation to promote well-being collapses.  
The second emphasises that the moral obligation to promote well-being which I have 
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established here is closely related to (and limited to) an expanded range of opportunity and 
the provision and promotion of the general conditions for welfare. 
 
We must firstly consider how a very general obligation to promote well-being would operate 
in practical terms.  As I have repeatedly argued, the duty to promote well-being is only prima 
facie, or to phrase this differently, a “conditional duty” (Ross 1930: 19).  We do not consider 
such duties in isolation, but in the context of our entire spectrum of moral obligations.  So, for 
example, you are not only obligated to promote my well-being, but the well-being of all moral 
agents equally
83
.  If the well-being of all moral agents will be promoted by a trip to Hawaii, or 
by similarly extravagant preferences (although I do not think that this is likely to be the case, 
as I will argue in the next section), then we are equally morally obligated to provide this to 
everyone, but this general obligation weakens each specific obligation to the point of non-
existence
84
, as it is impossible to fulfil.  In addition, we have other duties which are 
(inestimably) more important than the duty to promote the well-being of moral agents by 
sending them to Hawaii.  In other words, there are particular kinds of contributions to well-
being which we consider to be more fundamental than others, and this brings me to my 
second point.     
 
What I want to argue here, is that while the satisfaction of each of our interests may contribute 
towards our well-being, we have different sorts of interests which contribute towards well-
being in different ways.  Some kinds of interests are more fundamental to well-being, and 
therefore of more moral importance, than others.  To illustrate this, we can refer to a 
distinction which Feinberg introduces between our ulterior interests and our welfare interests.   
 
Ulterior interests are those interests which are specific to an individual.  For example, 
individuals may have interests in “producing good novels or works of art, solving a crucial 
scientific problem” and so on.  (Individuals may also have interests in enjoying holidays in 
Hawaii).  These interests differ for each of us.  They are determined by the individual 
differences between us in terms of our set of values and our conceptions of the good.  
Therefore, we might disagree with regard to whether each other‟s ulterior interests are worth 
promoting.   
                                                 
83
 Of course, we also have special obligations to certain persons because of the existence of special relationships.  
I will consider this point at greater length in the following chapter.  For the purposes of this example, I am 
referring to the moral obligation which we have towards others who do not have special relationships with us.  
84
 This also seems to suggest that the obligation to enhance, when conceived as applying equally to all moral 
agents, is weakened to the point of non-existence.  I will make some suggestions about why this might not be the 
case in the next chapter, by referring both to special relationships and to duties we attribute to the state. 
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In this regard, you might disagree that my ulterior interest in going to Hawaii is in fact in my 
best interest from your perspective.  You may think that it is far more beneficial for me to 
finish this dissertation on time.  I am not required to agree with you, but neither can I force 
you to agree with me.  Our differences depend on the values and preferences that we (choose 
to) hold, and while we can try to convince others that our values are more worthwhile, we will 
not always be successful.   
 
Our ulterior interests, while often remaining relatively constant, are also not fixed, in that our 
preferences or values may change.  I may later come to agree with you that going to Hawaii is 
less beneficial than finishing my dissertation, and therefore regret that you accepted my 
previous subjective estimation of the relative effects of these two courses of action on my 
well-being.   
 
Related to this point, we should note that the satisfaction of ulterior interests may in fact act to 
constrict rather than to expand our opportunity range.  If I have an ulterior interest in 
becoming an Olympic athlete, and I determine that high-cost athletic training will therefore 
promote my well-being, the time and effort which I will need to devote to this goal will close 
off other life plans to me.  This will not necessarily be undesirable to me from a personal 
perspective, but its desirability cannot be formulated in terms of the obligation to promote 
well-being by widening the range of opportunities which I have argued for in the foregoing 
section.   
 
A general obligation to promote everyone‟s ulterior interests is therefore not only so 
demanding that it nullifies the obligation on an individual level, but problematic, because 
these interests are to a great extent the result of individual values and chosen preferences 
which others may not recognise, which are not necessarily forever fixed, and which are not 
directed towards the widening of opportunity ranges, and therefore the promotion of these 
interests cannot be shown to be a general good in every case
85
.   
 
                                                 
85
 We may still be morally required to satisfy these interests, especially in the context of special relationships.  
We usually think that the nature of the relationship between two parties affects the type of obligations which 
arise between these parties (Glannon & Ross 2002: 155).  For example, we think that parents should consider the 
well-being of their children to be more morally important than the well-being of strangers.  We therefore think 
that it is morally admirable when parents seek to promote the ulterior (specific) interests of their children 
(provided they are indeed their children‟s interests and not their own), even when they sacrifice some of their 
own ulterior interests to this end.  
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Welfare interests, on the other hand, are those interests which are universal for all people.  
These interests are in “the necessary means” which are the precondition for our achieving our 
“more ultimate goals”.  In other words, they are the basis for the advancement of each one of 
our ulterior interests.  As such, they are the precondition for welfare or for well-being in 
general.  Feinberg includes under the category of welfare interests
86
:  
  
[C]ontinuance for a foreseeable interval of one‟s life,....physical health and vigour, the 
integrity and normal functioning of one‟s body, the absence of absorbing pain and suffering or 
grotesque disfigurement, minimal intellectual acuity, emotional stability, the absence of 
groundless anxieties and resentments, the capacity to engage normally in social intercourse 
and to enjoy and maintain friendships, at least minimal income and financial security
87
, a 
tolerable social and physical environment, and a certain amount of freedom from interference 
and coercion (1984: 37).   
 
Feinberg‟s suggestion that the minimal fulfilment of these interest is of fundamental moral 
importance seems to bear some resemblance to the normal function model, as he regards an 
interest in “achieving a much higher level of a particular element of welfare than is actually 
required” as a form of ulterior interest (1984: 57).  
 
I do not agree with Feinberg on this point.  I cannot see why an interest in achieving a higher 
level of any one of the capabilities identified in this category is not itself a welfare interest
88
.  
Unlike ulterior interests, an interest in achieving a higher level of these capabilities is not 
dependent upon one‟s particular set of values or one‟s conception of the good.  A higher level 
of any one of these “generalized means” (Feinberg 1984: 42) will, for all of us, regardless of 
our conception of the good, increase our range of opportunities by improving upon our 
general ability to fulfil our ulterior interests.  An interest in increasing these abilities is one 
which is fundamental to human beings because we all have an interest in being better able to 
achieve those (particular) goals in life which we have chosen, and to increase the available 
possibilities through which we can realise our individual conceptions of the good life. 
                                                 
86
 I will expand on the category of welfare interests in the next chapter. 
87
 The notion of financial security could be problematic for the moral obligation to improve our welfare interests 
which I am trying to argue for here, as its inclusion under this category of interests seems to suggest that we 
ought to maximise financial security in general by redistributing financial resources so that everyone is equally 
benefited by them (given that this is a finite resource).  While I cannot pursue this at any great length, I will 
tentatively suggest that in the context of an existing distribution of socio-economic resources in society that is 
not unjust (I will not speculate as to what this might be as this is outside the realms of this study), individuals 
with (relatively) equal ranges of opportunities would be equipped to pursue a higher level of financial security, 
to the extent that this was important to them, as an ulterior interest. 
88
 Apart from, possibly, financial security – see the previous footnote. 
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The distinction which I have introduced here between ulterior and welfare interests explains 
why our moral obligation to fulfil the latter sort of interests is a great deal stronger than our 
moral obligation to fulfil the former.  In the promotion of well-being, not all sorts of interests 
count the same.  Some interests are specific to individuals, whereas the promotion of others 
can be recognised as being good for moral agents, by expanding their range of opportunities, 
in general.  In addition, the promotion of welfare interests has an impact on our ability to 
promote (our own) ulterior interests, and provides us with (enhanced) means to fulfil these 
too.  As such, the advancement of our welfare interests may not be the only way to promote 
our well-being, but the advancement of these interests provides the basis for the further 
promotion of that well-being by equipping us with an enhanced ability to promote our ulterior 
interests for ourselves.  “The attraction of the concept of a welfare interest lies precisely in its 
pluralism: welfare interests are those necessary for whatever more ultimate aims the person 
may select” (Von Hirsch 1986: 705).  The promotion of welfare interests therefore tends to 
promote choice and does not require us to elevate or privilege one conception of the good 
over another, or to adhere to a set of ulterior interests which we may not share. 
 
Therefore, the sort of enhancements which we are obliged to pursue are those which will 
advance our welfare interests.  These are general-purpose enhancements.  We are entitled to 
pursue enhancements which promote our ulterior interests for ourselves on the basis of an 
autonomous decision, but we are not entitled to choose them for others
89
 without their explicit 
agreement, as this will be overly prescriptive and deterministic, and will imply the imposition 
upon others of a particular set of values which cannot be evaluated from an objective 
perspective.  On the other hand, the advancement of our welfare interests is always a good 
thing for the individual because this improves the “generalized means to the advancement of 
his various ulterior interests”, whatever these may be, and including even those “that have not 
suggested themselves yet to the person who will one day have a stake in them” (Feinberg 
1984: 41).  The promotion of these interests “is good for a person in any case, whatever his 
beliefs or wants may be” (Feinberg 1984: 42).  Viewed in this way, enhancement can be 
regarded as a means to promote autonomy (Juth 2011: 36), as it increases “the capacities to do 
the things we need to do in order to effectuate our plans”90. 
 
                                                 
89
 Including our children, as I will argue in the next chapter. 
90
 The fact that we will still need to expend effort in order to achieve our ulterior interests also seems to 
invalidate the argument against enhancement from the value of effort which I discussed in the previous chapter. 
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I must now turn to the final question which I will consider in this chapter.  We usually regard 
a failure to promote the welfare interests of moral agents up to a minimum level (for example, 
by a failure to provide treatment or environmental interventions which allow us to function in 
a minimally normal way) to be harmful to those agents.  Can we make an argument that 
suggests that failure to provide enhancements may be harmful in an analogous way? 
 
Enhancement and harm 
 
In this section, I want to examine the relationship between enhancement and harm.  In order 
to do so, I will have to deconstruct the extraordinarily complex relationship between harm and 
non-benefit.   
 
To fail to take an action which improves an individual‟s situation is usually regarded, not as 
an instance of harm, but as an instance of non-benefit (Bayles 1976: 298).  However, there are 
cases when we do regard the withholding of a benefit to be harmful.  We usually think that it 
is harmful to withhold medical treatment, for example.  Given the validity of the argument 
above, which suggests that the motivations for medical treatment and enhancement are 
closely related, can it be the case that a failure to enhance could be similarly harmful? 
 
To determine whether this is the case, I will firstly try to determine what we mean by the 
concept harm. 
 
What is harm? 
 
What do we mean when we say that a particular event harms someone?  At its most basic 
level, to be harmed is to be made worse off (Bayles 1976: 293).  In other words, “for a person 
to be harmed by some event, her life must go worse because of it” (Holtug 2002: 364).   
 
It is relatively obvious that this definition of harm implies that we ought not to inflict it.  
Making other moral agents worse off is, in a fairly uncontroversial way, bad for them.  We 
therefore usually believe that we ought not to take actions which are harmful to others, and 
this is often expressed as the moral principle of nonmaleficence (Beauchamp & Childress 
2009:149, Ross 1930: 21). 
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Of course, not all harm results from morally blameworthy behaviour.  For example, an 
(unpreventable) disease condition that results in blindness harms the one who is blinded by 
making him worse off, but nobody is morally responsible for this effect.  In other words, 
sometimes (in fact, often) harms result from causes that are independent of human agency.  
When we talk about morally blameworthy acts of harming, which it is our moral obligation to 
avoid, we imply that the person so harmed is also “wronged” by another (Feinberg 1992: 4).  
This is the type of harm which I am referring to here. 
 
In some cases, while we might acknowledge the prima facie wrongness of actions that harm 
moral agents (Beauchamp & Childress 2009: 152), we nonetheless think that such actions are 
justified.  For example, we sometimes think that harm is justified in cases of punishment.  We 
might think that this is justified because of a competing moral obligation to avoid some 
greater harm, by, for example, preventing future behaviour which could be harmful to other 
moral agents or to the one who is punished.  Alternatively, we might think that the infliction 
of harm is justified because a particular individual, by their past behaviour, deserves to be 
harmed as a matter of justice, or that they have, through this behaviour, given up their right 
not to be harmed.  We might also harm someone temporarily (for example, when we treat 
them with chemotherapy) in order to gain some greater net benefit for them.  In other words, 
the obligation not to harm does not hold in all circumstances, but must be weighed against our 
other moral obligations.  
 
Feinberg works out the concept of harm in some detail in Harm to Others, in order to 
determine “what sorts of conduct...the state [may] rightly make criminal” (1984: 3).  This 
project proceeds in accordance with Mill‟s contention that “the only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others” (1956: 52).  Feinberg‟s goal then, is to determine when behaviour is 
harmful and can therefore justly be punishable, or forbidden, by law.  While our legal 
obligations are not necessarily equivalent to our moral obligations (Thiroux 1980: 15), 
Feinberg‟s contribution here is illuminating. 
 
Feinberg contends that harm makes someone worse off by “the thwarting, setting back, or 
defeating of an interest” (1984: 33).  These interests are “distinguishable components of a 
person‟s well-being” (1984: 34).  Harm is regarded, in general, as a morally impermissible 
action, because it frustrates an interest or interests of the affected person, and this makes them 
worse off.    
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The notion of being worse off necessarily invokes the (possible) existence of two alternative 
states of affairs.  These states of affairs are distinguished on the basis of a value judgement - 
we determine that one state of affairs is worse for a person than an alternative state of affairs 
which is better for them. 
 
It is fairly uncontroversial to claim that it is possible to bring about the worse state of affairs 
for a given individual both by acting and by failing to act.  For example, we can put someone 
into a state that is (considerably) worse for them by shooting them, or by allowing them to 
drown when we could easily have prevented this (Holtug 2002: 360).  In both cases, two 
alternative possible states of affairs exist – one which is worse for the affected person, and 
one which is better.  In the first case, we bring about the worse state of affairs by our direct 
action.  In the second case, we fail to prevent the worse state of affairs from coming about by 
our omission. 
 
Can we say that our moral behaviour in each case is equally morally blameworthy?  In other 
words, is there a significant difference between acting to cause harm, and failing to act to 
prevent harm?  This question has been hotly debated in bioethics
91
.  The general consensus 
seems to be that this distinction, by itself, cannot tell us anything about the morality of the 
relevant behaviour without knowledge of relevant, additional facts about the context of the 
situation (for example, the intentions of a person in acting or failing to act). 
 
In the example provided above, for instance, we might be inclined to regard the harmful 
action of shooting to be more seriously wrong than the harmful omission of failing to prevent 
drowning (although we would tend to regard both sorts of behaviour as being generally 
morally reprehensible), even if they resulted in equivalent harm for the affected individuals 
(the loss of life as opposed to its continuance).  This is because we might have to consider the 
extent to which the act or omission was carried out with deliberate, pre-meditated intention, 
which would increase the associated level of blameworthiness.  However, this does not imply 
that the shooting was more seriously wrong because it was an act and not an omission (and 
therefore that acts are always more seriously wrong than omissions).  In order to better 
illustrate this, we can instead imagine a situation in which the intention behind an act and an 
omission is identical.   
                                                 
91
 This debate often centres on the distinction between “killing” and “letting die”, with specific regard to the 
debate around the morality of active and passive euthanasia respectively.  For examples, see Beauchamp and 
Childress (2009: 174), Begley (1998: 865) and Hope (2000: 227).  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 145 
 
 
Let us imagine that A stands to gain an inheritance upon the death of B, and therefore decides 
to kill B in order to receive this inheritance sooner.  A decides that the least detectable method 
of killing will be to trick B into eating some poisonous mushrooms, the ingestion of which 
will certainly be fatal.  However, the night before he can act upon this plan, he notices that B 
has himself mistakenly picked some poisonous mushrooms and is preparing them for dinner.  
A is aware that the ingestion of these mushrooms will kill B.  He therefore simply fails to 
prevent B‟s death by notifying him of this fact.  It is difficult to argue in this case that there is 
any moral distinction between A‟s planned action and his unplanned but deliberate92 
omission.  
 
We have now established that moral agents can inflict wrongful harm both by acting and by 
failing to act.  We have also established that the notion of harm necessarily invokes two 
alternative states of affairs, one which is better and one which is worse for a person in terms 
of their interests, and that the harmed person is caused to be in the worse state of affairs when 
the better state of affairs would have pertained in the absence of the harming action or 
omission.  We must now distinguish between two alternative delineations of harming.  The 
first maintains conceptual integrity by introducing a clear distinction between harm and non-
benefit, but at the cost of excluding from the category of harmful behaviour omissions that we 
usually regard to be harmful.  The second threatens to collapse this distinction, but also 
accords with our commonsense intuition that some instances of non-benefit are harmful.  
 
Two conceptions of harm 
 
The two delineations of harm which I wish to discuss in this section differ in their description 
of the harmed agent‟s prior position.  The first categorisation of harmful behaviour regards it 
as necessary, in the case of both acts and omissions, that the prior position of the harmed 
agent is the better position.  The second categorisation, on the other hand, allows that, in the 
case of harmful omissions only, the prior position of the moral agent may be in the worse 
position.  In the first case, a harmed person is made worse off than he was before, and, in the 
second, a harmed person is made worse off than he could have been.  
 
 
                                                 
92
 In other words, for an omission to be morally similar to a (deliberate) action, it must be the case that the agent 
who fails to perform a particular action is aware that this failure will result in a particular result, and deliberately 
chooses not to act regardless.  In so doing, he makes himself responsible for the result. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 146 
 
Harm makes one worse off than one was before 
 
The contention that harm makes one worse off than one was before entails that a harmful 
behaviour (whether an act or an omission) moves a person from a position which is better for 
them to a position which is worse for them.  In other words, for a behaviour to count as 
harmful, it is necessary for the harmed person to have been in a better position before the 
(causal) behaviour or event began which moved them from this prior position into a worse 
position.  The harmful behaviour therefore causes the interest of the harmed person to be set 
back, where in the absence of that behaviour this setting back would not have occurred.  This 
condition, when regarded to be necessary for a behaviour to be considered harmful, is 
described by Feinberg as “the worsening test” (1992: 7).     
 
To illustrate how one‟s interests may be set back by either an act or an omission, we can refer 
back to the example of blindness.  One‟s interests are set back when one is blinded because 
one is deprived of one‟s interest in seeing, along with one‟s interest in all the “future 
worthwhile experiences and opportunities for which...seeing [is] necessary” (Hall 2008: 80).  
Harm which passes the worsening test only results, in this example, when one is moved from 
a position where one is able to see into a position where one is blind.  This can occur as a 
result of an action, whether deliberate or negligent (the harming agent A intentionally and 
actively damages the eyes of B or negligently performs particular actions which run a great 
risk of damaging the eyes of B).  It can also, however, result from inaction or omission (A is 
aware that B has contracted a disease which will inevitably lead to blindness, but chooses not 
to act to counteract or cure this disease, despite A‟s awareness that such a cure is easily 
available and that only he can provide it).  In the latter case, A allows B to move from the 
better into the worse position by his omission.  In other words, he fails to “prevent a...decline 
in...[B‟s] fortunes from [B‟s] normal baseline” (Feinberg 1984: 136). 
 
This is all very well, and thus far accords with our commonsense idea of harm.  However, we 
should note what behaviours are excluded from the category of harm by the worsening test.  If 
B presents with congenital blindness, or with a pre-existing condition of blindness, and A 
chooses not to counteract or cure this disease, despite A‟s awareness that such a cure is easily 
available and that only he can provide it, A does not harm B, but merely fails to benefit him.  
Therefore, according to the first categorisation of harmful behaviours, “whether one is harmed 
by an event is determined by reference to where he was before” (Feinberg 1984: 54).  It is 
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only a regression from this original position that is regarded to be harmful.  The concept of 
harm, under this view, “requires [the] worsening [of] a prior condition” (Feinberg 1984: 99).  
 
To further distinguish the meanings of harm and non-benefit according to the prescriptions of 
the worsening test, we can formulate these meanings in terms of net-loss or net-profit.  If we 
regard a given individual‟s “normal baseline” to be the point on the scale of interests where “a 
person‟s interest line usually is, or at any rate where it was during the period before the 
present episode began” (Feinberg 1984: 138), harmful behaviour is the sort of behaviour 
which results in a net loss in interests for that person, in that they are made worse off than 
they were before.  Anything which results in a gain in their net interests from their normal 
baseline, however, is “windfall profit” (Feinberg 1984: 138).  In this regard, behaviour which 
prevents a loss in the interest scale from the baseline is construed as “active aid”, whereas 
behaviour which brings about a profit in the interest scale is construed as “gratuitous benefit” 
(Feinberg 1984: 130). 
 
Why might we think that this limited description of harm is problematic?  A conceptual 
categorisation, as mentioned with regard to the treatment-enhancement distinction, has no 
moral significance in and of itself, unless distinctions between concepts also tell us something 
about the relative moral importance of particular behaviours.  To determine whether this is the 
case, we must look at the moral weight which is given to the distinction between harm and 
non-benefit.    
 
The moral distinction between harm and non-benefit 
 
When we think about our moral obligations, we usually conceptually separate “[o]bligations 
not to harm others” from “obligations to help others” (Beauchamp & Childress 2009: 150).  
These are often expressed as the duties of nonmaleficence and beneficence respectively.  Ross 
states that duties of beneficence “rest on the mere fact that there are other beings in the world 
whose condition we can make better”, while the duties of nonmaleficence “may be summed 
up under the title of „not injuring others‟” (1930: 22).   
 
The distinction between these two sorts of duties is relatively clear.  While “we are not 
morally required to benefit persons on all occasions, even if we are in a position to do so”, we 
do think that we have a prima facie duty not to harm others.  In other words, “we are not 
morally required to perform all possible acts of generosity or charity that would benefit 
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others” (Beauchamp & Childress 2009: 199), but we are, as a general rule, obliged not to 
harm others, in the absence of competing moral obligations.  There is clearly some sort of 
relation between this notion of harm, in terms of its prima facie moral prohibition, and Mill‟s 
legalistic suggestion that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (1956).  
We tend to think of harms as the sorts of actions, or inactions, which we are always required 
to avoid because of the moral claims which other agents have upon us. 
 
In other words, “nonmaleficence is apprehended as a duty distinct from that of beneficence, 
and as a duty of more stringent character” which is “prima facie more binding” (Ross 1930: 
22-23).  We generally regard the obligations of nonmaleficence to be of more moral 
importance than the obligations of beneficence (Beauchamp & Childress 2009: 150), and this 
is related to the fact that we always have a conditional duty not to harm others, but do not 
always have a prima facie duty to benefit others. 
 
Note that this does not imply that the moral obligation not to harm is always of greater moral 
strength than the duty to benefit.  We do sometimes think that we have a strong “moral 
obligation to act for the benefit of others” (Beauchamp & Childress 2009: 197).  For example, 
in the example above, we would tend to think that A‟s obligation to provide B with the easily 
available cure for blindness is of far greater strength than his obligation not to harm B in some 
trivial way, because the impact on B‟s interests is much greater in the former case than the 
latter. 
 
However, when we have such a strong obligation to benefit, we tend to express that obligation 
in a particular way.  Because we might regard the obligation to benefit, where the benefit is of 
a great magnitude and of a particular kind, to be a prima facie duty of the type that prohibits 
harm, we tend to want to formulate this duty in such terms.  In other words, we want to say 
that some instances of non-benefit are harmful, regardless of the prior position of the affected 
agent.  This is because we might think of some sorts of non-benefits as inactions which we are 
required to avoid as a result of the moral claims which other agents have upon us, and we 
normally describe these sorts of inaction as harmful.  This inclination is expressed in the 
second, and alternative, categorisation of harm that I will now describe.   
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Harm makes one worse off than one could have been 
 
The second conceptual connotation of harm does not take into account the prior position of 
the harmed agent.  Instead it regards harm broadly as deriving from any event, intervention or 
omission which makes the harmed agent worse off than he could have been.  This is 
expressed by Feinberg in “the counterfactual test”, which holds that harmful behaviour occurs 
when “B‟s personal interest is in a worse condition...than it would be in had A not acted93 as 
he did” (Feinberg 1992: 7).   
 
This definition includes in its scope all those instances of harm that are included under the 
first definition, whereby interests are set back from a prior, superior position to a position in 
which one is worse off.  However, it also includes under the category of harmful behaviour 
those sorts of behaviours which “thwart” or “impede” (Feinberg 1984: 33) the advancement 
of interests from a worse prior position to a better position.  In other words, A‟s failure to 
provide B with a cure for his congenital, prior blindness thwarts his interest in achieving 
sight, and therefore puts B in a worse position than he could have been in.  Under the 
counterfactual definition of harm, A‟s failure to benefit B is harmful to him. 
 
There is no doubt that, as it is stated above, the counterfactual description of harm collapses 
the distinction between harm and non-benefit.  Any omission that fails to put me into a better 
position than I could otherwise have been in, by the above description, harms me. Quigley 
and Harris feel that, because of the “continuum between harms and benefits”, it follows that 
“to decide to withhold a benefit is in a sense to harm the individual we decline to benefit” 
(2007: 129).     In other words, your failure to give me R 1,000 thwarts my interest in having 
an extra R 1,000 and put me into a worse position (not having an extra R 1,000 to spend) than 
would have otherwise been the case (having an extra R 1,000 to spend).  However, our moral 
intuition is that your omission here is not harmful.  It therefore seems that we must add 
something to this definition, in order to specify which kinds of non-benefit cause harm.    
 
Feinberg‟s solution to this problem is to introduce the notion of a “harmed condition”.  A 
harmed condition is regarded to be a condition which is (substantially) “below the centreline 
(1984: 54).  Such a condition is “a state in which a person is handicapped or impaired...that 
has adverse effects on his whole network of interests” (1992: 6).  Feinberg seems to imply 
                                                 
93
 “Acted” here is broadly construed to include omissions. 
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that failures to act which keep a person in such a harmed condition, when remedy is (easily) 
available, constitute harmful behaviours: 
   
 If the point of the interest curve...is near the bottom of the chart, then the conduct of another 
that prevents it from improving can itself be harmful.  When a person‟s situation is bad 
enough, simply to maintain it there when one could let it improve, may be to harm that person 
(1992: 5).   
 
By this definition, the failure to benefit congenitally blind B by providing the easily available 
cure for blindness keeps him in a harmed condition (the state of blindness) and is therefore 
harmful to him.   My lack of an extra R 1,000 is not a harmed condition, because I am not 
impaired in a way which affects my whole network of interests by my lack of R 1,000
94
, and 
therefore I am not harmed by your failure to provide me with this, despite the fact that this 
failure puts me into a worse condition than I could otherwise have been in. 
 
What does all of this imply?  It seems that the counterfactual definition of harm is trying to 
capture some specific quality of certain kinds of benefits.  This quality seems to be that 
certain kinds of benefits promote the interests of moral agents in a particular sense which 
renders the provision of these benefits prima facie moral obligations.  In other words, all that 
we are trying to say by the assertion that a particular act or omission is harmful is that we 
have a prima facie moral obligation not to behave in such a way, because of the particular 
type of impact that such an act or omission will have on the fundamental interests of moral 
agents.  Therefore, the failure to perform any prima facie obligatory act of beneficence is by 
definition harmful, whereas the failure to perform optional or supererogatory acts of 
beneficence is not. 
 
Throughout this chapter, I have argued that we have a prima facie obligation to provide 
(certain kinds) of enhancements to moral agents.  Does this imply that a failure to enhance is 
per definition harmful, in the counterfactual sense which I have developed here? 
 
Feinberg‟s description of a harmed condition as one which is “below the centreline” seems to 
suggest that this is not so.  His contention seems to be that we only have a moral obligation to 
benefit moral agents when they are in such a harmed state.  In other words, Feinberg, who 
                                                 
94
 Note that I could be in a harmed condition as a result of my lack of R 1,000 if I were in a condition of extreme 
poverty – this would indeed be a condition in which I am impaired in a way which affects my whole network of 
interests.  See footnote 87. 
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approaches the topic from an entirely different angle, seems to reinstate the moral distinction 
set up by the normal function model between acts of improvement which move a moral agent 
towards the centreline, or normality, and acts of benefit which go beyond this. 
 
However, it is worth repeating Feinberg‟s definition of a harmed condition at this point.  Such 
a condition is “a state in which a person is handicapped or impaired...that has adverse effects 
on his whole network of interests” (1992: 6).  The handicap or impairment here is constructed 
relative to the idea of the centreline.  In other words, the implication is that those of us whose 
welfare interests (which are the basis for our “whole network of interests”) are considerably 
impaired in relation to others (by disease, disability, or possibly extreme negative divergences 
from the centreline in our socio-economic circumstances) are disadvantaged by this 
impairment, so that our fundamental interests are thwarted in a way that is harmful to us. 
 
I must now return to the case which I made above for the moral obligation to enhance, and 
evaluate this moral obligation in these terms, to determine whether a failure to enhance might 
place the unenhanced in a “harmed condition”. 
 
The harm of disadvantage 
 
The first case which I will make for the harm of non-enhancement is fairly simple, because it 
relies upon the contention, described above, that disease conditions are harmful to us, in that 
they constrict our range of opportunities (or welfare interests) in comparison to others.  This 
seems to be exactly what Feinberg has in mind when he refers to “a state in which a person is 
handicapped or impaired...that has adverse effects on his whole network of interests” (1992: 
6).  Disease and disability can handicap us in comparison to others who are not so impaired.  
They affect our functioning in ways that limit the range of opportunities that we can enjoy.  
However, as I have argued above, some disease conditions may affect the functioning of 
individuals in ways that are comparable to the effect of an overall level of functioning that 
falls within the lower ranges of natural variation.  It is not always the case (although it is 
generally the case) that disease conditions reduce our general capacity to flourish more than 
natural variation, and therefore, we might consider a state of disease or disability and a state 
of natural variation which have equivalent effects upon overall functioning to be equally 
harmful states which require restitution.  In other words, both disadvantageous states of 
disease and disability and disadvantageous states within the lower ranges could be harmful 
conditions in which we are impaired in a way that affects our whole network of interests. 
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We can refer back to the case of low levels of impulse control to illustrate this.  As the study 
described earlier in this chapter seems to show, the ability to delay gratification has a strong 
predictive value with regard to how well our lives go in general.  Those with lower levels of 
this ability are therefore impaired in comparison to others who are better able to exercise 
impulse control, and this impairment affects their whole network of interests.  In other words, 
the former group are generally less competent with regard to their ability to achieve their 
individual goals or to advance all of their ulterior interests.  This seems to satisfy all the 
prerequisites for a state to be considered harmful, according to the counterfactual model of 
harm. 
 
Therefore, it seems that we ought to regard a failure to intervene to correct such harmed 
conditions to be equivalently harmful (even if this harm is not equivalent to the harm which 
results from a failure to correct disease conditions which inhibit overall functioning to a 
greater extent), whether this harmed condition results from disease or natural variation.  We 
therefore have a moral obligation not to bring about such harm by the omission or the non-
provision of enhancement.   
 
The harm of species-typicality 
 
Can we also regard a failure to enhance beyond species-typicality to be harmful in a sense that 
it is a morally prohibited act of non-beneficence?  My foregoing argument that enhancement 
beyond the normal ranges is also prima facie morally obligatory seems to suggest this.  Let us 
consider this argument again with relation to the description of counterfactual harm. 
 
Harm, as I have described, invokes the possible existence of two possible states of affairs – 
one which is worse, and one which is better for a moral agent.  Where we are describing 
harms which result from non-benefit, these states of affairs differ in terms of the relative 
position of a moral agent‟s welfare interests, which are foundational to well-being and to the 
achievement of all ulterior interests.  In other words, harmful non-benefit impairs moral 
agents by detrimentally affecting their whole network of interests.  Non-benefit is only prima 
facie harmful when it concerns the failure to improve capacities which are the preconditions 
for any sort of human flourishing.  We may think other sorts of non-benefit are harmful under 
particular circumstances (for example, in the context of special relationships), but these sort 
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of non-benefits do not belong to the category of non-benefits that are always prima facie 
harmful.   
 
Does the case of non-enhancement belong to the category of conditionally optional non-
benefits or harmful non-benefits?  I want to argue that the failure to enhance, where 
enhancement is readily available, falls within the latter category.  This is because an 
unenhanced condition, in the context where an enhanced condition is available, impairs the 
moral agent, in comparison to what otherwise could have been, in a way which affects their 
whole network of interests.  Therefore, non-enhancement, where enhancement is available, is 
a harmed condition.   
 
To illustrate this, let us consider the enhancement of cognitive functioning.  Our level of 
cognitive functioning affects our whole network of interests, because an increased level of 
this sort of functioning generally improves our ability to achieve all of our ulterior interests.  
When we choose not to enhance this sort of functioning, we therefore bring about a worse 
state of affairs for the affected unenhanced moral agent than would pertain if we were to 
choose enhancement.  In comparison to the enhanced state, the unenhanced person is 
impaired by their lower level of cognitive functioning in a way which affects their whole 
network of interests.  This may not represent a disadvantage in comparison to others (unless 
others were enhanced in this way) but this is immaterial.  Disadvantage can be harmful in 
ways which require correction, but this is an additional and independent motivation for moral 
action which is distinct from the motivation which considers that the promotion of our welfare 
interests is generally good for a person.  If an unenhanced state diverges negatively from an 
enhanced state in a way which affects one‟s whole network of interests, and therefore affects 
one‟s ability to flourish, this seems to imply that this unenhanced state is, in comparison to the 
possible enhanced state, a harmed condition.    
 
The motivation for enhancement, in this regard, is similar to and continuous with the 
motivation to provide medical therapies, the non-provision of which we regard to be harmful.  
This motivation is the imperative to promote human welfare in general by improving human 
capacities that are the precondition for flourishing beyond the sup-optimal level provided to 
us by evolution, and this motivation is not limited to the achievement of “normal 
functioning”, as I have argued earlier in this chapter.     
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As Quigley and Harris point out, “the moral imperative, and the most usual moral motive, for 
medical interventions is not to return an individual to „normal‟ functioning, but to change 
their condition where possible for the sake of the harms these changes will prevent or palliate 
and the goods that this will bring about” (2010: 124).  We think that we harm people by not 
treating them when we are able to because this brings about a worse situation for them, in 
terms of their possibilities for flourishing, than would otherwise be the case.  This is precisely 
the type of harm which results from the failure to provide (particular kinds of) enhancement. 
 
The possible successful future development of enhancement technologies, in other words, 
provides us with an alternative to the level of functioning which we currently enjoy.  It 
provides us with a conceivable state of affairs which is better for moral agents than the 
alternative, in terms of their possibilities for well-being.  We are now obliged to “make a 
choice” between “the natural lottery [and] rational choice” (Savulescu 2005: 39), as we have 
previously had to make a choice when deciding whether to intervene via therapeutic and 
environmental enhancements.  I do not believe that this is a choice of no moral significance.  I 
believe that a failure to choose enhancement could be harmful to moral agents, as this would 
amount to the thwarting of our fundamental interest in the promotion of capacities which 
determine the extent to which we will flourish.  Non-enhancement, in the context where 
enhancement is available, is a harmed condition, because we are handicapped or impaired in a 
way that has adverse effects on our whole network of interests, in comparison to the 
alternative of enhancement.  We are therefore made “worse off than [we] otherwise could 
have been” in a way that has a fundamental effect on our welfare (Quigley & Harris 2010: 
125).  Failing to enhance is therefore always prima facie harmful.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued in favour of a general moral obligation to enhance.  This moral 
obligation is derived from the same reasons that suggest that we are morally obligated to 
provide medical treatment, namely, the requirement that we should try to reduce unfair 
disadvantage, and the requirement that we ought to promote human well-being by advancing 
our welfare interests.  When we reject available enhancements, we harm moral agents by 
putting their welfare interests in a worse state than they could otherwise have been in. 
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However, there is a great deal more to be said about this prima facie obligation, with regard to 
its application in a practical context.  In the next chapter, I will consider what such a practical 
application might entail. 
 
Firstly, I need to define the category of morally obligatory enhancements in greater detail.  I 
will do so by attempting to make some suggestions as to which kinds of enhancement will be 
likely to promote our welfare interests.  I will distinguish these enhancements from 
enhancements that are morally impermissible, and enhancements that are merely optional.    
 
Secondly, as I have argued, the obligation to enhance is not of equal strength in every case, 
nor does it necessarily trump other ethical considerations which we might need to take into 
account.  Therefore, I will try to imagine how we might balance the obligation to enhance 
against such considerations.   
 
Finally, I will consider the role of special relationships in the provision of enhancement 
interventions, and in particular, the relationships between parent and child, and the state and 
its citizens.    
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5  What, How and Who?    
 
Introduction 
 
My goal in this dissertation has been to make a case for a prima facie moral obligation to 
enhance.  I have argued in the previous chapter that this obligation derives from two factors.  
Firstly, we may be obliged to enhance in order to counter for undeserved, and unfair, 
disadvantage which results from normal variation.  Secondly, we may be obliged to enhance 
as a result of the general obligation which we have to promote well-being by advancing the 
welfare interests of moral agents.  I have argued that it is precisely the imperative to promote 
human well-being in this way which has been the impetus for the development and 
application of medical technologies, as well as for the environmental enhancements which 
have characterised human civilisation from the outset.  These interventions are motivated by 
the recognition that the species-typical functioning that we are endowed with by the process 
of evolution is not optimal functioning, from the perspective of human welfare, and that we 
ought to improve upon this functioning if we are able.  As such, genetic and other forms of 
biotechnological enhancements are simply the latest additions to an overarching category of 
enhancements of species-typical functioning which have been undertaken in response to the 
moral obligation to promote the welfare interests, and the possibilities for flourishing, of 
moral agents.    
 
However, the prima facie moral obligation to enhance which I have established here requires 
further qualification.  Such qualification is necessary in order to provide some idea of how the 
moral obligation to enhance ought to be interpreted in practical terms.  In this chapter, I will 
consider three questions that must be posed in this regard.  First of all, what interventions are 
to be included under the category of morally obligatory enhancements?  Secondly, how do we 
balance the moral obligation to enhance against other practical and ethical considerations?  
Thirdly, who are we obliged to enhance?    
 
The first question requires me to define the category of morally obligatory enhancements in 
greater detail.  I have argued that these are the sorts of enhancements which will tend to 
promote the welfare interests of moral agents.  However, there are many interventions which 
we usually call enhancements which do not tend to promote these sorts of interests.  I 
therefore need to clearly distinguish these types of interventions from the category of morally 
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obligatory enhancements.  In doing so, I will acknowledge that some kinds of enhancements 
are indeed morally impermissible, while others are permissible but not required.  
 
The second question arises due to the fact that the moral obligation to enhance is not 
necessarily our primary duty under all circumstances.  Rather, it is prima facie in nature.  
Prima facie duties must be evaluated in context, and balanced against other considerations, in 
order to determine what the direction of our action ought to be.  With regard to the prima 
facie duty to enhance, there are two distinct questions which we can ask.  Firstly, and taking 
into account that our resources are limited, how do we balance the duty to enhance against 
other important moral duties which we have?  Secondly, what other negative consequences 
might arise as a result of the fulfilment of the widespread obligation to enhance, and might the 
imperative to avoid these consequences negate this obligation? 
 
The third question invokes the notion of special relationships, and asks who we are required 
to enhance.  The obligation to enhance, when this obligation is directed towards all moral 
agents equally, seems to be so weakened by this latter condition that it ceases to be significant 
or meaningful.  However, I will argue that our practical obligations in this regard ought to be 
modelled upon the way in which we conceive of the obligation to provide healthcare and 
environmental interventions such as education.  My discussion here will focus on two sorts of 
special relationships – the relationship between parents (or caregivers) and children, and the 
relationship between the state and its citizens. 
 
I will consider each of these three questions in turn. 
 
What are morally obligatory enhancements? 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the provision of enhancements that tend to promote 
welfare interests is prima facie morally obligatory.  I have suggested that these sorts of 
enhancements are those that improve capacities which serve as general-purpose means to our 
more ultimate ends.  However, I now need to define this category of enhancements in greater 
detail.  My main objective, in this regard, is to emphasise that this category does not include 
many interventions which we currently refer to as enhancements.  In other words, not all 
enhancements are morally desirable to the extent that their provision constitutes a moral duty.  
In fact, some sorts of enhancements could very well be morally impermissible, while others 
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are morally permissible but not required.  To show why this is so, we can begin by making a 
distinction between two principal ways in which enhancement is defined.  
 
Enhancement as augmentation and enhancement as improvement 
 
The concept of enhancement can be used to imply either augmentation or improvement
95
, 
although these two senses of enhancement are often conflated.  To enhance in the first sense 
is to “raise in degree [or to] heighten” (Burchfield 1989), to “add to” (Hornby 1974), to 
“make higher or greater” (Mackwardt 1995), to “intensify or increase”, or to “augment” 
(Butterfield 2004).  In this first sense, enhancement of a particular function or attribute simply 
denotes the augmentation of a particular function or attribute.  However, because the 
augmentation enacted by enhancement is frequently also considered to be an increase in 
“quality”, “value” (Butterfield 2004, Robinson 1999), “desirability, or attractiveness” (Gay 
1984), to enhance can also be taken to mean to “improve” (Butterfield 2004, Gay 1984, 
Robinson 1999).  The first sense of enhancement is value-neutral, while the second sense 
encompasses the first in that it accords with the notion of enhancement as augmentation, but 
also implies a value judgement, in that the augmentation referred to as an enhancement is 
specifically regarded to be an improvement.  Some dictionary definitions define enhancement 
only in the first sense (Burchfield 1989, Hornby 1974, Mackwardt 1995), while some conflate 
both meanings (Butterfield 2004, Gay 1984, Robinson 1999).  
 
Defining enhancement in the second sense, without qualification, clearly denotes an element 
of normative force, and this is misleading (Shickle 2000: 342).  John Harris, whose argument 
in favour of enhancement I considered in Chapter 3, seems to define enhancement in this sort 
of normative way by insisting that enhancement “is good for you!” (Harris & Chan 2008: 
338).  He claims that, where the term is used in connection with human functioning, “an 
enhancement is by definition an improvement on what went before.  If it wasn‟t good for you, 
it wouldn‟t be an enhancement” (Harris 2007: 9).  This claim is disingenuous.  Defining an 
enhancement as an intervention which is self-evidently good for human persons, because it is 
an improvement, already suggests that such an intervention is (morally) desirable and ought to 
be pursued, without the need for further argument.  However, as I shall show, this 
classification of enhancement is unreliable, as it does not capture the entire spectrum of 
                                                 
95
 Chadwick refers to these two senses of enhancement respectively as “the additionality view”, under which 
enhancement is “understood quantitatively”, and “the improvement view”, under which enhancement is 
“understood qualitatively” (2008: 26).  See also Kalokairinou (2011: 176) on this distinction.  
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interventions which we can call enhancements, and this needs to be made clear to avoid 
circularity. 
 
This can be illustrated by referring back to a further distinction which I introduced in the 
previous chapter.  This distinction is between the enhancement (as augmentation) of local 
functioning and the enhancement (as improvement) of overall functioning.  Local 
enhancement is a necessary precondition for general enhancement to occur, but this does not 
imply that local enhancement always results in general enhancement.  In other words, 
enhancement is, in the first place, always a “local affair”, which simply implies the 
augmentation “of a capacity or function, with no assumption that this means an improvement 
in well-being overall...for the individual who is enhanced” (Buchanan 2011: 57).  
 
The distinction between local and general enhancement is also developed by Savulescu, 
Sandberg and Kahane (2011: 3-18).  In their discussion of the various approaches which are 
taken to the topic of enhancement, they distinguish between “functional” and “welfarist” 
definitions of enhancement.  The “functional approach” which they identify corresponds to 
what I have described as local enhancement.  In other words, functional enhancement is 
simply the augmentation of the functioning of a particular (local) capacity (2011: 6).  The 
“welfarist account of enhancement”, on the other hand, refers to “human enhancement” in a 
more general sense.  An enhancement, by this account, is an intervention which brings about 
“[a]ny change in the biology or psychology of a person which increases [their] chances of 
leading a good life in the relevant set of circumstances”96 (2011: 7).  Enhancement in this 
latter sense therefore implies general improvement.   
 
Again, we should note that not all instances of local (functional) enhancement lead to general 
(welfarist) enhancement.  In other words, not all augmentation leads to improvement.  This is 
most evident when we consider that we can describe the augmentation of local capacities or 
characteristics that we do not value as enhancement.  For example, it makes conceptual sense 
to say that we can enhance the tendency towards alcoholism.  This would imply that such a 
tendency is increased or augmented, although this sort of local enhancement would clearly not 
result in general improvement or contribute towards welfare.  Because we do not value the 
tendency towards alcoholism (as this tendency does not contribute towards, and in fact 
detracts from, our chances of leading a good life), the enhancement of this characteristic will 
                                                 
96
 As the authors point out, this is compatible with regarding medical treatment as a kind of enhancement, which 
corresponds with the argument that I advanced in Chapter 4 (Savulescu, Sandberg & Kahane 2011: 8).  
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never bring about general enhancement.  Such an enhancement would be likely to make our 
lives worse, would harm us, and would therefore be morally impermissible in a fairly 
straightforward way. 
 
The undesirable effect of enhancement in the above example derives from the fact that the 
enhanced local characteristic is not likely to increase our chances of leading a good life under 
any circumstances.  However, there are other sorts of capacities and characteristics, the 
enhancement of which would contribute towards our chances of leading a good life only 
under some sets of circumstances and not others.  These circumstances would include the 
particular social context
97
, but would also include relevant facts about the individual who is to 
be enhanced.    
 
Conditional welfarist enhancements 
   
The enhancement of local functionality only contributes towards welfare in situations where 
the relevant function or capability contributes towards overall functionality for the individual 
concerned.  Some functions or capabilities are general-purpose, as I shall argue shortly, but 
others are useful only with regard to the advancement of particular ulterior interests.  
Therefore, the extent to which certain enhancements are likely to contribute towards our 
chances of leading a good life is conditional upon what our specific goals and life plans are. 
 
To illustrate this, we can consider a purely aesthetic enhancement, which is already relatively 
common in society.  Breast enhancement surgery (also referred to as breast augmentation 
surgery) results in the augmentation or increase of a particular local attribute.  However, 
whether this local enhancement also results in a general improvement depends on the 
particular ulterior interests, and aesthetic values, which a particular individual holds.  The 
British glamour model Jordan, who has undergone multiple breast enhancement surgeries, 
clearly experiences her increased breast size as a general improvement which contributes 
towards her level of well-being, but it is doubtful that this would be the case for many, if not 
for most, women.  Her particular ulterior interests, aesthetic values and life plan imply that 
this is an improving enhancement for her.  However, for others who have different ulterior 
interests, or different aesthetic values, this would not be the case.  For some, it might have no 
impact on their general level of well-being at all.  For others (for example, those who have 
                                                 
97
 For example, and as noted in Chapter 4, the enhancement of local function which provides the basis for 
literacy would only increase our chances of having a good life in a literate society. 
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ulterior interests in being runway models), it would have an extremely negative impact upon 
their ulterior interests and chances of leading a good life (by their standard), and this would 
imply that such an enhancement would be to their detriment.   
 
It is not only physical, aesthetic local enhancements which are conditionally beneficial, 
however.  The value of other sorts of local functions or capabilities may also depend upon 
one‟s particular conception of the good.  Let us imagine that it is possible, via genetic 
enhancement, to increase one‟s musicality to the level of a virtuoso.  Such an enhancement 
would be valued by one who had a particular interest in performing and enjoying music, as in 
this case the intervention would be experienced as a great contribution towards overall 
functionality, but this would not be the case for everyone.  For some, it would have no impact 
upon one‟s chances of leading a good life at all (Brock 1998: 55), and if enhanced musicality 
implied a reduction in some other valuable local functionality, it would have a negative 
impact.  Even an enhancement which would contribute towards well-being for many people, 
for example, the enhancement of height, could have a negative impact upon overall 
functioning for someone who had an ulterior interest in being a jockey.  I will call these kinds 
of interventions, where the contribution towards welfare is conditional upon specific facts 
about the individual, conditional welfarist enhancements. 
 
Universal welfarist enhancements 
 
Not all local enhancements are only conditionally beneficial, as I have implied in the previous 
chapter.  In other words, there are some sorts of functional abilities and capabilities that 
contribute towards welfare under any circumstances.  These sorts of capabilities are general-
purpose, and function as “prerequisites to whatever mode of life [a] person may wish to 
achieve” (Von Hirsch 1986: 704-705), and which enhance “the capacity of the individual to 
make genuine choices among a meaningful range of life plans” (Fox 2007: 7).  The local 
enhancement of functioning in these cases would, I have argued, always tend to result in 
general improvement, as this would constitute an improvement of our general ability to 
promote our individual ulterior interests, whatever these may be.  I will refer to these sorts of 
enhancements as universal welfarist enhancements, as these enhancements would be likely to 
promote welfare in a way that is universal for all human beings.  This category will 
correspond to those enhancements which will tend to promote our welfare interests.  What 
kinds of enhancements might meet these conditions? 
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An initial objection to this question is that we cannot know which sorts of enhancement will 
contribute towards the chances of leading a good life, as we are not in a position to make 
judgements, from an objective perspective, as to what kinds of lives are “better” than others 
(Graham 2002: 171).  Due to value pluralism, it is not clear that we could identify “any 
adequate grounds for basing such decisions on one set of values rather than another” (Glover 
1984: 45).  Because of this strong pluralism as to what constitutes a good life, it is not 
possible, under this view, to identify a particular set of characteristics that will always tend to 
contribute to our possibilities in this regard.  Murphy makes this point as follows:  
 
There are many ways with which to frame and pursue a good life, not all of which – perhaps 
not even most of which – require that people have the greatest intelligence they can have, the 
greatest memory they can have, the greatest athletic ability they can have, and so on....it is 
simply not true that human life is meaningful only to the extent that people have physical or 
psychological capacities that set them head and shoulders above everyone else (2009: 44).   
 
We can illustrate this problem by referring to the “great prominence...given to intelligence” in 
“the literature written by scientists” (and, we could insert here, by academic philosophers) 
about the topic of genetic enhancement (Glover 1984: 46).  Is this prominence due to the fact 
that intelligence is universally valuable with regard to the chances of leading a good life, or is 
this latter conviction in fact based upon a particular conception of the good life common to 
these kinds of professionals?  Others with alternative conceptions of the good might well 
suppose that there are other sorts of characteristics that are far more generally valuable.  A 
professional athlete or avid sports fan may be more inclined to value athleticism.  A 
clergyman or social campaigner may be more inclined to value moral sensitivity or empathy.  
A businessman may be more inclined to value strength of character or confidence.  In each 
case, these evaluations are made from a particular standpoint, and therefore cannot be 
generalised. 
 
The problem with this objection is that it expresses considerable pessimism as to the 
possibility of making judgements about the value of certain capabilities, in a context where 
we already make these kinds of judgements all the time. We think it is universally good to 
eliminate disease via medical treatment, and we tend to place more moral emphasis on the 
eradication of diseases that place considerable limits upon overall functioning and therefore 
upon opportunity ranges, as I have discussed in the previous chapter.  This indicates that we 
recognise that certain functions or capabilities are universally valuable, and that inhibition of 
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these functions impacts upon our ability to flourish regardless of our particular conception of 
the good.  In addition, “we think that encouraging some qualities rather than others should be 
an aim of the upbringing and education we give our children” (Glover 1984: 52).  We think 
that these sorts of qualities are universally valuable to the extent that state intervention is 
justified where the environmental inputs which are directed towards their promotion fall short 
of some decent minimum.  As Steiner points out, “legal actions have already been brought or 
proposed, not only against parents or guardians for smoking or drug-taking during pregnancy, 
for child abuse, and for failing to curb truancy and aggression, but also against schools for 
educating badly” (1998: 140).  These legal actions are deemed to be justified because the 
deprivation of certain kinds of environmental enhancements, and the resultant low capability 
levels in certain kinds of universally valuable functions, have a very general negative impact 
upon one‟s chances of leading a good life.  Universal welfarist enhancements will be those 
that improve upon capabilities that we already regard to be generally valuable in any 
conception of the good life.  We can therefore once again turn to the question as to what these 
might be. 
 
I have already speculated, on the basis of the evidence provided by empirical studies, that 
impulse control and intelligence may be two sorts of local capabilities which are very 
generally beneficial.  The enhancement of these kinds of local functionality would seem to 
increase one‟s chances of leading a good life in a very general way that would not depend 
upon one‟s holding a particular conception of the good.  Enhancement would increase the 
likelihood of human flourishing here, no matter what one‟s ulterior interests are, and my 
contention here is also supported by others (Savulescu 2011: 11, Savulescu, Sandberg & 
Kahane 2011: 10).  What other characteristics or abilities might be similarly general-purpose?  
Feinberg‟s list of welfare interests (1984: 37) provides us with some possibilities here, which 
could include an increased resistance to disease, emotional stability and the ability to engage 
in meaningful social interactions.  Other suggested characteristics are the ability to 
concentrate (Lewens 2009: 356), “memory, self-discipline, patience, empathy, a sense of 
humour, optimism, and...a sunny temperament” (Savulescu, Sandberg & Kahane 2011: 11), 
“physical mobility and coordination, visual and auditory perception,...reflectiveness, novelty 
seeking, and the capacity to abide adversity” (Fox 2007: 11).  One could argue that all these 
traits seem to have a strong and relatively predictable impact upon how well our lives go, and 
that this impact does not depend upon particular facts about the individual.  In other words, 
the functional enhancement of these kinds of local capabilities would be likely to bring about 
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general improvement, and would increases one‟s chances of leading a good life in a universal, 
non-conditional sense. 
 
However, we should be careful of assuming without qualification that unbridled local 
enhancement of these general-purpose capabilities would always be morally obligatory, or, in 
other words, that such enhancement would always tend to promote our welfare interests and 
lead to general improvement.  We need to take into account three possibilities here: firstly, 
that some sorts of general-purpose abilities might only increase our chances of having a good 
life up to some optimal level; secondly, that enhancement of general-purpose abilities might 
have simultaneous but opposite impacts upon our well-being; and thirdly, that enhancement 
of some general-purpose abilities might result in trade-offs with the functional level of other 
general-purpose (or conditionally beneficial) abilities. 
 
Optimal levels of functioning 
 
The first point raised above can be illustrated by considering the enhancement of hearing.  
This is a generally beneficial
98
 ability (Brock 1998: 57) that underlies our ability to 
communicate and to interact with others in society.  These are abilities which we would 
usually regard to be very generally beneficial, and the enhancement of which would tend to 
promote one‟s chances of leading a good life no matter what our ulterior interests are.  Does 
this imply that local enhancement of hearing is always good for us?  This might be true up to 
some optimal level, but an enhanced ability to hear which goes beyond this level might have a 
negative effect upon overall functionality, by making it difficult to interact with others as we 
could experience aural stimuli as “too loud”.  This, for example, is why many patients who 
are hearing impaired complain that their hearing aids (which function as technological 
enhancements of hearing by amplifying noise) do not improve their functional ability overall 
(and therefore do not increase their chances of having a good life) as they make background 
noise “annoying, distracting, or unacceptable” (Kochkin 2000: 36).  In this case, an improved 
functional ability beyond an optimal level would not result in an improved ability to 
communicate, and would therefore not be generally beneficial.  While we can only speculate, 
it is possible that this might be the case for other valuable general-purpose abilities as well, 
                                                 
98
 There is some evidence, however, that hearing ability is not universally valued.  For example, some culturally 
Deaf parents have taken active steps to ensure that they have children who are also deaf.  This desire arises from 
a perspective which “view[s] deafness from the cultural or sociological perspective” and maintains that 
“deafness is a condition to be…preserved” rather than a “pathology to be treated or cured” (Middleton, Hewison 
& Mueller 1998: 1175).   
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such as self-discipline, intelligence, empathy, or optimism
99
.  The enhancement of these 
capabilities up to some optimal point might improve our chances of leading a good life, but 
enhancement beyond this point could negatively impact upon welfare.  
 
Complicated effects upon welfare 
 
The second concern is that the improvement of a local (general-purpose) functional ability 
might constitute a general improvement in one sense, but might detract from overall 
functionality in another sense.  We can refer back to an example from animal experimentation 
to illustrate this.  As noted in Chapter 2, there is some evidence from such experimentation 
that suggests that the genetic enhancement of memory is possible, and we tend to think that 
increased memory is a general-purpose characteristic that is useful no matter what our ulterior 
interests are.  However, we should recall what was revealed by the example of animal 
experimentation provided.  The improvement of memory in this case also appeared to 
increase pain perception.  Therefore, it might be the case that enhanced memory would 
improve our general functional ability in one way (by increasing our intelligence, or at least 
our capacity to learn and recall), but would reduce our level of general functioning in another 
way (by for example, increasing the intensity and duration of our recall of traumatic and 
painful experiences, thus heightening the impact of these experiences upon us and our 
aversion to future experiences which we associate with them).  In this case, it would not be 
clear whether the balance here would imply an overall reduction or increase of the level of 
general functioning.   
 
Questionable trade-offs 
 
The third possibility identified above questions whether the enhancement of some general-
purpose abilities might reduce the functional level of other valued capacities.  For example, 
imagine that one could genetically enhance the capacity for impulse control, which would be 
very generally beneficial, but only at the cost of reducing the capacity for creativity.  This 
implies a trade-off between different local functional abilities (Chadwick 2008: 29), and it 
would not always be clear whether the balance would imply an overall increase, or overall 
reduction, of one‟s chances of leading a good life.   
 
                                                 
99
 The idea that some characteristics or abilities may only be generally beneficial at some optimal level is 
reminiscent of Aristotle‟s description of virtues as the mean between two opposing vices (Urmson 1973), 
although this is not a relation that I can pursue here. 
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Three moral categories of enhancement interventions 
 
What are the implications of the foregoing discussion for the posited prima facie obligation to 
enhance?  While these implications should be relatively clear in the context of the argument 
which I advanced in the previous chapter, this is worth stating explicitly.  It seems that we can 
separate enhancement interventions which augment local functionality into three categories – 
morally impermissible enhancements, morally permissible but not required enhancements, 
and morally obligatory enhancements. 
 
Morally impermissible enhancements      
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that we are prima facie morally prohibited from harming 
moral agents, by putting them in a worse situation than they could otherwise have been in.  
The category of morally impermissible enhancements therefore includes any enhancement 
which is likely to make things worse for moral agents, by diminishing the possibility of 
leading a good life.   
 
We can firstly point out that any enhancement which would pose unacceptable risks of harms 
to moral agents because of a high possibility of unintended side effects, regardless of which 
local functionality it is directed toward augmenting, would be morally impermissible, and that 
this impermissibility would remain in effect until these risks can be countered.  This 
effectively implies that genetic enhancement of human beings is, currently, generally morally 
impermissible, as research into this topic is still in its infancy, and any attempt to genetically 
enhance human beings would be fraught with risk.  As scientific knowledge advances, 
however, this general level of risk is likely to be reduced.  However, I would like to argue that 
some sorts of enhancement will always be morally impermissible, even when their effect can 
be predicted with some certainty, and that this will be the case when this foreseen effect is 
likely to have a negative impact upon the welfare of moral agents.  For example, it is 
uncontroversial to claim that the enhancement of negative characteristics which would 
decrease one‟s chances of having a good life ought to be morally prohibited.  However, these 
are not the only sorts of enhancements that are morally impermissible.  Some conditional 
welfarist enhancements might also decrease one‟s chances of having a good life, when they 
are not chosen by the enhanced person themselves. 
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As previously discussed, we do not all have the same ulterior interests, or the same 
conception of the good.  Where the contribution towards welfare of a specific enhancement 
intervention is conditional upon specific facts about the individual, that intervention must be 
chosen by the individual themselves, or the given intervention could in fact reduce the 
possibility of leading a good life from the perspective of that individual.  This is especially the 
case when such enhancements could constrict one‟s range of opportunities, by closing off 
some possible life plans.  Therefore, enhancements which promote ulterior interests, or which 
are directed towards a particular life plan, are morally impermissible unless chosen by the 
person to be enhanced themselves.   
 
This prohibition is especially relevant when it comes to parents who seek to enforce a 
particular conception of the good or a particular life plan upon their children, and who might 
seek enhancement to these ends.  For example, parents who hope that their children will one 
day be professional basketball players might wish to enhance their height, but this would 
close off other life plans to their children, and if these children ultimately developed ulterior 
interests in being gymnasts or jockeys, this enhancement would have reduced their chances of 
leading a good life. 
 
What about enhancements that are directed towards particular ulterior interests, but which do 
not close off or constrict one‟s available range of opportunities?  For example, what if it is 
possible to enhance musicality, without thereby reducing functionality in other areas, so that 
children are able to choose whether to make use of the relevant enhanced function later in 
life?  These enhancements may not be directly harmful, as they do not seem to put the moral 
agent in a worse position than they could otherwise have been in (and if such a person was to 
develop an ulterior interest in a musical career, they would, in fact, be in a better position).  
Whether such enhancements ought to be prohibited is a difficult question.  However, we 
should note that their use would probably be morally problematic in the context of a parental 
attitude which seeks to enforce a particular plan of life upon their children via enhancement.  
Parents who choose an enhancement which is directed towards a particular life plan, even 
where this enhancement does not technically close off other life plans, are clearly expressing 
some level of expectation that their children will indeed ultimately choose the life plan which 
the enhancement is directed towards, and this seems overly deterministic.  It is not clear 
whether the balance should fall in favour of prohibition or permissibility in this case, as 
parents already necessarily exert some influence upon their children‟s values and interests, 
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and therefore their life plans, via environmental means.  This question is therefore open to 
further debate.    
 
However, we can tentatively suggest that decision-making around this issue ought to be 
guided by the moral demand that parents should “respect their child[ren]‟s autonomy” by 
“ensuring that [they] come...into existence able to lead a lifestyle founded on values opposed 
to those of [their] parents”.  This implies that parents‟ use of enhancement interventions 
should equip “their child[ren] for any choices [they] might make” (Agar 2004: 126), rather 
than being prejudiced towards particular choices.  Enhancement interventions ought to be 
sought with a view to maximising the possibilities of “self-creation and independence” 
(Glover 2006: 71), and in order to provide “an open future” (Feinberg 1980: 124).  
Enhancements chosen by parents that are directed toward a very specific life plan seem to 
flout these moral principles, and one might therefore suggest that they should not be 
permissible.  
 
The category of impermissible enhancements would also include the enhancement of general-
purpose capabilities, where this enhancement does not in fact promote general welfare.  This 
might be the case when enhancement interventions augment local functionality in a way 
which exceeds some optimal level, or when enhancement of local function increases overall 
functionality in one way, but decreases it another way, so that it is not clear whether one‟s 
chances for a good life are increased or decreased.  This latter situation may also result when 
the enhancement of a particular local function reduces functionality of some other valuable 
capability. 
 
The category of morally impermissible enhancements which I have described here recognises 
that “[n]ot all enhancements will be ethical” (Savulescu 2005: 38).  When evaluating the 
permissibility of enhancement interventions, we should keep in mind the impact which such 
interventions would be likely to have upon welfare.  Where this impact is negative or 
contentious, enhancement is morally prohibited.    
 
This implies that enhancements that do have a positive impact upon welfare, or which 
“constitute an improvement, all things considered”100 (Chadwick 2008: 34) are morally 
permissible.  However, we can qualify a further distinction within this category, between 
enhancements that are permissible but not required, and enhancements that are generally 
                                                 
100
 Or at the very least, that do not make things any worse. 
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morally desirable and which ought to be provided.  Both these sorts of enhancements “must 
be safe” and must proceed with “a reasonable expectation of improvement” (Savulescu 2005: 
38).  In the former case, this improvement is conditional upon facts about the individual, 
whereas in the latter case, this improvement will always result from the given enhancement in 
a way that is universal.   
 
Morally permissible enhancements that are not required 
 
The category of enhancements that are permissible but not required roughly corresponds to 
the category of conditional welfarist enhancements that are autonomously chosen by the 
enhanced individual.  These are permissible, in other words, when they constitute an 
improvement, all things considered, from the perspective of the moral agents who choose 
them.  This is likely to be the case when these enhancements promote the (established) 
ulterior interests of the individual concerned, and when they are therefore likely to increase 
the likelihood of a good life for that individual.  In this case, the use of enhancement 
technologies would be an “exercise...of self-determination” (Brock 1998: 55).  However, 
because we are not (always) obliged to promote the ulterior interests of other moral agents, as 
I have argued in the previous chapter, the provision of these sorts of enhancement, while 
desirable from the perspective of the relevant individual, is not prima facie morally 
obligatory.    
 
Morally obligatory enhancements 
 
Finally, then, the category of prima facie morally obligatory enhancements includes those 
interventions which I have called universal welfarist enhancements, when these enhancements 
will in fact be likely to increase our chances of having a good life under any circumstances.  
This prima facie obligation, as I have argued in the previous chapter, derives from the 
obligation which we have to promote well-being via the promotion of the welfare interests of 
moral agents.  Where we ignore this moral obligation, we harm the affected moral agents. 
  
Of course, the effect of these kinds of universal welfarist enhancements will always be 
“probabilistic” (Savulescu, Sandberg & Kahane 2011: 9).  In other words, we can never be 
absolutely sure that they will indeed improve the life of the person so enhanced, for reasons 
discussed in Chapter 2.  Genetic characteristics are only one contributing aspect towards an 
eventual phenotype.  Environment, including upbringing, contingent events, and the personal 
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effort of the enhanced individual, will all have an impact on how well our lives ultimately 
turn out.  Genetic alteration will always only be predictive, rather than determinative.  It can 
only increase our chances of having a good life, and cannot ensure this result with certainty.  
For this reason, the moral obligation attached to the provision of universal welfarist 
enhancements is nonsensical without an equivalent moral obligation to provide environmental 
interventions which will have a parallel effect. 
 
While I have speculated earlier in this chapter as to what kind of enhancements might 
promote welfare in a universal way, more research is required on this topic.  We will need to 
determine, via empirical and scientific studies, what the effects of particular capability levels 
are upon our general tendency to flourish.  We will also need to know a great deal more about 
the effects of genetic enhancement, both in order to determine whether some capabilities are 
most beneficial at some optimal level, and to exclude the possibility of an unexpected 
negative impact upon our overall level of functioning.  We are currently a long way from 
being able to say with certainty that a particular enhancement of function will have a 
particular effect upon welfare.  We are therefore a long way from a situation where the prima 
facie duty to enhance comes into effect.  However, I have tried to provide, in this dissertation, 
a rough idea as to our obligations with regard to the provision of enhancement, so that we are 
ethically equipped to make moral judgements about these issues as our scientific knowledge 
advances.  These judgements ought to take into account that “[a]ll techniques can be abused 
and there is no knowledge or information that is not susceptible to manipulation for an evil 
purpose” and that we therefore need to be “vigilant” as to the likely effects upon welfare of 
particular enhancements to “prevent such abuse” (Harris 1992: 235).  However, we also need 
to recognise that some enhancements may result in significant increases in the possibilities for 
welfare for human beings, and take seriously the harmful consequences of rejecting these. 
 
Even in cases where enhancement will have a significant, and universal, positive impact upon 
welfare, we will still need to determine how we should balance the resulting prima facie 
obligation to make use of these sorts of interventions against other morally significant 
considerations.  I will therefore make some remarks about this question in the next section. 
  
How do we balance the prima facie obligation to enhance against other considerations?  
 
I have argued throughout this dissertation that the obligation to enhance should be thought of 
as a prima facie duty.  A prima facie duty to act implies that “there is a moral reason to do 
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[so]”, but that the obligation which therefore arises can be overridden by “other, weightier 
obligations, [whether] individual or in concert” (Brink 1994: 216).  Such an obligation, in 
other words, does not necessarily “override all other sorts of moral considerations” (Simmons 
1979: 7).  In order to determine whether we are indeed required to act in a particular case, we 
need to consider the context in which the prima facie obligation arises.  This context includes 
our entire spectrum of moral obligations, which we must “study...as fully [as possible]” in 
order to form a “considered opinion...that in the circumstances one [obligation] is more 
incumbent on [us] than any other” (Ross 1930: 19).  The obligation which is most incumbent 
upon us in a particular set of circumstances becomes an “all-things-considered moral 
obligation”.  An all things-considered moral obligation to do x entails that “on balance, or in 
view of all morally relevant factors, x is what one ought to do [because it is] supported by the 
strongest moral reasons” (Brink 1994: 216).   
  
In other words, prima facie obligations are always “more or less incumbent on [us] according 
to the circumstances of the case” (Ross 1930: 19).  What does this imply for the prima facie 
obligation to enhance?  In this section, I will try to provide some idea as to how we might 
balance the duty to enhance against other important moral obligations.  My aim in this regard 
is principally to determine whether the moral obligation to enhance is of such a nature, taking 
into account the strength of our other moral obligations, that implies that it would usually (or 
always) be nullified by competing morally significant considerations.  In other words, is the 
prima facie duty to enhance ever a duty proper?   
 
It is clearly not possible to embark upon an exhaustive study of every possible context in 
which the obligation to enhance will arise.  However, I would like to consider this question in 
a more general way by identifying two sets of competing moral obligations which are related 
to the obligation to enhance in such a way that they will tend to arise in the same context.  
 
Firstly, I will consider the duty to enhance in the context of other moral obligations that are 
similarly motivated, and specifically, in the context of the duty to provide medical treatment 
and environmentally enhancing interventions.  My question here will be whether, in the 
context of resource constraints, and under circumstances where we are not even able to fulfil 
the latter obligations in more than a minimal way, we would ever be justified in thinking of 
genetic enhancement as an all-things-considered moral obligation.   
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Secondly, I will reconsider the possible negative consequences of genetic enhancement 
identified by critics which I discussed in Chapter 3.  The question here is whether the duty to 
avoid these negative consequences would always tend to nullify the obligation to enhance.  
 
Rating our moral obligations to promote welfare 
 
The requirement that we ought to consider our entire spectrum of prima facie moral 
obligations in order to determine which is (most) incumbent upon us at any given point is 
demanding, and it is impossible to determine with certainty, and in a theoretical way, which 
of these obligations is most important when we are considering this question out of context.  
However, in this section, I will consider how we might rate our moral obligation to enhance 
against other obligations which are similarly motivated.  As I have argued, the provision of 
medical treatment, environmental enhancements, and some genetic enhancements, are all 
morally desirable because they increase the chances of moral agents leading a good life in a 
way that is universal for all human beings, and thereby promote well-being.  However, 
because medical treatments, and, to a variable extent, environmental enhancements, are 
directed towards providing the basic conditions for leading a good life (where these are 
lacking or absent), whereas enhancement is directed towards improving those conditions 
beyond this basic point, it might seem that the latter sorts of interventions will always have 
more moral importance than the former.  In other words, where our ability to act to promote 
the welfare interests of persons is limited due to resource constraints, it seems that it will 
always be most important to promote the welfare interests of moral agents where these 
interests are in a very bad state, and this might imply that our prima facie obligation to 
enhance will always be outweighed, and will therefore never be a duty proper, in this context.  
This is what seemed to be suggested by the contention, mentioned in the previous chapter, 
that the moral significance of the treatment-enhancement distinction is supported by the 
demands of “efficiency” (Buchanan et al. 2000: 132). 
 
This also might seem to follow from the argument which I advanced in the previous chapter.  
I have suggested that there is a moral imperative to promote the general possibilities for 
welfare and to expand opportunity.  I have also subscribed to the view that we ought to “judge 
the relative well-being of individuals or groups in order to assess the urgency or importance 
of claims they make on us” (Daniels 1985: 36).  In the context of conflicting obligations, this 
implies that it will always be of greater moral importance to counter or to correct for 
extremely limited possibilities for well-being which result from extremely negative 
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divergences from the (statistical) norm, either in terms of severely limited overall 
functionality which results from disease or disability, or in terms of extreme socio-economic 
disadvantage, than to improve upon possibilities for well-being that are not limited to this 
extent.  If we regard a greater range of opportunities to be morally desirable, it follows that 
some opportunity is better than none, and our primary obligation would then be to promote 
well-being in the latter case. 
 
This is problematic for my argument because it might seem that the primacy of the obligation 
to correct for severely limited opportunity effectively reinstates the moral distinction, which I 
criticised in the previous chapter, between interventions directed towards the achievement of 
normal functioning and interventions which reach beyond this goal.  Because we live in a 
world where a great many individuals have extremely limited opportunity for well-being in 
comparison to others, and because our resources are limited, it might seem that the moral 
obligation to enhance will always be outweighed by the moral obligation to correct for 
extremely limited possibilities for well-being, and this seems to deprive the duty to enhance 
of any concrete significance.  In other words, the contention of the normal function model that 
the line between treatment and enhancement marks the limits of our moral obligations would 
seem to be valid in a practical sense.  Can my argument withstand these objections?      
 
Normative normality revisited? 
 
There are three factors which could work against the objection described above. 
 
Firstly, as I have argued in the previous chapter, it might be the case that some kinds of 
natural variation will greatly limit opportunity in a way which will be equal to or which will 
exceed the limitation imposed by some kinds of disease or disability (or socio-economic 
hardship), even when such limitation is significant.  In other words, there will be 
circumstances under which the moral obligation to enhance will outweigh the moral 
obligation to treat. 
 
Secondly, even when the obligation to enhance does not outweigh the obligation to treat, it 
will not necessarily be the case that we will always have to choose between these two duties.  
The prima facie moral obligation to enhance is only negated by the more important moral 
obligation to correct for severely limited opportunity when we have to make a choice (due to 
resource constraints) between these two sorts of interventions.  We currently do not know 
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what resources will be required to provide genetic enhancement.  If such enhancement is 
relatively easily available, the moral obligation to provide enhancement would still hold. 
 
Thirdly, the provision of enhancement might also have an indirect tendency to counteract the 
effect of severely limited opportunity.  Cognitive enhancements, for example, could speed up 
the rate of research into, and development of, therapeutic technologies.  In a more general 
sense, enhancements would be likely to maximise productivity and contribute towards 
economic development, and this could have very positive consequences for society in general 
(Bostrom & Roache 2011: 141), which could include the lessening of severely limited 
opportunity.   Buchanan makes this point as follows:  
 
[I]n economically developed societies there is less serious mental illness, less disease, less 
premature death, less disability, and less violence and discrimination against women, and 
more opportunity for people to develop their talents and pursue their own conception of the 
good life (2011: 45).  
 
In other words, enhancement could be very generally beneficial with regard to countering 
severely limited opportunity.  We should therefore be wary of claiming that the prima facie 
duty to enhance will always be outweighed by more important moral considerations.  Taking 
into account the entire spectrum of our obligations also requires us to take into account the 
consequences of failing to enhance, and these, in the long run, could have a negative impact 
upon our ability to correct for severely limited opportunity.    
 
Julian Savulescu claims that one of the conditions which a particular enhancement must fulfil 
in order for such an intervention to be ethically permissible is that it should “not harm others 
directly through [the] excessive costs of making it freely available” (2005: 39).  We could 
adapt this condition, with regard to obligatory enhancements, in order to stipulate that the 
prima facie morally obligatory provision of enhancement only becomes a duty proper when 
such provision does not harm others by depriving them of other interventions which they have 
a more significant claim to.  However, as I have noted in this section, this does not imply that 
our in-context moral deliberations will never result in an all-things-considered obligation to 
enhance.    
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We must now turn to a second set of considerations which may negate the prima facie 
obligation to enhance.  These have to do with the possible negative consequences which may 
result from the widespread use of enhancement technologies. 
    
When do negative consequences preclude enhancement? 
 
In Chapter 3, I discussed various concerns raised by critics as to the negative consequences 
which might result from the widespread use of enhancements, whereas in the previous 
chapter, I tried to make a case for the innate moral desirability of enhancements which 
promote welfare interests.  I must now balance this moral desirability, which primarily 
considers the effect of enhancement upon the individual, against its possible negative 
consequences, which would accrue to society as a whole.  As Buchanan argues, “it is 
appropriate to look both at the considerations in favour of enhancement and those against it 
and to strive for a judgement that reflects a proper appreciation of both” (2011: 59).  This 
section will therefore make a preliminary attempt to determine whether the possible negative 
social consequences of enhancement identified by critics, and our obligation to avoid these, 
might negate its innate desirability.   
 
I have previously identified three main concerns raised by critics as to the possible negative 
social consequences of enhancement.  These were concerns about the exacerbation of 
inequality, concerns about the perpetuation of discrimination, and concerns about the effects 
of the widespread use of enhancement, where this is motivated by social pressure.  I think 
that, provided the motivations which I have posited for the moral obligation to enhance are 
kept in mind, these concerns can, at least to some extent, be countered.  I will deal with each 
of these concerns in turn. 
 
The exacerbation of inequality 
 
As described in Chapter 3, many are concerned that enhancements, particularly where these 
are purchased on the free market by those already economically advantaged, will exacerbate 
inequalities, both within and between societies.  This is because many enhancements, even 
when motivated by the imperative to promote well-being, would also confer competitive 
advantages, and the corresponding disadvantages that would result for those who remained 
unenhanced would be unfair. 
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This is indeed a legitimate concern.  As argued in the previous chapter, moral agents have a 
fundamental interest in not being unfairly disadvantaged in comparison to others, in terms of 
the opportunities that are available to them.  Because enhancements (and particularly 
universal welfarist enhancements) do tend to expand opportunity, it would seem that 
enhancement, when unequally distributed, would result in precisely this sort of disadvantage.   
 
However, the motivation which I have provided for the moral obligation to enhance implies 
that this moral obligation does not only apply to the provision of enhancement to some moral 
agents.  Rather, it derives from a general imperative to promote human well-being.  Where 
enhancement is sought for competitive advantage, and where its unequal distribution results 
in extreme disadvantage for the unenhanced, this would have a negative impact upon the 
well-being of these latter moral agents, and this might indeed provide us a with a reason to 
place some restrictions on the availability of enhancements, when it is impossible for many 
persons in society to acquire them.  My recognition and affirmation of the importance of the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity also suggests that this might be the case. 
 
The problem here appears to be, however, as noted in Chapter 3, not with enhancement itself, 
but with its distribution.  If we can agree upon some method of distributing enhancements 
which is not unfair, this would not negate the obligation to enhance.  This raises the 
possibility that the state, or some central body, may have to take responsibility for making 
enhancement available (Agar 2004: 138) in order to “constrain inequalities in the distribution 
of enhancements” (Buchanan 2011: 51), and that such distribution could perhaps be modelled 
on the provision which is made for primary healthcare, and for environmental enhancements 
such as education
101
.  We should therefore not assume, as some critics do (Frankel 2007: 31, 
Miller & Brody 2005: 16), that access to enhancements will necessarily be determined by a 
consumer‟s access to resources.  Again, in the context of limited resources, the state‟s 
obligations in this regard would have to be balanced and rated in terms of their moral 
importance, as described in the previous section.         
 
This suggestion does not provide a solution to the problem of global inequalities, however.  If 
some wealthier states are able to provide enhancement interventions for their citizens, while 
other states in the developing world cannot, this would certainly exacerbate inequalities 
between countries along the lines of current patterns of advantage and disadvantage. 
 
                                                 
101
 I will return to this suggestion in the next section. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 177 
 
These are complicated questions, which I cannot fully deal with here.  The problems which 
they raise are not new, but are already evident with regard to unequal global access to a 
variety of resources.  We should note again, however, that enhancements ought to be sought 
not to provide competitive advantage, but to promote general well-being.  The imperative to 
promote well-being does not only apply to others in one‟s particular society, but is universal.  
More advantaged societies may have a general obligation to assist those who are less 
advantaged in making enhancement available, particularly if these enhancements have a 
strong tendency to promote well-being.  This obligation, however, would not only apply with 
regard to enhancement, but also with regard to other interventions which are similarly 
beneficial.  These are questions which I cannot consider here, but which deserve further 
attention within the context of a discussion of global distributive justice. 
 
The perpetuation of discrimination
102
 
 
The next potential negative consequence of enhancement which critics identify is the 
possibility that enhancement will be used in a way which will be influenced by discriminatory 
attitudes already prevalent in society.  This raises an interesting conundrum for the argument 
which I have advanced thus far, as in a society where prejudice is widespread, the absence of 
some characteristics which are the target of such prejudice may function to promote welfare 
interests by increasing the chances of an individual leading a good life (by decreasing the 
chances that they will be affected by discrimination), and this might seem to suggest that we 
are obligated to alter such characteristics via genetic manipulation.  This might seem to be the 
case despite the fact that the presence or absence of characteristics which are often the target 
of prejudice would have no effect on overall functional competence. 
 
Again, these are difficult problems to deal with.  However, I tend to feel, with Agar, that there 
is something deeply morally troubling about making use of genetic interventions to promote 
welfare by eliminating diverse characteristics that are the target of discrimination (2004: 156).  
I would tentatively suggest that it is possible to make the argument that the general value of 
such diversity in society would militate against this kind of use of enhancement technologies.  
In addition, as Agar states, it is hard “to imagine a successful fight against prejudice in the 
                                                 
102
 In Chapter 3, I also discussed the concern that enhancement may result in new forms of discrimination 
between the enhanced and the unenhanced.  In the context of the argument I have made above, which suggests 
that concerns about equality would imply that some form of universal access to enhancement technologies ought 
to be promoted, and if this is not possible that accessibility to enhancement ought to be limited, these concerns 
are, at least partially, negated. 
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very society in which there is a widely exercised freedom on the part of parents to remove 
from their children the characteristics that would make them objects of prejudice” (2004: 
157).  I therefore think that a case could be made for the prohibition of enhancements which 
are very obviously motivated by discrimination, although again, I cannot pursue this argument 
further here. 
 
Social pressure to enhance 
 
Some critics have raised the concern that, because enhancement may confer competitive 
advantage, individuals will be pressured to enhance, and that this will result in enhancements 
becoming self-defeating, or will bring about increased homogenization.  In terms of the moral 
motivations for enhancement which I have recognised in the previous chapter, this seems to 
be the easiest objection to deal with of the three concerns discussed here. 
 
I have argued that enhancement ought not to be motivated by the desire for competitive 
advantage.  Rather, it should be sought because it promotes the welfare of the individual so 
enhanced in and of itself, by expanding their opportunities for the promotion of their welfare 
interests, and by increasing their chances of leading a good life.  Competitive advantage may 
indeed be a by-product of this kind of enhancement, but this kind of possible advantage (and 
the converse, resulting disadvantage) provides us with a good reason to try to bring about a 
fair distribution of such enhancements, as I have argued above.  By this standard, the 
possibility that enhancement might be self-defeating (because when the goods of 
enhancement are widely distributed, this will negate the competitive advantage conferred) is 
an effect to be hoped for, rather than to be avoided, as this would indicate that the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity would be satisfied. 
 
What, though, about the possibility of homogenization which could result from a wide 
distribution of enhancement?  Again, by the standards of the argument which I have advanced 
here, this is unlikely to be a problem.  Morally obligatory enhancements, which, I have 
suggested, ought to be widely distributed, are those that promote welfare interests by 
augmenting local functionality of general-purpose capabilities.  These capabilities are 
specifically targeted as desirable because they are useful no matter what one‟s conception of 
the good is or what one‟s ulterior interests are.  The differences between us in terms of our 
conceptions of the good and our various ulterior interests will therefore not be eliminated by 
universal welfarist enhancements, which will instead tend to promote autonomy by widening 
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the range of life plans available to moral agents.  Individuals will continue to choose between 
life plans, where this choice is based upon their individual values and characteristics, in the 
same way that they always have done.  While they will be permitted to choose conditional 
welfarist enhancements for themselves, this choice will accord with their differing ulterior 
interests, and will be unlikely to result in homogenization
103
.   
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Based on the foregoing discussion, it seems as though the possibility of negative 
consequences does not necessarily limit or negate our obligation to enhance, but may indeed 
indicate that we should control the way in which the goods of enhancement are distributed in 
order to promote fair equality of opportunity and to ensure that enhancement does not 
perpetuate discrimination.  In other words, concerns about the possible negative consequences 
of enhancement “provide valuable guidance for how we should pursue the enhancement 
enterprise, but not good reasons for refraining from it” (Buchanan 2011: 36). 
 
Savulescu, in this regard, provides a list of conditions which particular enhancements ought to 
meet in order to avoid possible negative social consequences.  He stipulates, among other 
conditions, that enhancements should not “confer an unfair advantage” or “reinforce or 
increase unjust inequality and discrimination” (Savulescu 2005: 39).  Introducing policies 
which would control and facilitate the distribution of enhancement, and which would promote 
equality by making universal welfarist enhancements widely available, would seem to fulfil 
these stipulations.  As noted above, this implies that the state would need to take some 
responsibility for such a distribution
104
.   
 
This brings me to the final question which I must consider in this chapter.  In the previous 
chapter, I discussed the obligation to enhance in a very general sense.  However, when 
considering how this obligation may be fulfilled in practice, we need to determine which 
parties will be responsible for providing enhancement in particular cases.  I have already 
suggested that the state should have some involvement here.  I now need to outline this 
                                                 
103
 Of course, the societal context in which we find ourselves will necessarily have some impact upon our 
ulterior interests, but this is the case already, and within society, a great deal of variation will still exist as to 
conceptions of the good.  The availability of enhancement will be unlikely to alter this. 
104
 Again, the obligation to enhance would have to be balanced against other moral considerations, as discussed 
in the previous section. 
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involvement in greater details, and to make suggestions as to who else might be required to 
provide enhancement.  
 
Who is obliged to provide enhancement? 
 
In this chapter, I have detailed what kinds of interventions the category of morally obligatory 
enhancements ought to include.  I have also provided some rough idea as to how we might 
rate our moral obligation to enhance against other considerations.  The last question to 
consider asks how we might practically conceive of the obligation to enhance.  Who is 
responsible for providing, to particular individuals, the kind of universal welfarist 
enhancements that I have deemed to be morally obligatory?  If each individual is equally 
responsible for providing enhancement to all other moral agents, this seems to weaken the 
obligation to enhance to such an extent that it becomes meaningless, both in terms of resource 
constraints, and in terms of practical impossibility.   
 
However, we don‟t usually think of our moral obligations in this kind of general way.  While 
we might regard the promotion of welfare to be generally morally desirable, we regard an 
obligation to be “owed by a specific person...to a specific person or persons” (Simmons 1979: 
14).  This conviction is related to the idea that we can only accuse parties of failing to perform 
some morally required duty when they had the “known ability and opportunity” to do so 
(Feinberg 1984: 162).  Non-actions, in other words, can only become omissions when one 
was able to perform a particular action and refrained from doing so.  In addition, we also 
think that there are some kinds of special relationships between people and groups that 
deserve special consideration.  In other words, we think that “[d]ifferent people...have 
different [kinds of] claims on us” (Glover 2006: 44), and for this reason, we might have 
special (and stronger) obligations to promote the welfare of particular persons.   
 
I would like to suggest that such special obligations arise in the context of the relationships 
between parents
105
 and children, and between the state and its citizens, and that these 
obligations may provide a practical structure in terms of which we can understand and act 
upon the obligation to enhance.  I will model this argument upon the way in which we 
commonly conceive of the obligations to provide healthcare and education.  As I have argued, 
these practices are motivated by moral imperatives which are similar to those which weigh in 
favour of enhancement.   
                                                 
105
 I will use “parents” in an inclusive way to refer to primary caregivers in general. 
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The obligation to provide interventions such as healthcare and education, in liberal 
democracies, is widely regarded to accrue partially to parents (or caregivers) of children, and 
partially to the state.  This conviction is based partly upon the fact that it is these parties who 
are in a position to be able to provide these kinds of interventions to particular individuals, 
and partly upon the framing assumptions that parents have special obligations to promote the 
welfare of their children, and that the state has a special obligation to promote the welfare of 
its citizens.   While I am not in a position to subject these assumptions to a thorough analysis 
here, they do seem to be relatively widely acknowledged (Feinberg 1984: 140, Hardimon 
1994, Jeske 1998, Nortverdt, Hem & Skirbekk 2011).  I will give a general description of how 
the obligations to provide healthcare and education accrue to these two parties, before going 
on to argue that extending these obligations to include the provision of enhancement is 
required as a matter of consistency (Fox 2007: 14).   
 
The obligatory provision of healthcare and education (at least to some basic level) is usually 
governed by a system in which parents are expected to provide, or to facilitate access to, such 
interventions for their children.  When they fail to do so, the state is required to intervene to 
prevent harm, and when they are unable to do so, the state is required to provide some level of 
universal access.   
 
Parents are expected to provide or to facilitate access to these interventions because, as they 
have primary physical custody of their children, they are in a position to practically do so.  
Parents have a special responsibility for how their children‟s lives go “insofar as they have the 
power to leave things as they are or make them different” (Harris 2007: 142, my italics).  
While parents are given a great deal of leeway in deciding how to raise their children, we 
usually regard them to be morally required to provide certain interventions, where the absence 
of these interventions will (severely) limit their children‟s possibilities as adults.  Where they 
fail to provide such interventions, children can therefore accuse their parents of “wrongly 
depriv[ing them] of the higher ability level [they] would have had on [their] arrival at the 
threshold of adulthood” (Steiner 1998: 140-141); in other words, of harming them, by putting 
their welfare interests in a worse position than they could otherwise have been in.  Both the 
failure to provide (certain kinds of) healthcare and the failure to provide education result in 
these kinds of harm by omission. 
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Usually, state intervention (in the form of coercion) to force parents to fulfil their moral 
responsibilities in this regard is unnecessary because most “parents...want above all what will 
be best for their children” (Glover 2006: 50), and will therefore naturally seek out 
interventions which will promote their welfare.  However, there are cases where this kind of 
intervention is required.  In addition, there may be cases in which parents require help from 
the state to ensure that the things they ought to provide for their children are accessible.  
Parents cannot be accused of harming their children by omitting to provide welfare-promoting 
interventions when they are unable to do so because these interventions are inaccessible.   
 
The state is therefore expected to play a role in the provision of healthcare and education, 
either through legal coercion, in the cases where parents fail to fulfil at least their basic 
obligations, or through making such interventions widely available.  This expectation is based 
upon the conviction that the state has some form of duty towards its citizens which implies 
that it ought to promote their welfare, or at least ought to intervene in order to “prevent harm” 
to them (Mill 1956: 52).  Because the non-provision of healthcare and education is harmful to 
moral agents in a fundamental way, the state is required to intervene to prevent this kind of 
harm. 
 
Partially, the state‟s duty to prevent harm in this regard is attributable to the obligation to 
prevent “large inequalities” with regard to the “distribution of social opportunities” (Føllesdal 
1997: 145).  Moral agents, as I have discussed extensively in the previous chapter, have a 
strong interest in avoiding being severely disadvantaged by their opportunity ranges in 
comparison to others.  However, this cannot be the only kind of harm which the state ought to 
intervene to prevent, because inequality could be avoided equally well by “depriving everyone 
of an education” (Buchanan 2011: 51), or of other sorts of interventions which promote 
opportunity.  Rather, the state also has “a legitimate interest in fostering economic prosperity 
and increasing welfare” (Buchanan 2011: 50), and this interest suggests that the provision of 
welfare-increasing interventions is required independently of the tendency of these sorts of 
interventions to promote equality.     
 
If we regard the obligation to provide opportunity-expanding interventions such as healthcare 
and education to accrue partially to parents and partially to the state, it seems that we might 
regard these parties as being similarly obligated to provide enhancement, in a context where 
such enhancement is possible, and where its provision would not come into conflict with 
more important moral obligations.  This obligation derives from the argument which I 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 183 
 
advanced in the previous chapter, which suggests that the motivation for enhancement is 
continuous with the motivations for medical therapy and for environmental enhancements 
such as education, and that the failure to provide enhancing interventions could be harmful to 
moral agents.     
 
Parents would therefore be obliged to seek out universal welfarist enhancements for their 
children
106
.  This obligation would arise due to their practical opportunity to facilitate access 
to enhancement for their children, as well as their special obligation to promote their welfare.  
The state‟s duties in this regard would be twofold - to prevent harm to its citizens, and to 
ensure distributive justice with regard to enhancements (Savulescu, Sandberg & Kahane 
2011: 15-16).  On the one hand, this would require them to intervene to ensure that parents 
fulfil their obligations to enhance, so that children are not harmed by the non-provision of 
enhancement.  The extent to which coercion would be justifiable here is arguable, particularly 
as I have suggested that the obligation to enhance is (usually) weaker than the obligation to 
provide medical care, for example.  However, “coercion” needn‟t be construed in an active 
sense, but could take the form of encouragement, via the provision of “subsidies, tax credits, 
or other incentives” to those who enhance (Buchanan 2011: 50).  On the other hand, the state 
should also ensure that parents are (universally) able to access enhancement interventions for 
their children.  This is required not only as a result of the state‟s duty to prevent the harmful 
non-provision of enhancement, but also in order to minimise unjust equality (Buchanan 2011: 
51).  Making enhancement universally accessible in this way may also be motivated by the 
positive impact which enhancement could have for societal productivity, so that it might not 
only be morally required, but also “economically efficient to subsidize enhancements for the 
poor” (Bostrom & Roache 2011: 142-143).  However, as I noted in a previous section of this 
chapter, where the universal provision of enhancement is not possible due to resource 
constraints, taking into account the balancing of obligations discussed earlier, this might 
provide some justification for limiting, to some extent, the availability of enhancements, if 
widely unequal access will greatly contribute towards unjust inequality. 
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 It is not clear at this point whether genetic enhancements will be optimally applied at an embryonic or foetal 
level, or whether persons could make use of these interventions later in life.  However, with regard to universal 
welfarist enhancements, one could argue that these ought to be made use of as early as possible in life, in order 
to maximise their beneficial effects upon welfare. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to place the prima facie obligation to enhance in a practical 
context.  I have done so by considering three questions.   
 
Firstly, in order to determine in greater detail what sorts of interventions ought to be prima 
facie morally obligatory, I have introduced distinctions between morally impermissible, 
morally permissible but not obligatory, and morally obligatory enhancements.  The latter 
category includes those enhancements that I have referred to as universal welfarist 
enhancements.  While I have made some speculative suggestions as to what kinds of general-
purpose capabilities might tend to promote welfare in a universal way, further research is 
required here. 
 
Secondly, I have attempted to provide some idea as to how we might balance the prima facie 
obligation to enhance against other important considerations.  My focus in this regard was to 
determine whether this prima facie obligation would ever be a duty proper in context.  I 
concluded that this could indeed be the case, although the imperative to balance this 
obligation against other morally important considerations may require us to place some limits 
upon the availability of genetic enhancements, where this could result in unfair inequality or 
perpetuate discrimination, or to make allowance for some sort of universal access to universal 
welfarist enhancements to be provided by the state. 
 
Thirdly, I expanded on possible state involvement in the provision of genetic enhancements in 
my attempt to answer the question as to who would be responsible, in a practical context, for 
providing enhancements.  I argued that we should model the obligation to enhance upon the 
obligation to provide medical treatment and education.  This would require parents to 
facilitate access to enhancement for their children, with the state intervening where necessary 
to encourage the use of enhancement, and to ensure that enhancement interventions are (at 
least to some basic level) universally accessible.  
 
I will now move on to the final chapter of this dissertation, in which I will summarise my 
recommendations and conclusions, and suggest areas for further research. 
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6  Conclusion 
 
The aim of this dissertation has been to determine the moral status of the use of genetic 
enhancement technologies directed towards the improvement of the human genotype.  What I 
have tried to argue is that the possible development of such technologies should not be 
perceived as an ethical watershed.  The unease which many feel about genetic enhancement 
arises as a result of a fundamental misunderstanding of its nature, in that it is regarded as 
having revolutionary potential to transform and transcend a given standard of normal 
functioning.  However, I have tried to show that this is an illusion.  Rather, genetic 
enhancement is simply the latest in a long line of interventions, both biotechnological and 
environmental, which have sought to improve upon the species-typical human functioning 
provided by evolution. 
 
I have suggested that what we think of as normal functioning cannot function as a normative 
goal which determines our moral obligations.  Rather, the extent to which we value normal 
functioning, and the moral desirability that we attach to interventions which are directed 
toward achieving it, is based upon an indirect recognition that the achievement of this kind of 
functioning, in comparison with negative divergences from it, tends to promote human 
welfare.  In other words, it is good for human persons to achieve normal levels of functioning 
because this increases their chances of leading a good life in general.   
 
Normality is therefore not an ideal, naturally given standard of human functioning in 
accordance with species-typical design, the value of which suggests that we should pursue 
interventions which seek to correct deviations from this ideal.  Rather, these interventions 
have partially constructed the ideal.  This construction is undertaken by rejecting aspects of 
species-typical functioning which diminish the possibilities for human welfare (such as 
vulnerability to disease and disability) and attempting to develop and improve upon aspects of 
human functioning which promote the possibilities of human welfare (such as cognitive 
functioning and capacities for social interaction and organisation).  It is the value that we 
attach to human welfare that implies that we ought to seek to achieve normal functioning, 
rather than the fact that normal functioning is simply what is good for us.  Without reference 
to the moral desirability that we attach to the promotion of the possibilities for human welfare, 
the notion of normality can tell us nothing about why we ought to pursue it. 
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However, the moral desirability attached to the expansion of the possibilities for human well-
being equally suggests that enhancement interventions which are directed towards the 
promotion of our welfare interests, and thus the improvement of our possibilities for leading a 
good life in general, are morally desirable in precisely the same way as interventions which 
are directed towards the achievement of normal functioning.  The fact that genetic 
enhancement might go beyond what we currently conceive of as normality is irrelevant to this 
morally desirable status.  To deny this is to construct an unreasonable dichotomy between the 
manner in which therapeutic and environmental interventions, on the one hand, and 
enhancement interventions, on the other, improve upon species-typical functioning.  Indeed, 
all three of these sorts of interventions are in fact directed towards the improvement of the 
functioning that is typical of members of the species Homo sapiens in their natural state, in 
order to improve upon the possibilities for human welfare, and as such, all three bring about 
enhancement.  We should therefore not understand enhancement as a radical departure from 
what has gone before, but within “the historical context of human development” (Buchanan 
2011: 44).  
 
This implies that we need to rethink our ethical conception of harmful non-benefits.  As I 
have argued, we tend to think of non-benefit as harmful when such non-benefit amounts to the 
failure to promote our welfare interests.  This is why we think of the non-provision of medical 
treatment and some environmental enhancements, such as education, as harmful to the extent 
that state intervention is merited to rectify this.  We recognise that such non-provision, and 
the resultant failure to promote the welfare interests of moral agents, where such promotion is 
possible, harms persons by putting them in a worse position than they could have been in with 
regard to their chances for leading a good life.   
 
The new technological possibilities offered by the prospect of genetic enhancement imply that 
we might soon have a better alternative, in terms of our chances of leading a good life, to the 
level of functioning that we have thus far been able to achieve.  The existence of this 
alternative level of functioning constructs a new possible opposition between two states of 
affairs, one of which is better and one of which is worse for moral agents, with regard to the 
position of their welfare interests.  Because, as I have argued, we tend to think of non-benefit 
as harmful when such non-benefit amounts to the failure to promote our welfare interests, the 
failure to make use of universal welfarist enhancements would harm moral agents by putting 
them, by this omission, into a worse position than they could have been in, with reference to 
their chances for leading a good life.  Therefore, we should not think of the provision of such 
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enhancement interventions as an optional non-benefit, which is how we think of the failure to 
promote the ulterior interests of others.  Because some forms of genetic enhancement could 
have the potential to promote our welfare interests, the non-provision of these enhancements 
would be harmful to the extent that intervention to bring about this provision would be 
justified.  This means that we should not only regard harm as deriving from the non-provision 
of interventions which bring about normal functioning.  The non-provision of any 
intervention which would promote welfare interests harms the affected moral agent by 
inhibiting their functioning, and therefore the associated possibilities for leading a good life, 
in comparison to the alternative.  All the development of genetic enhancement does, under 
this view, is to introduce a new alternative for the possibilities of human welfare in terms of 
which we must evaluate the harmfulness of our omissions.  
 
None of this suggests that we should not also take seriously the possibility that enhancement 
technologies could be put to uses which might detract from the possibilities of human welfare.  
Where enhancement interventions have this effect, they may have the potential, not to benefit, 
but to harm moral agents, and, as I have suggested in the previous chapter, such interventions 
should indeed be prohibited.   
 
We also cannot consider the prima facie moral obligation to make use of universal welfarist 
enhancements in a vacuum.  When we determine whether this prima facie obligation is a duty 
proper in a practical context, we must necessarily take into account competing moral 
obligations.  As I have argued in the previous chapter, this not only requires us to rate the 
urgency of the moral demands made upon us with regard to a standard which considers the 
relative impact upon well-being of respective proposed interventions, but also to take into 
account the critique which has been levelled against enhancement by critics, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, particularly where this critique considers the possible negative social consequences 
of the widespread use of enhancement technologies.  These possible consequences will 
require us to develop safeguards and policies, a rough outline of which I have provided in the 
previous chapter.  These will need to be further refined and developed as the technology of 
genetic enhancement develops.   
 
These cautionary remarks emphasise that, faced with the complexities of enhancement, it is 
our duty to “understand the phenomenon in all its complexity, to resist the tendency toward 
sweeping condemnation or praise, and, above all, to start thinking hard about practical 
responses that are ethically sensitive, true to the complexity of the phenomena, and realistic” 
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(Buchanan 2011: 12).  This equally implies that while we should not ignore the possible 
negative consequences of enhancement, nor should we ignore the great potential for the 
improvement of human welfare which genetic enhancement holds, both for individuals and 
for society as a whole (Bostrom & Roache 2011: 141), and we should bear this in mind as we 
continue researching these technologies. 
 
Such research into the development of genetic enhancement technologies must overcome the 
myriad obstacles posed to it by the nature of genetic functioning, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
These obstacles suggest that it will be some time before the enhancement of human beings is 
a practical possibility.  However, the nature of genetic functioning, properly considered, also 
reminds us that the possibility of the successful development of genetic enhancement does not 
absolve of us our moral duties to promote the welfare of other moral agents in other ways.  
Genes undoubtedly play a role in determining who we become, and what our eventual 
chances of leading a good life are, but this role is inseparable from the mutual role played by 
exposure to particular environments and environmental interventions. 
 
Scientific research into genetic enhancement technologies must also be accompanied by 
further research into its ethical implications.  This should include studies of, and wide 
consultation with regard to, the impact upon the possibilities for welfare of particular 
characteristics.  This is not only necessary in order to provide a more detailed conception of 
the category of universal welfarist enhancements, but also in order to determine research 
priorities with regard to the moral importance of the enhancement of various capacities.   
 
Ultimately, a rejection of the possible development of technologies for genetic enhancement 
could very well harm human beings by putting their welfare interests in a worse condition 
than they could have been in, by reducing their possibilities, in comparison to the alternative, 
for leading good lives.  In this regard, we should bear in mind the possible harm that would 
have resulted for a multitude of individuals as a result of a refusal to consider the 
development or use of medical therapies or environmentally enhancing interventions.  Where 
better possibilities for welfare are available, it is harmful for human beings to be subject to the 
sub-optimal functioning given by natural evolution, and this is no less the case for genetic 
enhancement than for medicine, education, and other wide-ranging environmental 
interventions such as the development of agriculture, transport and sophisticated means of 
communication. 
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I have tried to show in this dissertation that, far from being a transformative, disruptive 
technology, which is likely to alter the world as we know it, the moral motivation for genetic 
enhancement is in fact continuous with the moral motivations for the provision of 
interventions which have shaped who we are as a species and which have been foundational 
to the development of civilisation.  These interventions have partially determined our 
conception of normal, morally desirable modes of human functioning, and have thus shaped 
what we think of as our obligations in terms of the manipulation of human functioning.  We 
now think of the non-provision of these interventions as harmful.  However, we should keep 
in mind the moral standards in terms of which we make such judgements, as these suggest 
that a failure to enhance our possibilities for leading good lives by genetic means could 
perpetrate similar harms. 
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